The obstruction of search and rescue vessels causes hundreds of deaths at sea

0

The obstruction of search and rescue vessels causes hundreds of deaths at sea

32 organisations demand the immediate ending of the systematic obstruction of non-governmental search and rescue (SAR) efforts by the Italian state. In the past month alone, NGO vessels have been detained three times due to legal restrictions based on allegations under the “Piantedosi decree” – one of them, the monitoring vessel Nadir operated by RESQSHIP, got detained twice in a row. Deliberately keeping non-governmental search and rescue organisations away from the Central Mediterranean causes countless more deaths at sea on one of the deadliest flight routes worldwide.

Despite numerous alerts raised by SAR organisations, NGO vessels continue to be arbitrarily detained since the adoption of the “Piantedosi decree” in January 2023, aggravated by the conversion into law of the “Flussi decree” in December 2024. In the last month, Nadir and Sea-Eye 5, two of the smaller vessels operated by RESQSHIP and Sea-Eye, were detained on accusations of not complying with authorities’ instructions. Both crews were assigned very distant ports and asked for partial transshipments of people based on vulnerability criteria, despite the fact that a proper vulnerability assessment needs a safe environment and can not be conducted aboard a ship and directly after a rescue.

Implementing legal and administrative obstructions serves an obvious goal: to keep SAR vessels away from their operational areas, drastically restricting their active presence at sea. Without the presence of NGO assets and aircrafts, more people will drown while fleeing across the Central Mediterranean, and human rights violations as well as shipwrecks will occur unnoticed. Smaller vessels play a crucial role: they monitor the route, provide first aid to people on boats in distress and, when necessary, embark the people until the arrival of better-equipped vessels.

Since February 2023, NGO ships have been subjected to 29 detentions, amounting to a total of 700 days in harbours instead of rescuing lives at sea. They spent an additional 822 days at sea navigating to reach assigned ports at unjustifiable distances, amounting to 330,000 kilometres of navigation. What initially only affected non-governmental SAR vessels has now been extended also to smaller monitoring ships.

In addition, NGOs spend a huge amount of time and financial resources appealing Italy’s restrictive legislation and the administrative detentions arbitrarily imposed on them.

In previous months, national courts – in Catanzaro, Reggio Calabria, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, and Ancona – issued decisions recognising the detention of NGO rescue ships at port to be unlawful and, as a consequence, they annulled the related fines. In October 2024, the Brindisi Tribunal asked the Italian Constitutional Court to assess the compatibility of the “Piantedosi decree”, converted into law in February 2023, with the Italian Constitution. On the 8th of July 2025, the Constitutional court re-established that the Law of the Sea cannot be circumvented by punitive and discriminatory norms and any order contrary to it is to be considered illegal and illegitimate.

Non-assistance is a crime!

Under international maritime law, every shipmaster has the obligation to assist persons in distress at sea. Likewise, any state operating a Rescue Coordination Centre is legally bound to facilitate and ensure timely rescue operations. Yet today, what we are witnessing is not a state failure, but a pattern of deliberate violations: withholding information about distress cases, coordinating with the so-called Libyan coast guards for illegal pullbacks – even within Maltese waters – and allowing Frontex aircraft to observe shipwrecks and violent interception without intervening.

These practices are a blatant violation of the SOLAS Convention, the SAR Convention, UNCLOS, and the principle of non-refoulement. When states obstruct rescue activities instead of enabling them, they are not enforcing the law, they are breaking it.

Background

In December 2024, the “Flussi decree” (converted by Law 145/2024) concerning migration and asylum legislation passed by the Italian government came into force. It tightens the already restrictive provisions of the “Piantedosi decree”, ranging from fines to the detention and permanent confiscation of search and rescue vessels . The new provisions facilitate the confiscation of vessels by holding shipowners liable for repeated violations regardless of the captain, and hence represents a further escalation in the targeted obstruction of the work of SAR NGOs in the Central Mediterranean.

Ten years ago, search and rescue NGOs started filling the lethal gap left by the EU and its Member States in the Central Mediterranean. While the EU increasingly focuses on border control and border externalisation to prevent any arrivals of people on the move to European coasts, more than 175.500 people have been rescued by NGO ships since then. Nevertheless, since 2017, SAR actors have been increasingly exposed to criminalisation and systematic obstruction due to restrictive laws and policies, which contradict international maritime law and human rights.

We demand:

  • The immediate repeal of the Piantedosi and Flussi decrees, putting an end to inhumane requests for rescue ships to perform partial disembarkation and stopping the assignment of distant ports. As requested by international maritime law, those who have just been rescued should be disembarked without delay at the closest place of safety; they should not be made to endure long journeys due to political calculations.
  • The immediate release of the monitoring sailing vessel Nadir and the end to the obstruction and criminalization of non-governemental SAR activities.
  • That EU member states fulfil their duty to rescue people at sea and comply with international law. The authorities should provide all NGO ships with the necessary support in the coordination of rescues in order to take their responsibility to assist people in distress.
  • The establishment of a EU-financed and coordinated search and rescue programme.
  • Safe and legal pathways to Europe to prevent people from being forced onto unseaworthy boats and embarking on difficult and sometimes deadly journeys.

Signatories:

  1. Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI)
  2. borderline-europe, Human rights without borders e.V.
  3. Captain Support Network
  4. Cilip | Bürgerrechte & Polizei
  5. CompassCollective
  6. CONVENZIONE DEI DIRITTI NEL MEDITERRANEO
  7. EMERGENCY
  8. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR)
  9. Gruppo Melitea
  10. iuventa-crew
  11. LasciateCIEntrare
  12. Maldusa project
  13. Médecins Sans Frontières
  14. MEDITERRANEA Saving Humans
  15. MEM.MED Memoria Mediterranea
  16. migration-control.info project
  17. MV Louise Michel project
  18. Open Arms
  19. RESQSHIP
  20. r42 Sail And Rescue
  21. Refugees in Libya
  22. Salvamento Marítimo Humanitario (SMH)
  23. SARAH-Seenotrettung
  24. Sea-Eye
  25. Sea Punks e.V
  26. Sea-Watch
  27. SOS Humanity
  28. SOS MEDITERRANEE
  29. Statewatch
  30. Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights FTDES
  31. United4Rescue
  32. Watch the Med Alarm Phone

The obstruction of search and rescue vessels causes hundreds of deaths at sea

32 organisations demand the immediate ending of the systematic obstruction of non-governmental search and rescue (SAR) efforts by the Italian state. In the past month alone, NGO vessels have been detained three times due to legal restrictions based on allegations under the “Piantedosi decree” – one of them, the monitoring vessel Nadir operated by RESQSHIP, got detained twice in a row. Deliberately keeping non-governmental search and rescue organisations away from the Central Mediterranean causes countless more deaths at sea on one of the deadliest flight routes worldwide.

Despite numerous alerts raised by SAR organisations, NGO vessels continue to be arbitrarily detained since the adoption of the “Piantedosi decree” in January 2023, aggravated by the conversion into law of the “Flussi decree” in December 2024. In the last month, Nadir and Sea-Eye 5, two of the smaller vessels operated by RESQSHIP and Sea-Eye, were detained on accusations of not complying with authorities’ instructions. Both crews were assigned very distant ports and asked for partial transshipments of people based on vulnerability criteria, despite the fact that a proper vulnerability assessment needs a safe environment and can not be conducted aboard a ship and directly after a rescue.

Implementing legal and administrative obstructions serves an obvious goal: to keep SAR vessels away from their operational areas, drastically restricting their active presence at sea. Without the presence of NGO assets and aircrafts, more people will drown while fleeing across the Central Mediterranean, and human rights violations as well as shipwrecks will occur unnoticed. Smaller vessels play a crucial role: they monitor the route, provide first aid to people on boats in distress and, when necessary, embark the people until the arrival of better-equipped vessels.

Since February 2023, NGO ships have been subjected to 29 detentions, amounting to a total of 700 days in harbours instead of rescuing lives at sea. They spent an additional 822 days at sea navigating to reach assigned ports at unjustifiable distances, amounting to 330,000 kilometres of navigation. What initially only affected non-governmental SAR vessels has now been extended also to smaller monitoring ships.

In addition, NGOs spend a huge amount of time and financial resources appealing Italy’s restrictive legislation and the administrative detentions arbitrarily imposed on them.

In previous months, national courts – in Catanzaro, Reggio Calabria, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, and Ancona – issued decisions recognising the detention of NGO rescue ships at port to be unlawful and, as a consequence, they annulled the related fines. In October 2024, the Brindisi Tribunal asked the Italian Constitutional Court to assess the compatibility of the “Piantedosi decree”, converted into law in February 2023, with the Italian Constitution. On the 8th of July 2025, the Constitutional court re-established that the Law of the Sea cannot be circumvented by punitive and discriminatory norms and any order contrary to it is to be considered illegal and illegitimate.

Non-assistance is a crime!

Under international maritime law, every shipmaster has the obligation to assist persons in distress at sea. Likewise, any state operating a Rescue Coordination Centre is legally bound to facilitate and ensure timely rescue operations. Yet today, what we are witnessing is not a state failure, but a pattern of deliberate violations: withholding information about distress cases, coordinating with the so-called Libyan coast guards for illegal pullbacks – even within Maltese waters – and allowing Frontex aircraft to observe shipwrecks and violent interception without intervening.

These practices are a blatant violation of the SOLAS Convention, the SAR Convention, UNCLOS, and the principle of non-refoulement. When states obstruct rescue activities instead of enabling them, they are not enforcing the law, they are breaking it.

Background

In December 2024, the “Flussi decree” (converted by Law 145/2024) concerning migration and asylum legislation passed by the Italian government came into force. It tightens the already restrictive provisions of the “Piantedosi decree”, ranging from fines to the detention and permanent confiscation of search and rescue vessels . The new provisions facilitate the confiscation of vessels by holding shipowners liable for repeated violations regardless of the captain, and hence represents a further escalation in the targeted obstruction of the work of SAR NGOs in the Central Mediterranean.

Ten years ago, search and rescue NGOs started filling the lethal gap left by the EU and its Member States in the Central Mediterranean. While the EU increasingly focuses on border control and border externalisation to prevent any arrivals of people on the move to European coasts, more than 175.500 people have been rescued by NGO ships since then. Nevertheless, since 2017, SAR actors have been increasingly exposed to criminalisation and systematic obstruction due to restrictive laws and policies, which contradict international maritime law and human rights.

We demand:

  • The immediate repeal of the Piantedosi and Flussi decrees, putting an end to inhumane requests for rescue ships to perform partial disembarkation and stopping the assignment of distant ports. As requested by international maritime law, those who have just been rescued should be disembarked without delay at the closest place of safety; they should not be made to endure long journeys due to political calculations.
  • The immediate release of the monitoring sailing vessel Nadir and the end to the obstruction and criminalization of non-governemental SAR activities.
  • That EU member states fulfil their duty to rescue people at sea and comply with international law. The authorities should provide all NGO ships with the necessary support in the coordination of rescues in order to take their responsibility to assist people in distress.
  • The establishment of a EU-financed and coordinated search and rescue programme.
  • Safe and legal pathways to Europe to prevent people from being forced onto unseaworthy boats and embarking on difficult and sometimes deadly journeys.

Signatories:

  1. Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI)
  2. borderline-europe, Human rights without borders e.V.
  3. Captain Support Network
  4. Cilip | Bürgerrechte & Polizei
  5. CompassCollective
  6. CONVENZIONE DEI DIRITTI NEL MEDITERRANEO
  7. EMERGENCY
  8. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR)
  9. Gruppo Melitea
  10. iuventa-crew
  11. LasciateCIEntrare
  12. Maldusa project
  13. Médecins Sans Frontières
  14. MEDITERRANEA Saving Humans
  15. MEM.MED Memoria Mediterranea
  16. migration-control.info project
  17. MV Louise Michel project
  18. Open Arms
  19. RESQSHIP
  20. r42 Sail And Rescue
  21. Refugees in Libya
  22. Salvamento Marítimo Humanitario (SMH)
  23. SARAH-Seenotrettung
  24. Sea-Eye
  25. Sea Punks e.V
  26. Sea-Watch
  27. SOS Humanity
  28. SOS MEDITERRANEE
  29. Statewatch
  30. Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights FTDES
  31. United4Rescue
  32. Watch the Med Alarm Phone

Statement to the National Public

Tunis, July 11, 2025 Statement to the National Public On Wednesday, July 9, 2025, the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights received a summons from the Research and Tax Evasion Unit, requesting the submission of financial and administrative documents. This summons is based on a judicial mandate issued by the Sub-Directorate of Economic and Financial Research of the Judicial Police Department, pursuant to a referral from the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Economic and Financial Pole of the Court of First Instance in Tunis. In full respect of the law and in the spirit of transparency, the Forum’s legal representative is today, Friday, July 11, 2025, submitting all requested documents to the relevant authorities. The Forum has consistently complied with all requests from regulatory bodies, including the Court of Auditors and the Associations Department under the Presidency of the Government. This reflects our unwavering commitment to all applicable legal, administrative, and financial frameworks—chief among them Decree No. 88 governing associations. This latest development cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader context of mounting pressure on civil society and the shrinking of civic space. While we reiterate our firm respect for the law and our readiness to engage responsibly with all legal procedures, we categorically reject any attempt to target, intimidate, or delegitimize our work. We remind the public that our activities have always been conducted within the legal framework and in alignment with the national movement for social justice and human dignity. Our struggle began in the early 2000s with the support of social movements; textile workers, the mining basin uprising, and the defense of student, political, and civil society activists. Despite trials, repression, and restrictions, we stood firm. Our official recognition in February 2011 marked a new chapter in our engagement, deepening our commitment to social and civic causes. That struggle continues unabated. It is the voice of the marginalized, a force resisting injustice, and a cornerstone of freedom and social equity. Regardless of the outcome of this process (whether for the organization or its members) we will remain where we have always stood; alongside the people, at the heart of the fight for genuine democracy, a just social order, a free society, and dignity for all Tunisians. Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights President: Abderrahmane Hedhili

World Refugee Day Statement

World Refugee Day Statement As the world marks World Refugee Day, remembering the suffering of millions who have been forcibly displaced from their homes by war, tyranny, climate change, and discrimination, this occasion is marked in Tunisia by ongoing “national shame” in the form of a systematic policy of racism and repression towards refugees, asylum seekers, and all displaced persons. Tunisia, which has always celebrated the abolition of slavery and the enactment of a fundamental law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, is today reneging on its African, Arab, and international commitments regarding the status of refugees, deliberately obstructing the processing of asylum applications, and continues to humiliate victims of forced displacement and statelessness. The Tunisian authorities are not content with inaction; they go even further: they criminalize solidarity, repress activists, and close down civil space. Most refugees and asylum seekers in Tunisia continue to live in inhumane and degrading conditions, especially women and children, without the right to housing, work, health, or education. They are evicted from their homes, threatened with violence, and deprived of their livelihoods, as if they were enemies against whom the state has declared war.  These repressive policies have resulted in widespread flight, with the number of people registered with the Tunis office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees falling from 18,362 in June 2024[1] to 10683in May 2025[2]. Today, we also remember the Tunisian men and women who fled their country because of their opinions, positions, identities, or civil and political activities, or because of the absent guarantees of fair trial. By the end of 2024, their number had reached 15,022.[3] Let us work harder to ensure that no one in Tunisia is persecuted for these reasons. In line with this repression, the attack on civil society is intensifying: associations are being shut down, activists are being arrested, and the most basic conditions of justice are absent. All this simply because they believed in the human right to life and dignity, regardless of color, nationality, or identity. The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights thus demands:
  • The immediate halt of policies of expulsion, starvation, and repression targeting refugees and migrants under the pretext of enforcing national laws, and respect for Tunisia’s obligations under the Organization of African Unity Convention on Refugees, the Arab Convention on Refugees, the Geneva Convention, and its supplementary protocols.
  • Comprehensive reform of the legal system to guarantee the rights of all without discrimination based on legal status or nationali
  • The creation of safe and dignified shelter alternatives for refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons who are displaced.
  • Release refugees and asylum seekers detained on administrative grounds and release victims of policies criminalizing civil action: Mostfa Jamali, Abderrazak Krimi, Cherifa Riahi, Saadia Mosbah, Iadh Bousalmi, Mohamed Jouo, Iman Wardani, Mohamed Ikbal Khaled, Abdallah Said, and Salwa Ghrissa.
In light of its shameful performance in Tunisia, the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights also holds the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees responsible for the situation of refugees and stateless persons and its complicit silence regarding what they are subjected to in Tunisia. We call on it to mobilize all its resources and energies to resettle refugees stranded in Tunisia. the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights affirms that the struggle for freedom, dignity, and solidarity cannot be suppressed or criminalized, but rather will continue to grow and take root. Tunisia is a land of solidarity and cooperation. Refugees are not enemies, and activists are not criminals. We will not remain silent. We will resist. We will continue to raise our voices until solidarity is achieved. We will not be silent. We will resist. And we will continue to raise our voices until solidarity is achieved.   Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Right President: Abderrahmane Hedhili [1] https://data.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/109621 [2] https://data.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/116934 [3] https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/tunisia

Suppression of Movement Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

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Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

   

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

   

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

   

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

Suppression of Movement

Migration Control, Manufactured Precarity and Racialised Border Regimes in Post-Hirak Algeria: In the Name of Sovereignty, at the Service of Rent Accumulation

“We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is running headlong into the abyss; we would do well to avoid it with all possible speed.”

Frantz Fanon, 1961

In recent years, Algerian authorities have substantially tightened their (anti-)migration policies. Pushbacks to Tunisia and mass expulsions to Niger were expanded while the state is deporting more and more people to Libya and to Morocco. The image of a prosperous ‘New Algeria’, propagated by the post-Hirak regime, is, meanwhile, strongly contradicted by the increasing number of Algerian harraga who are once again favoring the risks of a clandestine migration over remaining in the country.

In the past, Algeria, unlike neighboring countries, was considered extremely reluctant to formally integrate into the European border regime, near-consistently refusing to take part in Europe-funded ‘border management’ projects. Under President Abdelmajid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, however, the state initiated a cautious turnaround and intensified its (anti-)migration cooperation with Germany, Italy, IOM and the Arab League, mostly in regards to police training and deportation cooperation.

The state’s reprisals against the harga, the manufactured precarity of thousands of people and the widespread racism (re-)produced by the state and large parts of society are, however, in stark contrast to Algeria’s anti-imperialist past. The state maintains a political imagery nurtured by the spirit of the post-colonial Algeria of the 1960s and 70s. Yet, de facto, only traces of this once staunch alignment with the Global South remain. The international solidarity occasionally vocalised by the Algerian state is today a conditional and selective one, driven by the regime’s internal tug-of-war over access to the hydrocarbon revenues and, at best, the “anti-imperialist strategies” of foreign policy.

Migration control has turned into an ever-present subject of public discourses and government interventions across northern Africa. Corresponding matters in Algeria, however, remain strongly unreported. Accordingly, this report aims at contributing to bridge this gap by providing a mapping of the state’s crackdowns against Algerian and non-Algerian harraga, the authorities’ retention infrastructure, the security services’ deportation practices, and Algeria’s engagement with foreign governments regarding the suppression of movement. In particular relevant in this regard are Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Germany as well as with IOM, UNHCR and the Arab League and its ‘scientific body’, the Riyadh-based Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS).

Télécharger (PDF, 4.23MB)

 

OST Digital Report – َApril 2025

0

  April 2025 The tempo of protest picks up again …between union and civil rights demands The number of protests doubled during April 2025, expressing widespread popular anger and discontent. The month saw an increase in the level of demands linked to economic and social rights, as well as demands linked to human rights and the right to freedom of expression and a fair trial. As predicted by the Tunisian Social Observatory of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, the pace of protests during April increased to 422 protest actions, compared to just 217 actions during the previous month of March 2025. The month of April was dominated by demands linked to professional and labor rights, 45% of which related to the regulation of professional status, the right to work, the right to pay overdue wages, the violation of workers’ rights, the improvement of working conditions, arbitrary dismissal, the implementation of outstanding agreements and the delimitation of “traditional” outstanding professional files, such as the file on site workers over 45 years of age, the files on teachers and substitute teachers, and the file on employees of associations working with disabled people. Alongside what’s been happening in the social sphere, the Tunisian street has seen a resurgence in the civil, political and human rights movement, which accounted for 28.44% of the total number of movements observed during April 2025. This movement was mainly linked to demands relating to developments in the so-called “conspiracy” case, where movements were organized to denounce the judicial process, considered not to have met the conditions for a fair and public trial, with families of detainees and journalists prevented from attending, covering and following the trial. In addition to the arrest of lawyer and former judge Ahmed Souab, those arrested in the so-called conspiracy case went on hunger strike to reject the remote trial. Abir Moussi, president of the Destourian Libre party, protested against being denied direct access to her children on the day of Eid al-Fitr. April saw a resurgence of activism and demonstrations calling for the decriminalization of civilian work and the release of people arrested for their humanitarian work, such as Saadia Mesbah, Cherifa Riahi, Mustafa Jamali, Abdallah Said, Mohamed Jouaou, Iyadh Boussalmi, Abdelrazak Krimi and Salwa Grissa… During the same month, demonstrations and statements continued in support of the Palestinian cause and against the assault on Gaza. The death of three students following the fall of the high school wall in the Mazouna delegation triggered a state of anger and discontent whose impact spread across social networks and among all Tunisians, and took regional forms reminiscent of the post-2011 years. The protest in the Mazzouna delegation continued for days and took many forms, day and night, and spread to neighboring delegations such as Meknassi, Regab and Menzel Bouzayane. Generally speaking, this is a clear indication of the lack of social justice between the regions and highlights the deterioration of educational establishments in the public sector and the absence of minimum protection measures for students and teaching staff within these establishments. Protests remain predominantly mixed in terms of the gender perspective of demonstrators, as the month recorded 20 actions organized solely by men, while the remainder were jointly organized by both sexes. In addition to appeals through the media and petitions, which were a tool for expressing demands on some 56 occasions, protest actors turned to action on the ground in the rest of the demonstrations of their social, economic, civil and human rights demands. Vigils represented the main form of activism during April, accounting for a third of the movements tracked by the Tunisian Social Observatory team, followed by strikes, where 54 strikes were conducted throughout the month, then sit-ins, where 47 sit-ins were held by employees and workers and one sit-in by fishermen. According to the sample, 27 peaceful marches, 24 days of anger and 15 hunger strikes were organized during April. As part of their pressure to achieve their demands, social actors resorted to banning classes, blocking roads, burning rubber tires, disrupting activities and wearing red badges. An artistic mobilization was adopted on one occasion. It is worth noting that in April, unemployed graduates from the Gabès governorate marched on foot to the Presidency of the Republic to demand their right to employment. Workers, employees and trade unions were the main protagonists of the 157 actions recorded in April 2025. Medical and paramedical workers made up the second largest protest bloc. Young doctors, largely supported by medical and paramedical staff, led a series of actions to demand improved economic conditions, the strengthening of public health institutions and their provision with the equipment needed to provide medical services guaranteeing the right to health of all Tunisians. Human rights activists and defenders staged 44 protest actions, students staged 30 actions, prisoners demonstrated 12 times, as did journalists, lawyers, the unemployed, fishermen, farmers, cab drivers, regional bus drivers, shopkeepers, athletes, construction workers, teachers and professors. As in previous months, Tunis, the capital, saw the highest number of protests, with 84 actions, during which social actors went to the Presidency of the Republic, either to denounce policies seen as a return to dictatorship, repression and lack of justice, or to demand its intervention in order to obtain long-awaited social and economic justice for vulnerable groups whose living conditions have been further marginalized by deteriorating living conditions. Unusually, Tozeur occupied second place in the ranking of most protested regions with 40 actions, followed by Sidi Bouzid with 32, Kairouan with 28, Manouba with 26 and Gafsa with 20. Mahdia saw the lowest number of social movements with 6 protests, preceded by Zaghouan, Tataouine and Ariana, which each saw 7 social movements. Around 28% of social movements were directed at the Presidency of the Government or the Presidency of the Republic, while the Ministry of Education was involved in 15.64% of movements recorded during April, followed by the Ministry of Health, which provoked 13% of protests. The Ministry of Agriculture was involved in 6% of protests, while the employer’s failure to meet its obligations to workers and employees was the cause of 9% of protests. Regional authorities such as municipalities, regional delegations, hospitals, judicial authorities and security forces were targeted by the remainder of protests. Based on the sample studied, the Tunisian Social Observatory team of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights recorded 11 cases of suicide and attempted suicide during April 2025, around half of them among schoolchildren aged between thirteen and sixteen. A security guard committed suicide at his workplace with his own weapon, a young man who climbed the electricity pole in front of the Manouba court of first instance attempted to throw himself off and threatened suicide, another in a protest movement poured fire over his body in the middle of the Nabeul international fair, and a 50-year-old man committed suicide by burning himself. The category of suicides was divided between 4 women and 7 men. As regards the geographical and spatial distribution of suicidal behavior, the majority of suicidal behaviors and attempts were recorded in the governorate of Kairouan, which saw 5 cases and attempts of suicide, 2 people committed suicide in Bizerte, and each of the governorates of Tunis, Gafsa, Manouba and Nabeul saw one case of suicide. Educational establishments saw 4 cases and attempts of suicide, while one case of suicide was recorded at home and another in the workplace, the remainder having chosen the public space (farm or public highway) as the setting for ending their lives. The methods used in suicide attempts and cases vary from throwing oneself, hanging oneself, burning oneself, to absorbing toxic substances or medication. The geographical distribution of the suicide category indicates the need to highlight the issue of mental health care for children, taking into account the repercussions of the fragility experienced by young people, which has led a number of them to end their lives, with particular attention to the working conditions of a number of professions (security services), within which the act of suicide has become frequent. As far as violence is concerned, the Tunisian Social Observatory continued to document acts of murder, relational violence, cases of domestic violence, murders of women, sexual assaults, thefts, burglaries, trafficking, abduction of minors, kidnapping, This confirms that the phenomenon of violence cannot be limited and is widespread and unevenly distributed across the Republic’s various governorates, with Tunis, Manouba and Sousse recording the highest numbers. Acts of violence and marginalization are widespread in both large urban areas and rural zones. Public space was the main setting for acts of violence observed during April, followed by housing, industrial production facilities, administrative headquarters, recreational and tourist areas, and health facilities. The majority of perpetrators were men, accounting for 91% of offenders. Six percent of violence was perpetrated by women, the remainder being mixed. As far as victims of violence are concerned, neither gender is excluded from recorded cases of violence. 44.44% of victims of violence were men, 42.22% women and 13.33% both men and women. Among the cases of violence against women, we find a husband who burned his wife in the governorate of Tozeur and then fled to Algeria, and a similar crime in Sejoumi, where a husband killed his wife with a sharp instrument, and in the Gobaa region, in the governorate of Manouba, a husband killed his wife and stabbed his daughter. In the governorate of Manouba, the body of a lawyer was found burnt and thrown into the Oued Majerda, and in the governorate of Gabès, a girl was stabbed by her friend after an argument between them, and classes were suspended after a teacher in a Manouba school was attacked by a parent, and in Kasserine, a group of people broke into a wedding venue, creating a state of panic and fright. The month also saw cases of rape and attempted hijacking of under-age children, both male and female, and witnessed murders, mutual violence, hold-ups, robberies and cases of police violence targeting sports team supporters and citizens, the most notable of which was the assault on a bus driver in Nabeul. Hate speech, racism, exclusion and discrimination continue to multiply on social networks, and their circle widens still further as voices reject the judicial, economic and social paths adopted by the authorities, while official discourse tends to further divide Tunisians into patriots, anti-patriots, conspirators and loyalists.

Preparatory session for the conference on rights, freedoms, and for a fair democratic republic Opening speech by the president of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights

Preparatory session for the conference on rights, freedoms, and for a fair democratic republic

Opening speech by the president of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights

Mr. Abderrahman Hedhili

 

Dear ladies and gentlemen.

Freedom and justice activists from all fronts, warm greetings.

We have succeeded in organizing this preparatory session in response to the attack on our initiatives since the first hours of their announcement. After a few days, this attack shifted to target the League and its president, to whom we renew our full solidarity. We only see this attack as a sign of the ruling system’s anxiety and fear of serious national initiatives that challenge tyranny.

 The days since our initiative was made public have been difficult and rich in intense lessons, because they have enabled us to make a clear distinction between what we represent, we who are here today in this hall and many others, as a democratic and human rights movement that has not and will not surrender to threats and pressure in defending rights, freedom, and justice ,  and what is represented by those who target us from the partisan and media circles that support tyranny, who remain silent about human rights violations, and advocate for autocratic rule. They even gloat shamelessly at times over the victims of oppression, reveling in their suffering. The importance of this distinction lies in drawing a line between us, who believe in freedom, rights, and a democratic republic, and those who defend tyranny and justify its oppression, despotism, and failure.

Our call for a national conference, as stated in our first appeal, came after the situation had reached its limit and after the farcical trial known as the conspiracy case and the unjust verdicts that resulted from it, and then the arrest of the lawyer and activist judge Ahmed Souab, who shook the authoritarian regime to its core and exposed its true nature. .

However, this call, in essence, even if it comes today, is the culmination of a national role that we did not abandon in the forum and the league before July 25 and after. We warned on several occasions of the danger of the regime’s drift towards absolute individual rule, which was clearly embodied in Decree 117, then the 2022 Constitution and the referendum that was ratified and boycotted by the majority of voters, followed by the parliamentary elections that were rejected by most political forces and lacked the elements of integrity, pluralism and competition between programs. We contributed from a position of historical responsibility and from advanced and active positions in the dialogue initiative called for by the Tunisian General Labor Union, but it never saw light.

The decline, weakness, and fragmentation of civil society, along with the absence of a unifying vision and a clear roadmap, have contributed to the ruling authority’s increased encroachment and tightening of its security and judicial grip on society. The situation will not change as long as the current equation persists.

The 2024 presidential elections were a political setback that took us back to a bygone era that the revolution had sought to end. The elections lacked the most basic conditions for fairness and transparency and turned into a 90 percent endorsement of the current president after he refused to engage in real competition with candidates who wanted to challenge him. The appointed electoral commission refused to implement the administrative court’s decision to reinstate three candidates to the race. In addition, the courts took it upon themselves to remove candidate Ayachi Zamal from the competition by imprisoning him and depriving him of his election campaign. He remains unjustly behind bars to this day. This is in addition to the loyalist parliament’s amendment of the electoral law and the transfer of electoral disputes to the Court of Appeal instead of the Administrative Court a few days before the vote, which is a dangerous precedent that demonstrates the degree of disregard for institutions and the law.

What we conclude today is that all the indicators of authoritarian deviation of the ruling regime have come together. Over the years following July 25, the justice system has been transformed into a tool for suppressing all opposition and free voices, including politicians, civil society activists, journalists, and trade unionists, especially after the decision to dismiss judges and pressure through appointments and the failure to establish an elected Supreme Judicial Council and a Constitutional Court. This has created a stifling climate for freedoms and a state of fear and caution that has spread throughout civil society, the elites, and the general public, causing state legislative institutions to lose their independence and even government structures to lose their prestige.

 Free and bold voices have faded within parliament and even in the media, which we lost as a free space after 2011. It has become persecuted and besieged, whether by Decree 54 or under the pressure of instructions and censorship. It gradually lost its role in conveying an honest picture of reality and in organizing the circulation of free and diverse ideas and alternatives. It became dominated by incitement, demonization, and superficiality. Some media platforms turned into tools for spreading discourse of betrayal, violence, and hatred among Tunisians.

Today, many groups are increasingly convinced that the current closed system of government, which rejects dialogue and acknowledgment of the crisis, cannot provide a roadmap for reconciliation or a way out of the suffocating crisis in which the country finds itself and which may quickly deepen in a tense regional and international context for which our country is not prepared.

 Although we no longer pin our hopes on political reform from within, we are certain that working to shift the balance of power in favor of democratic change through civil and peaceful means is our only path forward, and one that we must pursue without hesitation.

Dear friends

Supporters of President Kais Saied’s current regime continue to promote him based on his legitimacy as a savior and liberator of the nation and protector of national sovereignty. However, based on the facts, we realize today that these slogans are empty, and that the July 25 regime has destroyed political life, rejected fair democratic elections and peaceful transfer of power, and damaged Tunisia’s image abroad. It is moving towards undermining the foundations of the state as a guarantor of stability and destroying the gains of civil and political society, which date back not only to the post-2011 period but to decades before that. The struggle for human rights, democracy, social justice, trade unionism, student rights, and women’s rights in Tunisia is authentic and deeply rooted. It has not bowed in the past, it does not bow in the present, and it will not bow in the future. Anyone who reads Tunisia’s political history understands that even prisons and torture chambers have reinforced, over generations, the firm conviction that rights are won, not given. Today, we are determined to win our full rights, whatever the cost.

We do not want to remind anyone who we are, what we were, and what we promised ourselves, our consciences, our people, and our friends who are today imprisoned or exiled, or who have been taken away by death. Rather, we will simply say that we are all Ahmed Souab

and we are all Charifa Riahi

and we are all Sonia Dahmani

and we are all Issam Chebbi…

and we are all Rachad Tanboura

and others who have been unjustly imprisoned. In fact, we are all prisoners, whether inside the regime’s prisons or in the big prison that the country has become, and we have decided to break our chains. We will not back down from the struggle we have carved into the soil of our homeland and the memory of our people with our own hands.

We are fully aware that Tunisia is going through a comprehensive and unprecedented crisis that threatens to completely derail the struggle for democracy and disrupts an economy in dire need of new policies that achieve social justice. The current government is responding to the complex structural crisis of the economy with fragmented, propaganda-driven solutions that do not propose radical changes to public economic policies but rather reflect an undeclared submission to the dictates of global neoliberal institutions.

In addition to violations of public and civil rights and freedoms, we now have clear indicators of the severity of the economic and social crisis, which threatens to become dangerous:

With regard to the spread of precarious work: data indicates that the number of workers has reached 3,511,600, of whom 1,630,000 work in the informal sector, representing 46.4%. This is in addition to the continued use of precarious employment mechanisms, the promotion of partial solutions, the failure to respect and implement the promises made by successive governments, and the repression of movements demanding their fulfillment. There is also continued indifference to the suffering and demands of large groups of workers in these sectors, such as agricultural workers, site workers, substitute teachers, the unemployed, PhD holders, and others. In this context, we express our solidarity with the representatives of the staff and executives of the international center for the promotion of disabled people in their struggle and hunger strike to regain their stolen rights. Partial adjustments to certain situations and the abolition of subcontracted labor cannot achieve decent working conditions and decent wages if they are not part of an integrated development vision.

As for inflation and the deterioration of purchasing power: While inflation overall reached 5.7% in February 2025, it reached 7% for foodstuffs. This undermines the right to a decent life, as it directly affects citizens’ ability to secure food and access basic services and contributes to rising poverty rates. All this comes in a context where the country is experiencing repeated disruptions in imports of basic goods and food products, which exacerbates social suffering and deepens inequality and disparities.

With regard to the spread of poverty and deprivation: According to the former Minister of Social Affairs, approximately 4 million Tunisians, representing more than 33% of the population, suffer from deprivation due to a lack of income or loss of employment caused by economic circumstances. Despite the existence of social security programs, free medical care, and low tariffs, these groups remain marginalized and face high prices, shortages of basic foodstuffs, and the deterioration of the public health and transportation sectors. These groups remain in dire need of social and economic integration programs that provide them with decent work and income.

As for social services, we have observed that the state has abandoned its social role:

  • The deterioration of public education has gone hand in hand with the expansion and prosperity of private education, the spread of private tutoring, and the rising costs of such services. This is in addition to the collapse of infrastructure, and the tragic disaster that befell Mazouna was merely a sign of this deterioration and the state’s abandonment of its responsibilities.
  • The deterioration of public health and its growing lack of health facilities, adequate equipment, human resources in many specialties, and necessary medicines, forcing patients to resort to the private sector, which imposes exorbitant prices for medical services that only the wealthy and the upper middle class can afford.
  • Collapse of the public transport sector: This sector suffers from chronic neglect, which has led to a reduction in transport options and a lack of investment in fleet renewal and service improvement. This has resulted, for example, in a decline in the number of buses in Greater Tunis from 1,157 to 350 over the past ten years, as well as a shortage of metro cars due to the lack of renewal of the fleet for more than 15 years and the impossibility of maintaining them.

This is in addition to criminalizing social movements in all their forms and the demands they make, which have long been marginalized. Social movements have undergone a qualitative development, with nearly 2,000 protests taking place by the end of May 2025. The state responded with repression and criminalization. The unjust sentences handed down to young people protesting the environmental situation in Gabes are a clear indication of the authorities’ policy of marginalization and denial.

As for the migration issue:

The February 2023 speech signaled the start of numerous violations affecting refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, their families, students from sub-Saharan Africa, and even black Tunisians. A climate of fear prevailed among migrants, forcing sub-Saharan countries to evacuate their nationals, while the rest remained stuck in Tunisia, caught between the danger of returning to their countries of origin and the danger of staying in Tunisia in a climate of agitation and mobilization against them. Hate speech and racism thus moved from being the discourse of groups in cyberspace to state policy.

The Tunisian authorities turned the country into an open prison for migrants and chose, in the first phase, to expel them to the olive woods, deprived of any kind of basic services. Then, in the second phase, they destroyed their primitive tents, scattered them in the open, hunted them down under the trees and in the valleys, and expelled them to the borders and deserts. Women and children were not spared.

We affirm that we are committed to our convictions in word and deed to confront inhumane European policies in the field of migration, from border exportation to proxy guarding and securitization of migration. We reject violations that affect the rights and dignity of Tunisian migrants, such as racism, hatred, and forced deportation, and we reject the same violations that affect migrants in Tunisia .

We also reject policies that criminalize solidarity and stigmatize civil society, and we affirm our solidarity with all detained civil society activists. We stand in solidarity with Charifa Riahi, Saadia Mosbeh, Salwa Ghrissa, Mohamed Jouo, Iyadh Bousalmi, Mostafa Jamali, Abdelrazak Krimi, and Abdallah Said.

Dignity for migrant women and men

Freedom for detained women and men

What we seek today at this conference and at this opening session is not only to raise our voices in anger, but also to set out a necessary path toward national and democratic agreement that will restore hope for saving the state, resuming the process of democratic transition, and guaranteeing citizenship and rights.

We know that what civil society in Tunisia has historically accumulated, especially with the opening up of the public sphere in the last ten years, in terms of experience in struggle, advocacy, mobilization, and proposing alternatives, is under threat but still resisting. We also acknowledge that the political elites who ruled and controlled the political space missed many historic opportunities to break with the past and bring about radical change to the political, economic, and social systems due to the narrow calculations of the various political forces. Tunisians have also come to realize that the goal of assassinations and terrorist plots was, at one point, to undermine the foundations of the nation state and the elements of coexistence and to disrupt the progress of society. We cannot forget or gloss over this entire previous phase with false compromises in order to take decisive steps forward. We must return to it for accountability, evaluation, and criticism that concerns us all, without exception, so that we can resume the path of democracy and secure it from future setbacks.

 However, we do not place this legitimate demand and necessary step as an obstacle today to the urgent tasks we are proposing in defense of freedoms and rights and for a just democratic republic.

The rights we believe in are all rights for all people without discrimination based on affiliation, ideology, gender, color, social status, or country. The state we seek to establish is not a state of force that confiscates society, but a state of law based on the justice and supremacy of the law, equality for all before the law, the legitimacy of institutions, and respect for individual rights and public freedoms, which can only be guaranteed by a democratic constitution. A constitution that separates powers and breaks with the concentration of power in the hands of one man.

A just republic is one that does not oppress anyone, does not deny the rights of minorities, and is capable of building a new social contract that restores dignity to all and reduces inequalities.

On this basis, we are organizing this preparatory session and then preparing to organize a second general session in order to achieve clear objectives:

First, providing sufficient conditions for success to build a new space of resistance for forces and dynamics that reject tyranny and seek change with the aim of restoring the democratic path.

Second, launching a field and dialogue dynamic between those who reject autocratic rule and those who wish to transcend it, which means converging efforts and comparing interpretations and contributions in search of a common democratic denominator without compromising diversity and difference.

Third, develop an agreed-upon political roadmap that identifies urgent and medium-term tasks and establishes a framework for monitoring, reviewing, and developing their implementation.

Fourth, link the struggles of civil society and political actors with protest and social movements so that democracy becomes the horizon for all and tyranny does not continue to thrive on the misery of the people.

What we need to achieve these goals is to discuss today freely, openly, and boldly, and to agree and commit together, for we have no choice but to unite against a single adversary: the current ruling system.