

Migration, displacement and education:

BUILDING BRIDGES, NOT WALLS



GLOBAL EDUCATION MONITORING REPORT



2019

Arab States

MIGRATION, DISPLACEMENT AND EDUCATION:
BUILDING BRIDGES, NOT WALLS

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
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**Regional Reports of the
Global Education Monitoring Report series**

2019 *Arab States – Migration, displacement and
education: Building bridges, not walls*

Cover photo: Mark Kaye/Save the Children

Caption: Iraq. Yasmina recently fled fighting in Mosul.
She attends the Temporary Learning Space organised
by Save the Children.

KEY MESSAGES

No part of the world is currently as much affected by migration and displacement as the Arab States. The region accounts for 5% of the global population but 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of the global population of people internally displaced by conflict. Although migration offers opportunities, humanitarian crises have slowed down the pace of education development in the region relative to other regions, undermining the prospects of this and future generations.

INTERNAL MIGRATION

Rural to urban migration, a particularly salient phenomenon in middle-income countries, and seasonal or circular flows tend to pose the biggest challenges for education systems. But the pace of urbanization and internal migration intensity are lower in the Arab States than in other regions.

- In **Egypt**, children of internal migrants have slightly lower dropout rates in primary and lower secondary education and are more likely to persist into secondary and post-secondary education.
- In **Iraq**, 13% of the population lives in 3,700 slums where there are almost 2,200 uncompleted schools. In Sadr City, 9% of inhabitants cited education as a top-priority need.
- Field schools for nomads and pastoralists in countries such as **Djibouti** focus on farming-related skills aimed at increasing livestock management efficiency and mitigating climate change effects.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Migration from and to the Arab States has historically had two main facets, while a third one is emerging.

First, Gulf Cooperation Council countries have the highest immigration rates in the world. In **Qatar** and the **United Arab Emirates**, immigrants are the majority both in the overall and in the student population.

- Except for Bahrain, countries cater for migrants through a private education system, where access and quality are linked to ability to pay. Immigrants

make up 73% of private school students in **Kuwait**, 81% in **Qatar** and 83% in the **United Arab Emirates**.

- Private schools represent a lucrative market in these countries, valued at some US\$13.2 billion in 2016/17 and expected to double to US\$26.2 billion by 2023. These private schools offer curricula mostly in line with the country of origin of the student body.
- The Arab States display higher student mobility than the global average. The inbound mobility ratio in the Arab States increased from 2.3% in 2006 to 3.2% in 2017, reaching 35% in **Qatar** and 49% in the **United Arab Emirates**.
- Internationalization in higher education came with a switch from Arabic to English as a language of instruction, not only at university but also at pre-university level. Expatriate Arab, mostly Egyptian and Jordanian, teachers are being replaced by English-speaking recruits, largely from high-income countries, who are hired under much more favourable terms.

Second, regional emigration rates are above the global average of 3.4%, notably in **Lebanon** (12%) but also in the Maghreb countries of **Algeria**, **Tunisia** and especially **Morocco** (8%).

- The highest – and rising – shares of the total immigrant population from Arab States are found in France (37%; mostly Maghreb) and Sweden (18%; mostly from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic).
- Immigrant students from **Algeria**, **Morocco** and **Tunisia** do worse in France. For instance, 25% of them repeat a grade compared to 15% on average. But once their socioeconomic background is taken into account, their academic results do not differ from those of native French students.
- **Lebanon** and **Morocco** have the largest highly skilled emigration rates, about one in four. The effect of the prospect for skilled migration on human capital accumulation can be positive in sending countries, reaching a maximum at 14%, a moderate rate of high-skilled migration.

A third emerging trend is that sub-Saharan African migrants increasingly settle in Northern Africa. In **Morocco**, the government is developing policies and a framework to guide their integration into the

education system. An estimated 53,000 school-age refugee and migrant children in **Libya** needed support for education access.

INTERNATIONAL DISPLACEMENT

At the end of 2018, there were 25.9 million refugees, of whom 5.5 million were Palestinian. The **Syrian Arab Republic** (6.7 million) was the country from which the largest number of people had fled, while **Sudan** (0.7 million) was also in the top 10. **Lebanon** and **Jordan** are the two top refugee hosting countries in the world as a share of their population.

Despite an overwhelming response in the five countries hosting Syrian refugees, 39% of school age children are still not in education. And many are still placed in parallel systems, which are mostly unsustainable.

Faced with crises, most governments used to provide parallel education systems for refugee populations. This is still the case with Malian refugees in **Mauritania**. However, refugees should be fully included in national education systems. The 2017 Djibouti Declaration on Regional Refugee Education commits its signatories, including **Djibouti** and **Sudan**, to integrate education for refugees and returnees into their education sector plans by 2020. Turkey has committed to include all Syrian refugee children phase out separate provision in temporary education centres by 2020.

Geography, history, resource availability and system capacity all affect the degree of refugee inclusion.

- **Jordan** and **Lebanon** adopted double-shift systems. While the only realistic solution in the short- to medium-term, it is necessary that governments strengthen their teacher and school administration professional development and all actors prepare for eventually dismantling the second shift and addressing the consequences of including those who stay.
- Sahrawi refugees in **Algeria** have a separate education system and curriculum in Arabic and Spanish. While all children attend basic education, most of the over 2,200 lower secondary school graduates in 2017 had left for secondary schools in other cities.
- UNRWA, in partnership with UNESCO, provides accredited free basic education to 526,000 **Palestine** refugee children in 711 schools. It closely cooperates

with four host governments to ensure the smooth transition of students into their secondary education systems, including recognition and accreditation of their qualifications, curricula, examinations and timetabling.

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

While the Syrian Arab Republic has by far the highest percentage of internally displaced people (IDPs) as a share of the population (36%), Yemen (8%) and Iraq, Palestine and Sudan (each about 5%) are among the top 12 countries on this list.

- In **Iraq**, there are 1.6 million IDPs. Of these, almost 700,000 live in the Kurdistan region, where one of the challenges is the small number of Arabic-language schools and uncertainty over whether qualifications from Kurdistan region schools will be recognized, as the curriculum is different.
- In **Sudan**, conflict in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and, especially, the five Darfur states means there are an estimated 1.9 million IDPs, of whom 1.6 million live in camps. The Ministry of Education supports 360 primary schools in camps, serving about 260,000 children but these are only temporary arrangements, including provision of supplies and construction.
- In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, there remain more than 6 million IDPs, of which 52% are children and 86% live in urban areas. Only government-affiliated schools provide widely recognized certification and displaced children in opposition-held areas seeking access to examinations in government-held schools face risks. A 2018 report found that 13% of children required specialized psychosocial support in the classroom to facilitate learning and well-being.
- In **Yemen**, there are 2.3 million IDPs. The presence of two ministries, one ruled by the Houthis in Sana'a and another ruled by the internationally recognized government in Aden, poses a challenge for humanitarian actors. Like other civil servants in Houthi-controlled governorates, teachers have not received their salaries since 2016. Incentive payments were meant to begin in 2018 but were delayed because the Aden-based ministry claimed the teacher list submitted by the Sana'a-based ministry included Houthi followers.

Syrian children living in southern Turkey after fleeing their homes in war-torn Syria play and learn at a child-friendly space supported by Save the Children.

Credit: Ahmad Baroudi/Save the Children



CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Powerful stories of ambition, hope, fear, anticipation, ingenuity, fulfilment, sacrifice, courage, perseverance and distress remind us that '[m]igration is an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family' (United Nations, 2013). Yet migration and displacement are 'also a source of divisions within and between States and societies In recent years, large movements of desperate people, including both migrants and refugees, have cast a shadow over the broader benefits of migration' (United Nations, 2017, p. 2).

While there is shared responsibility for the common destiny formally endorsed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, migration and displacement continue to elicit some negative responses in modern societies. These are exploited by opportunists who see benefit in building walls, not bridges. It is here that education's role to 'promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious

groups', a key commitment in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, takes centre stage and was the focus of the 2019 *Global Education Monitoring (GEM) Report*.

The report looked at migration and displacement through the eyes of teachers and education administrators faced with the reality of diverse classrooms, schoolyards, communities, labour markets and societies. Education systems around the world are united in the commitment to achieve the fourth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) – 'Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all' – and to leave no one behind. For all students to fulfil their promise, systems need to adjust to their needs irrespective of their backgrounds. Education systems also need to respond to societies' need to be resilient and adapt to migration and displacement – a challenge affecting countries with large or small migrant and refugee populations (**Box 1.1**).

BOX 1.1:

Education is both a tool and a vulnerability for populations on the move

This report covers all types of population movements (**Figure 1.1**). The largest but most neglected is internal migration. On average, 1 out of 8 people lives outside their region or province of birth. While many internal movements have innocuous consequences, some – particularly in rapidly urbanizing low- and middle-income countries – have serious effects on the education opportunities of those moving and those left behind. Access to education at the destination may be constrained due to deliberate administrative rules or simple neglect.

On average, about 1 out of 30 people lives outside their country of birth. Almost two-thirds are in high-income countries, which explains the political prominence of the issue in those countries. International migrants are more likely to be of working age and therefore older than the population in destination countries. While most move to work, the extent to which their skills are recognized, utilized and rewarded is a key factor in the decision to move. Many also move for education, which several measures can facilitate. Their migration also affects descendants, in the next generation if not beyond.

Some 1 out of 80 people is displaced within or across borders by conflict or natural disasters, the number having risen rapidly in recent years. Nine out of ten of the displaced live in low- and middle-income countries. Delivering education for displaced people is part of restoring their sense of normalcy, structure and hope, but it can be challenging, conditioned by the unique social, economic and political contexts of displacement. Education needs to help these populations cope with protracted displacement and prepare them for a variety of futures.

Definitions for various categories of people on the move are meant to establish clear criteria that ensure respect for their rights. Yet even apparently clear-cut categories are less so in practice. In defining international migrants, for instance, some countries and organizations base nationality on descent, others on place of birth. Some categories provoke considerable controversy; fierce political arguments erupt over whether people migrate willingly to seek a better future or are forcibly displaced by human-caused or natural disasters. Host communities may interrogate migrants' and refugees' motivation (e.g. whether for work or education), legality (e.g. whether documented) or responsibility (e.g. whether victims of a crisis). Such arguments can divert focus from migrants' well-being.

FIGURE 1.1:**People move for a variety of reasons**

Internal migrants move within a country, usually in one direction, from village to town, but also on circular routes, following their livelihoods.




Nasser is a teacher working in a school in Giza, Greater Cairo, Egypt, a city that has expanded greatly as a result of internal migration.

International migrants move across country borders to work, either with authorization from the host country ...



Sofia's parents migrated from Morocco. She grew up in France but also feels strong links to Morocco. Both countries feel like home to her.

...or without the documents required under immigration laws and rules to enter, reside or work abroad.



Migrants rescued last March in the Channel of Sicily by Italian Coast Guard.

Some young people move across borders to pursue further studies in a foreign university.



Khadidja, an Algerian medical school graduate, went to France to fine-tune her skills because of the country's reputation for medical education.

Internally displaced people are forced to move within their country, remaining under the protection of their government.



Four siblings stand in the doorway of their parents' rented house in Dhamar Governorate, Yemen. They were forced to move from Al Dhale'e at the start of the war. The conflict has displaced over 2 million people in the country.

Asylum-seekers are those whose requests to seek refuge from persecution in another country need to be processed.



These young men are among the many asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic who sleep rough around Budapest's railway stations.

If successful in their requests, asylum-seekers obtain **refugee** status, which protects them and provides rights under international conventions.



Vinda sits with her mother, Hamrin, and two sisters in their home in a camp in Iraq. Originally from Qamishli, Syrian Arab Republic, the family fled the war. Her father works outside the camp. Vinda hopes to become a teacher.

Photo credits (top to bottom): Magali Corouge/UNESCO, Dominic Egan, Francesco Malavolta/IOM, Roméo Balancourt/IOM, Arwa Al Sabri/UNHCR, Andras Hajdu/UNHCR and Claire Thomas/UNHCR.

But no part of the world is currently as much affected by migration and displacement as the Arab States. Hence the focus of this special regional edition of the 2019 GEM Report. The Arab States have been shaped by population movements for several decades, whether related to the growth of megacities like Cairo; the demographic transformation of oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries; the masses of Palestinian, Sudanese and Syrian refugees; or the internal displacement of millions in Iraq and Yemen. The proliferation of conflicts fuels displacement. While the region accounts for 5% of the global population, it accounts for 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of the global population of people internally displaced by conflict. Lebanon and Jordan have the highest percentage of refugees as a percentage of the population. While the Syrian Arab Republic has by far the highest percentage of internally displaced people as a share of the population (about 36%), Yemen (about 8%) and Iraq, Palestine and Sudan (each about 5%) are among the top 12 countries on this list.


Displacement due to conflict deprives millions of children, adolescents and youth of an education, undermining the prospects of a generation. Although data collection mechanisms struggle in

these conditions, the humanitarian crises have slowed education expansion. For instance, the gap in the adjusted primary enrolment rate between the Arab States and sub-Saharan Africa has been more than halved in the past 20 years (**Figure 1.2a**). Over the same period, Central and Southern Asia caught up with and surpassed the Arab States in the lower secondary total net enrolment rate (**Figure 1.2b**). The upper secondary total net enrolment rate in the Arab States exceeded the global average by 2.5 percentage points in 2005 but fell short of it by 2.5 percentage points in 2017 (**Figure 1.2c**).

THE FRAMEWORK: MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT INTERACT WITH EDUCATION IN MULTIPLE, OFTEN MUTUAL WAYS

Migration and displacement interact with education through intricate two-way relationships that affect those who may or do move, stay behind or host migrants and refugees (**Table 1.1**). The point in the life cycle at which people ponder or undertake migration is a key determinant of education investment, interruption, experience and outcomes.

FIGURE 1.2:
Conflict has slowed education expansion in the Arab States



Source: UIS database.

TABLE 1.1:**Selected examples of the relationship between education and migration/displacement**

		Effects of migration/displacement on education	Effects of education on migration/displacement
Origin	Migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Migration leads to education provision challenges in slums. Education systems need to adjust to the needs of populations moving in seasonal or circular patterns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The more educated are more likely to migrate.
	Left behind	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Migration depopulates rural areas and challenges education provision. Remittances affect education in origin communities. Parent absence affects children left behind. Emigration prospects disincentivize investment in education. New programmes prepare aspiring migrants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emigration of the educated has consequences for development of affected areas, e.g. through brain drain.
Destination	Immigrants and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education attainment and achievement of immigrants and their children usually lag behind those of natives. Refugees need to be included in national education systems. Refugees' right to education needs to be ensured. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Migrants tend to be overqualified, their skills not fully recognized or utilized and their livelihoods altered. Internationalization of tertiary education prompts student mobility.
	Natives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversity in classrooms requires better-prepared teachers, targeted programmes to support new arrivals and prevent segregation, and disaggregated data. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formal and non-formal education can build resilient societies and reduce prejudices and discrimination.

Source: GEM Report team based on Fargues (2017).

Children migrating from areas with lower levels of education development may gain access to opportunities otherwise unavailable. Yet migrant students' attainment and achievement often lag behind those of their host country peers.

Migration and displacement can profoundly affect education, requiring systems to accommodate those who move and those left behind. Countries need to recognize migrants' and refugees' right to education in law and fulfil this right in practice. They need to tailor education for those cramming into slums, living nomadically or awaiting refugee status. Education systems need to be inclusive and fulfil the commitment to equity, which cuts across the 2030 Agenda. Teachers need to be prepared to deal with diversity and the trauma associated with migration and, especially, displacement. Recognition of qualifications and prior learning should be modernized to make the most of migrants' and refugees' skills, which contribute greatly to long-term prosperity.

Education also profoundly affects migration and displacement – both their volume and how they are perceived. Education is a major driver in the decision to migrate, fueling the search for a better life. It affects migrants' attitudes, aspirations and beliefs, and the extent to which they develop a sense of belonging in their destination. Increased diversity in classrooms brings challenges, including for natives (especially the poor and marginalized), but it also offers opportunities to learn from other cultures and experiences. Curricula sensitive to addressing negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees are needed more than ever.

With migration and displacement being hot political topics, education is key to providing citizens with a critical understanding of the issues involved. It can support the processing of information and promote cohesive societies, which are especially important in a globalized world. Yet education should go well beyond tolerance, which can mask indifference; it is a critical tool in fighting prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. If poorly designed, education systems can promulgate negative, partial, exclusive or dismissive portrayals of immigrants and refugees.

THE CONTEXT: THE WORLD IS STARTING TO ADDRESS THE EDUCATION NEEDS OF MOVING AND HOSTING POPULATIONS

Migration is one of the key positive mobilizing forces in human history and development, and the principle that refugees should not be sent back to places where their lives or freedoms are threatened is a foundation of international law. Yet migration and displacement also pose challenges at the local, national and international levels. To address them requires mobilizing resources and coordinating actions. In September 2016, all 193 United Nations member states signed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants to strengthen and refine responsibility-sharing mechanisms (United Nations, 2016a).

The declaration set in motion processes for two global compacts: one on migrants, the other on refugees. The country-led Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was heavily contested: Five countries, including the United States, voted against and 12, mainly from Europe, abstained from voting. The Global Compact on Refugees, led by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), faced fewer challenges but also saw withdrawals from its operational component, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. The texts of the two compacts, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 2018, outline key commitments on education.

EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION

Including education in the migration agenda is novel, despite education being a core aspect of migrants' realities. For instance, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which became a UN agency in 2016 following the New York Declaration, has not had an education strategy or specialized expertise. Instead, it has responded over six decades to a large variety of project-related intervention requests, ranging from covering school transport costs and supporting vocational education programmes in sending countries to training border officials (Sanz, 2018).

It may not be surprising that a systematic approach is lacking on such complex, diverse and contested terrain. However, the migration compact's final text puts most issues addressed in this report on the agenda.

It conveys a generally positive message of education as an opportunity to make the most of migratory flows. A paragraph under objective 15 on access to basic services captures education, and paragraphs under objectives 16 and 17 refer to education beyond schooling. Emphasis is given to skills recognition, outlined in detail under objective 18.

What the compact's commitments on education will accomplish is unknown, since it is non-binding. This report aims to support countries in implementing the commitments. Implementation success also depends on the mechanisms set up to assess progress. Starting in 2022, an International Migration Review Forum, to take place every four years, will be aligned with the High-Level Political Forum, the apex mechanism for global SDG follow-up and review.

The right to education of migrants must be explicitly recognized

Migrants are protected through human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination. The general non-discrimination principle is affirmed in legally binding human rights instruments that guarantee the right to education, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education. Although legal and migration status are not explicitly included in the language of these treaties, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights confirms that 'the principle of non-discrimination extends to all persons of school age residing in the territory of a State party, including non-nationals, and irrespective of their legal status' (CESCR, 1999) and that 'all children within a State, including those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive education' (CESCR, 2009).

Such references specifically to primary education reflect a time when secondary education was rarely a right even for nationals. However, the committee overseeing the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families clarified that 'whenever children who are nationals have access to free secondary education, State parties must ensure equal access by children of migrant workers, irrespective of their migration status' (Art. 75) (CMW, 2013).

Despite treaty commitments to non-discrimination, making the right to education conditional on citizenship and/or legal residency status is perhaps the most common explicit exclusion in constitutions or education legislation. Requiring birth registration or national education credentials has been highlighted as discriminatory practice by the Committee on Migrant Workers and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which recommend that 'States should put in place adequate measures to recognize the child's former education by acknowledging previously obtained school certificates and/or issuing new certification based on the child's capacities and capabilities' (CMW and CRC, 2017). Only legislation that mandates the right to education for migrants and their right to non-compulsory education can guarantee these rights.

EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES

Refugees' right to education in host countries was already guaranteed in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, later expanded with a 1967 protocol that removed time and geographical restrictions. The 145 parties to the convention and 146 parties to the protocol have committed to refugees receiving 'the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education'. They should also receive 'treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships' (Art. 22).

In addition, UN General Assembly Resolution No. 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 addressed Palestinian refugees' right to education. UNHCR and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) are responsible, with host governments, for ensuring that this right is fulfilled.

The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons maintains that parties 'shall accord to stateless persons the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education' (UN General Assembly, 1954).

While the 1951 convention has protected refugees and provided access to services, including education, for nearly 70 years, its core principle of shared responsibility has not been sufficiently respected (Türk and Garlick, 2016). The need to renew the commitment with a clearer support framework led to the Global Compact on Refugees, whose final draft dedicates two paragraphs to education, focusing on financing to support specific policies. It makes clear the duty of countries to improve access to education and develop policies on refugees' inclusion in national education systems, which is considered best practice in the UNHCR 2012–2016 *Education Strategy*.

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework process, originally Annex I to the New York Declaration, further provides a practical approach to fulfilling obligations and sharing costs. Its pilot implementation has focused on more coherent planning in crises and protracted displacements in selected countries hosting refugees.

THE CONTENTS: GUIDE TO THE REPORT

This report on the implications of migration and displacement for education in the Arab States reviews evidence with the aim of answering two questions:

- How do population movements affect access to and quality of education, and what are the implications for individual migrants and refugees?
- How can and does education make a difference in the lives of people who move and stay behind and in the communities that send and receive them?

The following four chapters discuss how internal migration, cross-border migration, cross-border displacement and internal displacement affect education access, quality and inclusiveness in the Arab States – but also in countries that receive migrants and refugees from the Arab States. They ask whether education outcomes of migrants, refugees and other displaced people differ from those of natives, why gaps emerge and what the main barriers are to provision of good-quality, inclusive education. The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations.



Egypt, Bedouin communities in North Sinai assisted by the WFP. Bedouins are one of the poorest ethnic groups in Egypt. Low level of education, lack of professional skills and inhospitable living conditions are the main causes of poverty.

Credit: WFP/Laura Melo

CHAPTER 2

Internal migration

Faced with dramatic headlines on international migrants and refugees, it is easy to forget that internal migration accounts for the majority of population movements. Rural to urban migration is a particularly salient phenomenon in low- and middle-income countries, leading to higher levels of urbanization. Among a variety of possible movements, permanent or temporary, between or within urban and rural areas, it is rural to urban flows and seasonal or circular flows that tend to pose the biggest challenges for education systems.


Both types of population movement characterize the Arab States, but nomads and pastoralists began rapidly declining as a share of the population two generations ago (e.g. Iraq National Population Commission, 2012), even if significant nomadic communities still exist in countries such as Sudan. Mauritania, with an almost exclusively nomadic population at the time of independence, became sedentary within a generation

(**Figure 2.1a**). Drought and desertification played a major role in the share of urban population growing from 7% in 1960 to 39% in 1990 (USGS, 2016).

For the past 30 years, Northern Africa and Western Asia have experienced slower urbanization rates than the rest of the world. Yemen is one of the few countries still undergoing significant urbanization (**Figure 2.1b**). Environmental degradation and extreme weather negatively affect production and income from agriculture and livestock and may account for 10% to 20% of the migration observed in the region. These pressures are expected to increase as climate conditions deteriorate (Wodon et al., 2014). However, as overall internal migration rates are currently low, the pressures are not immediately perceptible.

That being said, urbanization in rural areas and expansion in peri-urban areas make it difficult to discern the boundaries between rural and urban areas

FIGURE 2.1:
Urbanization has been slower in the Arab States than in the rest of the world for 30 years



Source: UNDESA (2018).

and precise movements between them (FAO, 2019). While exit rates from rural areas have declined since the 1970s, urban to urban migration has become more common (Miftah, 2018). In Egypt, most migration in the 1990s and 2000s occurred within urban areas (25% to 30%), followed by migration within rural areas (7% to 9%), rural to urban migration (4% to 7%) and urban to rural migration (4% to 6%) (Krafft et al., 2019).

Education is a key factor in all these movements. Higher levels of education increase aspirations for opportunities outside rural areas. Education is also a goal of migration, with young people seeking skills converging on urban centres offering opportunities for secondary education and above. Education provision needs to accommodate the large flows out of rural and into urban areas. Education systems should also respond to the needs of migrant children, who face various adjustment challenges, depending on their background and cultural and social ties with the destination.

This chapter looks at the interrelationship between internal migration and education. It discusses access to different levels of education, the quality and relevance of education provided, and policy efforts and results, including teaching policy and practice. It examines the education status of various groups of migrants, particularly those facing barriers, and considers education planning challenges resulting from population movements, whether in depopulated rural areas or burgeoning slums.

EDUCATION PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE DECISION TO MIGRATE

A dynamic process, internal migration is difficult to quantify with precision, especially in an increasingly mobile world. Determining comparable trends across countries is hindered by deficiencies in data sources and differences in national definitions. Countries define rural administrative boundaries, size of geographic units across which moves are recorded, and reference periods differently. Circular or seasonal movements are the least easily captured.



In 2005, according to census data, 763 million people, or 12% of the global population, lived outside the region of their birth (Bell and Charles-Edwards, 2013). In 2011–2012, according to Gallup data, 381 million

adults, or 8% of the global adult population, had moved between regions in the previous five years (Esipova et al., 2013). In 61 countries with comparable data, as much as 20% of the population had changed place of residence in the previous five years (Bernard et al., 2018).

Internal migration intensity is lower in the Arab States. Prior to the civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic, about 14% of the Syrian population had migrated from the area of their birth in their lifetime, and 5% had migrated in the previous five years. These averages masked significant differences by governorate, from 4% in Deir ez-Zor to 25% in the areas surrounding Damascus. If internal migration is defined not at the population level but in terms of households with at least one member born elsewhere, then almost 40% of households were affected by internal migration (Khawaja, 2002).

The definition of the areas being compared also matters: The smaller the areas and the closer the distances between them, the more likely people are to have migrated out of or into them. In the Syrian example above, the percentage of lifetime migrants was as high as 35% in the urban section of the Sweda governorate (Khawaja, 2002). Egypt is administratively divided into three nested levels: villages or neighbourhoods (*shyakha*), districts (*kism* or *markaz*) and governorates. In 2006, 24% of adults lived in a different *shyakha* than where they were born, 19% in a different *kism* and 10% in a different governorate (Krafft et al., 2019).

Migration rates vary by age. From an education perspective, migration affects relatively few primary and secondary school-age children; rather, it affects those who may be migrating for post-secondary education. In Tunisia, 4% of the population migrated between 2009 and 2014. The migration rate jumps from 2% among 15- to 19-year-olds to 7% among those in their 20s (and higher among females) and declines gradually among older people (for whom the gender pattern is reversed) (Figure 2.2a). Education of better quality in urban areas is a prominent reason for migration. On average, 8% of Tunisians migrated for education purposes; the rate was 23% among those who migrated to Gabes governorate (Figure 2.2b) and 21% among those who migrated from Kebili governorate (Tunisia National Institute of Statistics, 2017).

FIGURE 2.2:**In Tunisia, 8% of people migrate internally to pursue education opportunities***a. Internal migration intensity rate, by age and sex, 2009–2014**b. Reasons for internal migration, by governorate of destination, 2009–2014*

Source: Tunisia National Institute of Statistics (2017).

In most countries, rural to urban migrants are more educated than those who stay in rural areas, especially in countries with low average education levels. In the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, the percentage of people who had migrated in the previous five years was 5%, varying from 2% among those with primary education to 17% among those with tertiary education (Bernard et al., 2018). In Egypt, the respective percentages were 5% and 12% (Herrera and Badr, 2012).

In three rural migrant-sending areas of Tunisia, the share of those with a university degree was 6% among those who did not move, 10% among those who did not move but belonged to a household with at least one migrant and 24% among those who migrated internally. Migrant women with secondary or vocational education were more likely than their male counterparts to have migrated after 2011, while those with primary education were less likely than their male counterparts to have done so, suggesting the feminization of migration is led by the more educated (Zuccotti et al., 2018).

MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS HAVE VARIABLE EFFECTS ON EDUCATION

Internal migration, especially to urban areas, can increase education attainment when education in the area of origin is low or of insufficient quality. However, the education opportunities of children affected by internal migration may be compromised for several reasons, from precarious legal status to poverty.

IN EGYPT, RURAL TO URBAN MIGRATION INCREASES EDUCATION ATTAINMENT

Worldwide, there is little evidence on the links between internal migration and education.¹ Such analyses require detailed life history data on residence, migration, enrolment and attainment, which are not common. The same is true of the Arab States, where, in addition, the rate of internal migration is lower than average and societies are generally more homogeneous. Both factors make it less likely that children will face the obstacles their peers commonly face in other parts of the world.

¹ This section is based on Krafft et al. (2019).

Analysis for this report used a high-quality data set from the 2006 and 2012 Egypt Labour Market Panel Surveys. Internal migration rates were low but followed the same patterns as other countries in the region, declining between the two waves, peaking among 20- to 25-year-olds and increasing with education: 18% of illiterate adults vs 33% of those with university education moved between *shyakhas*. Nevertheless, comparisons with other countries are obscured by the high population density and geographical structure that allow temporary movements.

Many children aged 6 to 17 were born to parents who had migrated: 25% to mothers and 18% to fathers who had moved between *shyakhas*. Children whose mothers had migrated were marginally more likely to be attending school than those whose mothers had not migrated, but there were more notable differences in attainment. Young people whose mothers had moved from a *shyakha*, *kism* or governorate persisted in education longer: They had slightly lower dropout rates in primary and lower secondary education and were more likely to persist into secondary (grade 10) and post-secondary education (grade 13 and beyond).


The differences were largest among children whose mothers had moved from rural to urban areas (Figure 2.3a). The opposite attainment pattern was evident among those whose mothers had moved from urban to rural areas. A potential cause, among others, is that a return to a rural area may result from an adverse turn in family circumstances (Figure 2.3b). These outcomes persist, especially for urban to rural moves, even after taking other factors into account, such as travel mode and time to school, household wealth and household adult earnings in 2006. This suggests that migration plays a role through unobserved potential factors, such as availability or lack of a network to support the move and the migrating family's motivation and drive.

Migration also affects children left behind with one parent or other family members. Globally, effects vary according to the sex of the migrant, the age of the child, the duration of the migration and its regularity. Children's well-being may benefit from the stability of staying at home but suffer from not living with a parent. Their education trajectory may be interrupted if the departure of a parent means children need to supply missing labour inputs but improve if the migrant parent sends remittances.


FIGURE 2.3:

In Egypt, children of mothers who migrated from rural to urban areas were more likely to stay in education longer
Child education survival rate by grade and mother's internal migration status, Egypt, 2012

a. Mother migrated from rural to urban areas compared with those who stayed in rural areas



b. Mother migrated from urban to rural areas compared with those who stayed in urban areas



Note: The analysis compares 6- to 17-year-olds in 2006 with 11- to 24-year-olds in 2012. Migration was defined as a different current residence in 2006 than the mother's birthplace. Rural or urban migration rates were calculated among those with mothers born in the initial location.

Source: Krafft et al. (2019).

The incidence and volume of remittances and intra-household decisions related to their use are the key factors. An analysis for this report confirmed the importance of remittances to education spending decisions. Internal migrant remittances increased education spending by 19%, on average, in a set of studies on 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central, Southern and South-eastern Asia (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2018).

MIGRANT CHILD DOMESTIC WORKERS ARE AMONG THE MOST VULNERABLE TO EXCLUSION FROM EDUCATION

Although evidence is limited, child labour remains a concern in the Arab States. Among children aged 5 to 14, about 14% in Yemen, 7% of Palestinians in Lebanon, 5% in Iraq and 1% in Jordan were employed. The percentage of those involved in wage labour was the reverse: from 7% in Yemen to 44% in Jordan. About 30% of child labourers were not attending school (ILO, 2016a). The latest inter-agency estimate for 12 Arab countries in Western Asia suggests that 3% of children aged 5 to 17 are child labourers, of which half are engaged in hazardous labour (League of Arab States et al., 2019).

Around the world, many rural children work as domestic help in urban households. They are among the most vulnerable to non-attendance at school, although estimates are scarce. In 2012, around 17.2 million children aged 5 to 17 were in paid or unpaid domestic work in an employer's home; two-thirds were girls (ILO, 2017a). In Yemen, 35% of child labourers, but 59% of girls, are employed in private households (ILO and Yemen Central Statistical Organization, 2013).

Assessing the prevalence of child domestic work is difficult. Using interviews with a small number of former and current girl domestic workers and their employers in Egypt, a study estimated that 1.7% of households employed a child domestic worker (Ahmed and Jureidini, 2010). A similar study on Tunisia's Bizerte and Jendouba governorates showed that 95% of girl domestic workers had migrated and worked far from their homes; about 60% worked in the capital. Among those who began working before age 13, 47% from Jendouba and 86% from Bizerte relied on an intermediary to find work. Overall, 90% of girl domestic workers had not completed lower secondary school (ILO, 2016b).

In Morocco, the 2000s were a period of rapid progress in primary school completion, and the number of child labourers declined by three-quarters. While there is no equivalent recent estimate for child domestic workers, it is likely that similar rates of progress have been achieved since 2001, when it was estimated that up to 86,000 girls under 15 worked in domestic service. However, girls still migrating from rural areas to work in homes in Casablanca, Marrakech and Rabat leave school after completing grade 3 at best. The government introduced a law to regulate domestic work in 2018, which should result in stronger inspection (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2014, 2018). Protecting such children requires free, high-quality public education and social protection, along with early intervention to curb child labour and to prevent entry into hazardous work (ILO, 2015, 2017a).

MIGRANTS IN SLUMS HAVE FEWER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES

The arrival of migrants in cities often leads to residential segregation, slums being the most visible manifestation in low- and middle-income countries. While the share of the urban population in developing countries living in slums decreased from 39% in 2000 to 30% in 2014, the slum population continued to grow and is estimated to be at least 800 million (UN Habitat, 2016a). Slum settlement quality, legal status and basic service provision vary widely among and within countries, but hundreds of millions of slum dwellers lack basic services, including public education (UN Habitat, 2016b).

Governments may be reluctant to invest in education infrastructure in slums because the inhabitants settled on land they did not own. In other cases, urban planners respond too late to the need for public services, after the land is occupied and no plots are available to build a school (TADAMUN, 2016). Lack of public investment limits availability of schools. Secondary schools are few and far between, and the problem of transport is acute for the disadvantaged inhabitants. A survey of eight peri-urban areas of Oran, Algeria, identified not only transport cost but also the time, effort and harassment involved in getting to school as problems affecting attendance (Rebouha and Pochet, 2011).

Analysis of the 2016 Survey of Young People in Informal Urban Areas of Greater Cairo, which

questioned almost 3,000 people aged 15 to 29 living in 164 informal urban areas across the Cairo, Giza and Qalyubia governorates, found that, for one-quarter of them, general secondary schools were situated far outside the neighbourhood (**Figure 2.4**). There was considerable disparity in the distribution of general secondary schools within settlements, with such a school in 53% of the richest neighbourhoods vs 34% of the poorest (Sieverding et al., 2019). A survey of 6,000 households in 2012 showed that 30% of 12- to 17-year-olds living in slums and 33% in unplanned areas in Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said and Sohag had dropped out of school (UNICEF and ISDF, 2013). Parents living in slums reported hiding their place of residence to gain school admission, and children did the same to prevent stigmatization by teachers (Khalil et al., 2018).

Authorities in the Arab States continue to dismantle slums and relocate inhabitants. In the Algiers governorate of Algeria, the 2007 census enumerated 569 slums inhabited by 58,000 families; the number had increased to 72,000 by 2014. In the following four years, authorities dismantled 316 slums and resettled 44,000 families (APS, 2018). Some local governments take steps to improve accessibility of public facilities such as schools when slums are

demolished. In Casablanca, Morocco, as part of the Cities without Slums programme, construction companies are contracted not only to clear slums but also to identify new areas for resettlement and develop facilities in these areas, including schools (Medias24, 2018).

However, major problems persist. In Iraq, 13% of the population lives in 3,700 slums (UN-Habitat, 2017). In addition to its already congested conditions, Sadr City, reportedly the largest slum in Baghdad, has seen internally displaced people occupy schools as shelters. As a result, 9% of inhabitants cited education as a top-priority need (IOM, 2015). The Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights reported there were almost 2,200 uncompleted schools in slums around the country (Baghdad Post, 2018). The lack of sufficient government schools in slums has led to provision by non-government organizations. Although often the only option, these schools may not meet minimum standards and are poorly regulated.

NOMAD AND PASTORALIST EDUCATION NEEDS ARE NOT ADDRESSED

Mobility is an intrinsic part of life for many nomads and pastoralists, who depend on livestock. It is difficult to determine the number of people practising pastoralism, as they tend to be undercounted in household surveys and censuses (Randall, 2015). By one estimate, there were at least 200 million pastoralists globally (Davies and Hagelberg, 2014). Sudan's nomadic population was estimated at 2.7 million, or 8.7% of the population, in 2008.


Providing education to nomadic children is difficult due to their dispersal over large geographical areas, far from public services, and their seasonal movements. About 1,000 households were tracked in remote rural areas of the Somali autonomous regions of Galmudug and Puntland and the federal member state of Somaliland between 2013 and 2016. School spot checks indicated high seasonal fluctuation in student numbers: 50% more children were in school in May than in November–December, at the end of the dry season (JBS International, 2017).

Evidence on nomads' learning outcomes is rare. A study of 6–14 year olds in 12 primary schools in South Sinai governorate, Egypt, found that Bedouin learners were more likely not to reach minimum proficiency in mathematics (41%) than their peers (14%) (Monir et al., 2016). Countries with significant nomadic or pastoralist populations tend to have government

FIGURE 2.4:

General secondary schools are too far away for at least one-quarter of households in Cairo's poorest informal settlements

Percentage of youth saying a school facility is outside the neighbourhood and far, by settlement wealth and facility level, informal settlements in Cairo, 2016



Source: Sieverding et al. (2019).

departments, commissions or councils dedicated to the issue. For instance, the Ministry of Education in Sudan has a nomadic education department. Some plans have focused on inclusion of nomads in the education system. In Somalia and its federal member state of Somaliland, pastoralist education features prominently in the latest Education Sector Strategy Plans (Somalia Ministry of Education Culture and Higher Education, 2017b; Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2017).

Mobile schools, one of the earliest strategies for nomadic education, have been limited in scale due to cost. Sudan's 2009 Nomadic Education Strategic Plan aimed to shift from a mobile school approach to on-site learning centres in locations where children remain in place for relatively long periods. The plan also envisaged – but ultimately did not succeed in establishing – boarding schools, where children would study in residence during families' seasonal migrations (UNICEF, 2009). In Oman, boarding schools have been successful in retaining pastoralist learners (Chatty, 2006).

Rigid school calendars are a barrier for pastoralist children who cannot adjust their mobility needs. Pastoralist learners also challenge traditional teaching. Teachers may be reluctant to re-enrol temporarily absent children or feel that taking extra measures is beyond their responsibility (Coffey, 2013). To help pastoralist children catch up after long absences, a project in Somalia worked with teachers and local education officials on specific skills gaps, connecting numeracy to financial literacy and business development, and developing leadership skills. It has been rolled out in 150 primary schools in Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland (CARE International, 2016).

Education for nomadic populations should recognize and value their way of life. Vocational education can be particularly relevant to pastoralists, especially agricultural skills for a nomadic lifestyle. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has worked with nomadic communities on pastoralist field schools in countries such as Djibouti since 2012. Courses focus on farming-related skills aimed at increasing livestock management efficiency and mitigating climate change effects, such as drought, which plague the region and greatly affect pastoralists (FAO, 2013).


CONCLUSION

While internal migration rates are lower in the Arab States than in other regions, internal migrants include children who are particularly disadvantaged and either receive education of insufficient quality or are out of school. Data on migrant numbers and education status are in any case scarce. Improving the visibility of migrants, slum populations, and nomads and pastoralists will help ensure that, eventually, all enjoy the right to education.

Planning needs to integrate internal migration patterns and challenges, with a focus on reducing legal, administrative and financial barriers to education provision. Innovative approaches, such as flexible calendars and migrant tracking, and development of teacher capacity should be prioritized. While boarding schools often facilitate mobility, their condition needs adequate attention. Inclusive education requires ensuring that migrants receive relevant skills and education from qualified teachers in non-discriminatory environments. More broadly, social protection, urban inclusion and livelihood programmes must integrate education needs and demands into their efforts to support the most marginalized.

Philippines International School in Qatar. Over the years policy makers have made concerted efforts to ensure a range of private school options for migrant children in order to address the increase in school-going children in the country.

Credit: GEM Report/AI Rawi Productions



CHAPTER 3

International migration

Movements of people across borders have become more diverse and complex in recent years, with an increasing impact on individual education opportunities and education systems. Individuals face outright exclusion or adjustment costs that bear on their ability to invest in education or use their skills. Access to and benefits of education may be constrained for legal or administrative reasons or compromised by linguistic barriers or discrimination. Lack of robust and transparent mechanisms to recognize prior learning and credentials can obstruct use of skills. Even in more advanced receiving education systems, immigrants and, to a lesser extent, people with immigrant backgrounds often lag behind their peers, although they may attain more education and skills than they would have at home.

Education systems also bear adjustment costs in accommodating new arrivals. As the main opportunity to get to know and respect immigrants and people with immigrant backgrounds, schools play a lead role in an inclusive society, but increasing diversity presents challenges for teachers, students and parents. While the Global Compact for Safe and Regular Migration positions international migration as a shared responsibility, education is not prominent on the agenda (UNESCO, 2018a). The role of teachers and the fight against school segregation deserve wider recognition.

This chapter describes the scale and diversity of international migration to and from the Arab States and how it interacts with education opportunities, attainment and achievement. It reflects on policies and practices that exacerbate or alleviate challenges. Finally, it addresses student and professional mobility.

THE ARAB STATES SEND AND RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

The number of international migrants increased by more than two and a half times between 1960 and 2017, from 93 million to 258 million. However, contrary to popular perceptions, the percentage of

international migrants in the population has remained fairly constant. It fell from 3.1% in 1960 to 2.7% in 1990 and has increased since 2000 to reach 3.4% in 2017 (World Bank, 2018a). The Arab States present two opposite migration stories.

OIL-RICH GULF COUNTRIES HAVE THE HIGHEST IMMIGRATION RATES IN THE WORLD


The oil-rich countries of the GCC have the world's highest immigration rates. Aside from some microstates and small island developing countries, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are the only countries where migrants are the majority group (UNDESA, 2017). The share of migrants has increased, on average, by more than 10 percentage points since 2000 (**Figure 3.1a**). About one out of five of these migrants are from other Arab States, such as Egypt and Yemen, but two-thirds of migrants to the Gulf come from Southern Asia. The bilateral migration corridors from Bangladesh and India to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are among the largest in absolute terms (**Figure 3.1b**).

GCC economies have relied much more than the rest of the world on migrant workforces for their rapid expansion over the past half century. As a consequence, in some, migrants constitute more than half the population. Hence migration is managed through a system favouring short-term contracts, close collaboration between public and private actors based on a sponsorship system (*kafala*) and high migrant turnover, as limits are placed on length of stay, especially for low-skilled workers (Thiollet, 2016).


Immigration policy also promotes segmentation in society, and the labour market discourages integration and prevents family reunification. Laws also prohibit migrants in the lowest salary brackets from bringing dependents with them. The minimum monthly salary required to sponsor a child ranges from about US\$2,700 in Qatar to US\$800 in Oman, which halved its threshold in 2017 (Al Mukrashi, 2017). GCC countries also place severe restrictions on naturalization and citizenship. In recent years, several countries have started opening paths to long-term residency for

FIGURE 3.1:
Gulf Cooperation Council countries have the world's highest immigration rates

a. International migrants as percentage of population, Arab States, 2000 and 2017



b. Distribution of migrants to GCC countries, by country of origin, 2017



Source: UNDESA (2017).


certain populations (Nereim et al., 2019; Reynolds and Badam, 2019; Toumi, 2018; Younes, 2018). Even so, the term 'immigrant' is not commonly used: Governments in the region refer to non-nationals as 'foreign workers' or 'expatriates' (Fargues and Brouwer, 2012).

Unlike the traditional pattern of migrant settlement, therefore, the majority of migrants in GCC countries belong to the 20- to 39-year-old age group. There are also more migrants of early childhood age, due to the obstacles to acquiring citizenship, and almost no migrants of retirement age, because of the limits on staying (Figure 3.2).

This approach to migration management affects education provision. Despite restrictions, there were over 3 million migrants under age 19 in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia, amounting to almost 25% of their combined population. From 2010 to 2017, the number of migrant children increased by 20%, while children of nationals increased by 8% (GCC-Stat, 2019).

FIGURE 3.2:
Migrants stay for shorter periods in Gulf Cooperation Council countries than elsewhere

Percentage distribution of international migrant stock, world and selected GCC countries, 2017




Source: UNDESA (2017).


FIGURE 3.3:

The share of migrants from the Arab States to Europe has increased since 2000


a. International migrants as percentage of population, selected countries in Europe and Northern America, 2000 and 2017



b. International migrants from Arab States as percentage of population, selected countries in Europe and Northern America, 2000 and 2017



c. Citizens living abroad as percentage of in-country population, Arab States, 2000 and 2015




SOME ARAB STATES HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF MIGRANTS

Some Arab countries have emigration rates well above the global average of 3.4%. In 2017, of the 9.8 million Arab State citizens who migrated outside the region, 65% went to Europe, 17% to Northern America and 13% to sub-Saharan Africa.

The percentage of international migrants in the population increased between 2000 and 2017 by three percentage points to 14.4% in western Europe and by five percentage points to 13.4% in northern Europe, while it doubled to 10.5% in southern Europe. For instance, it rose from 4% to 10% in Italy and to 13% in Spain (Figure 3.3a). Over the same period, the percentage of international migrants from the Arab States to European countries, excluding Syrian refugees, increased by 1.4 percentage points to 8%. It decreased in Italy and Spain, which received relatively larger numbers of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, but increased in France, the Netherlands and Sweden (Figure 3.3b).

From sending countries' perspective, the percentage of Arab States citizens living abroad, excluding Palestinian and Syrian refugees, is highest in Lebanon, whose historically large diaspora increased during the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 2000 and 2015, the percentage of citizens living abroad increased from 6.8% to 8.2% among Moroccans and from 4.9% to 6.7% among Tunisians (Figure 3.3c). Moroccans are the largest group of Arab international migrants in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Algerians are the largest group in France. Iraqis are the largest group in Denmark and Sweden (Figure 3.3d).

d. Distribution of migrants from Arab States to selected European countries, by country of origin, 2017



Note: Data for the Syrian Arab Republic in Figure 3.3c are for 2010, before the war, rather than 2015.

Source: UNDESA (2017).

Opinion polls suggest that the percentage of the global population that would like to emigrate has increased in recent years, from 13% in 2010–2012 to 15% in 2015–2017. The corresponding figures in North Africa and the Middle East were 19% and 24%, respectively (Esipova et al., 2018). According to the Gallup Potential Net Migration Index, if all adults who wanted to emigrate were to do so, the populations of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia would decline by 20% to 30%, while that of Saudi Arabia would double and that of the United Arab Emirates would triple (Gallup, 2018).

MIGRATION INFLUENCES EDUCATION

Overall, migrants are older than the general population. In 2017, 14% of international migrants were under age 20, a much lower percentage than for the general population or those forcibly displaced. Thus the high population shares of immigrants reported in the previous section do not automatically translate into high shares of immigrants in the student population. However, when discussing the relationship between migration and education, it is important to think not only of first-generation immigrants but also of their children, so-called second- or even third-generation immigrants.

Analysis of data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) suggests that, in a majority of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at least one out of five 15-year-old students was an immigrant or had an immigrant background in 2015 (OECD, 2016a). On average, 5.4% were first-generation immigrants, 7.1% were second-generation, 8.9% were natives of mixed heritage and 1.8% were returning students born abroad.

In GCC countries, the percentage of immigrant students is lower than the percentage of immigrants, as many immigrants are young men who travel without their families. While the percentage of immigrants in the overall population in Saudi Arabia was 37% in 2017, the percentage of first-generation immigrants in the grade 8 student population was 4% while the percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants was 9%, according to the 2015 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). But in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, first- and second-generation immigrants were more than half of the secondary school student population (**Figure 3.4**).

In terms of education attainment and achievement, understanding migration's impact involves comparing those who do and do not migrate, while acknowledging they differ in more than the decision to migrate. The other key comparison is between immigrants and natives, who similarly differ in more than migration status. For instance, immigrants tend to live in poorer areas served by lower-quality schools, contributing to their lower education attainment and skills acquisition.

EDUCATION INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF MIGRATING

Globally, migrants are not a random population. They differ from the general population in characteristics both easily observed (e.g. education) and harder to observe (e.g. motivation), both of which influence migration. The more educated are more likely to emigrate, being better able to gather information, respond to economic opportunities, utilize transferable skills and finance emigration. In 2000, global emigration rates were 5.4% among those with tertiary education, 1.8% for secondary education and 1.1% for primary education (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).

However, this pattern does not apply everywhere. The precise relationship between education and migration can be specific to individual migration corridors for historical reasons or as a result of selective immigration policies that apply to them. For instance, most Indian migrants to the Gulf are from Kerala state, which has education attainment rates above the national average. In addition, the pattern of migration in this corridor has changed over time, with the percentage of more educated, white-collar workers having increased from 10% to 30% between 1980 and 2010 in response to demand (Chanda and Gupta, 2018).


REMITTANCES BOOST HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION SPENDING

The opportunity to send money home is a key motivation for migration, and remittances are a substantial income source for many. Globally, households received US\$613 billion in international remittances in 2017, a flow four times higher than official development aid. Of this, US\$53 billion went to households in the Arab States. The countries in the region receiving the largest amounts in absolute terms were Egypt (US\$20 billion), Lebanon (US\$8 billion) and Morocco (US\$7.5 billion). The countries receiving the most remittances as a percentage of GDP were Palestine (17%), Lebanon (13%) and Yemen (12%) (World Bank, 2018d). Morocco and Tunisia, which receive most

FIGURE 3.4:

In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, at least one out of two secondary school students is a first- or second-generation immigrant

Distribution of 15-year-old students, by type of immigrant background, selected Arab States and OECD countries, 2015



Source: GEM Report team analysis based on the 2006 and 2015 PISA and 2015 TIMSS.

of their remittances from Europe, have enjoyed a stable income flow over 50 years. Egypt and Jordan, which rely on remittances from Gulf countries, received much higher but more volatile flows due to oil price fluctuation (**Figure 3.5**).

Extra income increases household spending across the board. Whether it increases education spending depends on context. Households in rural India that received international remittances spent 17% more on education than households that received no remittances (Parida et al., 2015). In Jordan, however, remittances from low-skilled migration led to lower investment in education (Mansour et al., 2011). Outcomes can differ by gender. Male-headed households in rural Morocco were less likely to invest remittances in girls' education than in that of boys (Bouoiyour et al., 2016).

A meta-analysis for this report examined 73 high-quality, peer-reviewed articles covering 30 countries. International remittances increased education spending by 35%, on average, in 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central, Southern and South-eastern Asia. The effect was larger in Latin America, where household education expenditure tends to be high, but close to zero in

eastern Europe, where such expenditure tends to be low (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2018).


Despite new technology, such as mobile payments and prepaid bank cards, high commissions and other transfer fees discourage use of formal remittance channels in favour of more efficient informal and in-kind transfers. It is therefore important for migrants to be aware of the opportunities and challenges when sending remittances (**Box 3.1**).

The global average cost of remitting is 7.1%, but there is wide variation by delivery channel and by country. Traditional banks cost the most, averaging 10.6%. By destination, costs range from 5.2% for Southern Asia to 7.3% for the Middle East and Northern Africa and 9.4% for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018c). By contrast, SDG target 10.c aims to see migrant remittance costs reduced to less than 3%, on average. Based on the estimated US\$613 billion in global remittances in 2017, reducing costs from 7.1% to 3% would translate into savings of more than US\$25 billion annually. Assuming a share of total household spending on education of 4%, lowering remittance costs would allow households to spend an additional US\$1 billion on education per year.

FIGURE 3.5:

Arab countries with migrants in the Gulf have seen the level of remittances fluctuate

Remittances received as percentage of GDP, selected Arab countries, 1970–2018



Source: World Bank (2018b).

Several studies suggest that remittances' overall effects on education outcomes are positive. In Morocco, children in households that received remittances were 11 percentage points more likely to be attending school than in those that did not (Ibourk and Bensaid, 2014). Effects also differ by gender. In Jordan, remittances had a positive impact on post-compulsory education attendance only among males (Mansour et al., 2011). Likewise, in rural southern Morocco, remittances increased school attendance only for boys (Bouoiyour et al., 2016).

IMMIGRANTS PAY AN EDUCATION PRICE IN DESTINATION COUNTRIES

Immigrants often leave education early. In 2017, 19% of foreign-born people aged 18 to 24 in the European Union had left school early, compared with 10% of natives (Eurostat, 2017). Immigrant students in OECD countries are nearly twice as likely as natives to repeat a grade (OECD, 2015, 2018b). In Spain's Catalonia region, 49% of Northern Africans aged 15 to 34 had not completed compulsory education, compared with 10% of Latin Americans and 4% of immigrants from other EU countries. Age at migration is usually a major determinant of education needs, opportunities and trajectories; whether one enters the host system at the beginning, middle or end of compulsory education greatly affects outcomes. Yet students from Northern African countries cut their education short regardless of background and age at entry into Spanish education (de Miguel-Luken and Solana-Solana, 2017).

Many countries divert low achievers into less demanding tracks. Ability sorting leads to inequality and a stronger association between social background and student results. While vocational training can motivate disadvantaged students put off by more academic tracks, it may compromise subsequent opportunities for students with immigrant backgrounds. In Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 9% of Moroccan second-generation immigrant students entered vocational tracks in lower secondary school at age 12 in 2007/08, compared with 2% of natives (Crul et al., 2012).

Attainment is not the only outcome of interest. Among 15-year-old students, 49% of first-generation and 61% of second-generation immigrants attained at least level 2 proficiency in reading, mathematics and science in the 2015 PISA, compared with 72% of natives (OECD, 2018). Among the OECD countries for which 2006 and 2015 PISA results can be compared, level 2 proficiency increased by seven percentage points among

BOX 3.1:**Migrants need financial education**

Financial literacy helps individuals better manage their economic circumstances and avoid fraud or financial exploitation. Migrants and refugees face particular vulnerabilities. Financial and welfare systems in host communities, as well as abuse reporting mechanisms, may initially be opaque, especially to less educated newcomers. Migrants are thus vulnerable to exploitative contractual agreements, exorbitant recruitment fees, exploitative visa arrangements and outright scams. The consequences range from financial struggles to human trafficking or bonded labour (UNODC, 2015).

Low financial literacy is pervasive. According to the Global Financial Literacy Survey, around one-third of adults were financially literate. In the Arab States, Yemen had the lowest financial literacy rate at 13% and Tunisia the highest at 45%. Among the seven countries that jointly accounted for 71% of remittances from the Arab States, financial literacy ranged from 18% in Nepal to 35% in Sri Lanka (Figure 3.6). Among migrants, concepts such as interest compounding, inflation and risk diversification are often not well understood (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).

Like everyone, migrants stand to benefit from a sound understanding of financial products, such as current accounts, savings accounts and electronic payments, as well as from personal money management skills, such as knowing how to budget, track expenses, keep records and understand debt management and credit (interest calculation, principal outstanding, repayment prioritization) (Atkinson and Messy, 2015; OECD, 2016b). In terms of remittances, a financially literate migrant would, at a minimum, need to understand channels and compare cost components, including exchange


rates, fees and varying inflation rates. More educated migrants typically exhibit higher than average entrepreneurship rates.

Financial education programmes for migrants often involve a combination of international, government, non-government and private sector stakeholders. The Moroccan Foundation for Financial Education partnered with the International Labour Organization to set up financial education programmes for the large communities of undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. They conducted qualitative surveys before developing the training to ensure the toolkit met the needs of both migrants and their families (World Bank, 2017a).

Even migrants with good literacy levels may be unfamiliar with financial terms and features of financial products. Undocumented or newly arrived migrants may not trust financial institutions and worry that information requested for access to financial services will be used to identify and deport them. Thus it is unsurprising that financial education initiatives alone are not necessarily effective. Evidence on financial education's impact on migrants' ultimate economic well-being is mixed and context dependent. Much of it links financial literacy to poor or smart financial decisions, but financial education's causal influence is less clear (Entorf and Hou, 2018). A study of Indian migrants in Qatar found some small impact on financial decisions (Seshan and Yang, 2014). Meta-analyses have produced mixed evidence (Fernandes et al., 2014). The most recent showed a small impact on financial attitudes and behaviours of disadvantaged groups (Kaiser and Menkhoff, 2017).

FIGURE 3.6:**Yemen has the world's lowest financial literacy rate**

Percentage of financially literate adults, 2014



Notes: Adults were defined as financially literate if they answered questions correctly on at least three out of four concepts for financial decision-making: basic numeracy, interest compounding, inflation and risk diversification. The red bars show the Arab States; the purple bars show major origin countries of migrants in the Arab States.

Source: Klapper et al. (2015).

second-generation immigrants but decreased by three percentage points among first-generation immigrants.

Lack of language proficiency is an education disadvantage. Combining language and content learning as early as possible has proven quite effective in integrating children with an immigrant background into education systems (OECD, 2015). In western Europe, participation of Moroccan immigrants in language courses in the first four years after immigration is associated with a positive and long-term impact on language skills and social contacts (Hoehne and Michalowski, 2018).

Education aspirations are a further dimension of interest. While immigrant parents in France have higher aspirations than native parents, in Italy, 25% of students of Moroccan parents reported that they wanted to attend university, compared with 49% of natives (Minello and Barban, 2012). In Spain, 59% of youth born in Morocco aspired to go to university, compared with 70% of students born to immigrants (Aparicio and Portes, 2014). New analysis for this report shows how all these factors interact in the education trajectories of students of Northern African origin in France (Ichou, 2018) (**Box 3.2**).

MIGRANTS MOSTLY ATTEND SEPARATE SCHOOLS IN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COUNTRIES

GCC countries have established education systems to support migrant children's needs.² However, they largely rely on private schools, where access and quality are linked to ability to pay. GCC countries provide free education to nationals. To a degree, they allow non-nationals to attend public schools, provided these children can study in Arabic and meet any additional requirements. Regulations on entry into the system vary by country (**Table 3.1**).

There is a large private school market for migrant children in GCC countries

As public schools are not accessible for most migrant children, GCC policy-makers have strived to ensure a range of private schooling options for them. Across the region, about 30% of all students are in private schools, with the largest proportions enrolled in the United Arab Emirates (73%) and Qatar (62%). Saudi Arabia, the country with the largest total number of students (nearly 6 million), has the lowest percentage of students in private schools (18%). The private education sector is a lucrative market,

TABLE 3.1:
Fees and other information related to non-nationals in public schools in Gulf Cooperation Council countries

Country	Fees for non-nationals	Other information	Source(s)
Bahrain	Free for both Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis	Box 3.3	Toumi (2017a)
Kuwait	Free for non-Kuwaitis who are eligible and obtain approval for enrolment in government schools	Typically, non-Kuwaitis are prohibited from enrolling in public schools; there are exceptions for children of parents employed in specific occupations, such as public school teachers and healthcare workers	<i>The Daily Star</i> (2018); Kuwait Government Online (2018b); Saleh (2018)
Oman	US\$400 to US\$520	Prior to 2018, public education was free for non-nationals and nationals	Al Mukrashi (2018); Qanoon (2018)
Qatar	Registration fee applies for non-Qataris, if there is space available for them to enrol	Priority is given to Qataris and those from a select list; non-Qatari admission is limited to children of parents working in specific occupations (e.g. Qatar Airways)	Hukoomi (2019); Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2019)
Saudi Arabia	Previously, non-Saudis had to pay; there are unconfirmed suggestions the country is now providing free education	The Ministry of Education prioritizes proximity for Saudi students over expatriates; non-Saudis also have to present original education equivalencies and valid residency permits for at least two semesters	Al-Behajjan (2017); Al-Sulami (2016); <i>Arab News</i> (2010, 2014); <i>Khaleej Times</i> (2017); Saudi Arabia Ministry of Education (2019)
United Arab Emirates	US\$1,650 registration fee	Enrolment capped at 20% for non-nationals	Pennington (2017); United Arab Emirates Government (2018b)

² This section is based on Kippels and Ridge (2019).

BOX 3.2:**In France, socio-economic factors largely explain the education gap between natives and students of North African origin**

Analysis for this report, based on France's 2007–2013 *panels d'élèves* (student panel surveys), points to multiple factors that need to be considered before concrete conclusions can be drawn about the education trajectories of students with immigrant backgrounds. Some 40% of parents born in France hold manual and routine non-manual worker occupations, compared with 73% among immigrant parents from Northern Africa. The contrast in parental education is even starker: 11% of native but 52% of Northern African parents have no more than lower secondary education.

Students of Northern African origin have an average academic achievement score about half a standard deviation below the mean in lower secondary school (grades 6 and 9, with the gap increasing marginally between these grades). Taking socio-economic and demographic background into account (parental occupation, education attainment and employment; and family structure) tells a different story. Students of Northern African origin perform at the same level as native students with the same socio-economic and demographic background in grade 6 and only slightly worse in grade 9. There is as much variation within this group as for natives.

Students' academic performance can also be observed over time. Performance gaps do not change much over 1995, 2002 and 2007, although the slight observable changes suggest the gaps are narrowing, as with migrant students of Northern African origin. Students of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian parents are doing as well as those of native parents with the same background (Figure 3.7).

A high level of grade repetition is a distinct feature of the French education system. Over 15% of children repeat at least one year in primary school,

and over 10% in lower secondary school. In cumulative terms, 15% of native students repeated at least one grade, compared with about 25% of students of Northern African origin. Children of immigrants were more likely to repeat in primary school, but the differences were much smaller for lower secondary school. Many children of immigrants struggle at the beginning of their academic trajectory due to lack of familiarity with the French language.

At the end of lower secondary school, students are assigned to one of three main tracks: academic and technological, long vocational or short vocational, which prepares them for quick entry into the labour market, including apprenticeships. About 65% of children of natives enter upper secondary school in the academic and technological track, compared with 57% of students of Northern African origin.

Since 1981, France's main policy to reduce inequality among schools has been Education Priority Zones (ZEP), a compensatory programme aimed at giving more resources to schools in underprivileged neighbourhoods. The difference in attendance at ZEP schools is striking: 2% of native students vs 15% of children with parents from Northern Africa. The division is also indirectly expressed in the concentration of children of immigrants in large, densely populated urban areas: 32% of children of natives but 65% of children of Northern African origin attend school in a city of more than 200,000 inhabitants.

Yet immigrant parents and their children hold higher aspirations for education than natives. About 69% of native parents and 76% of parents of Northern African background wish their children to attend higher education. The percentage point gap more than doubles when background factors are taken into account.

FIGURE 3.7:

In France, students of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian origin do as well as natives after accounting for background

Average performance scores in grade 6 before and after accounting for socio-economic and demographic background, by parental place of birth, France, 1995, 2002 and 2007



Source: Ichou (2018).

BOX 3.3:**Bahrain provides open access to public schools for migrants**

Bahrain is the only GCC country with open access to the public system for migrants, providing that migrant parents meet the requirements to sponsor children in the country. Non-nationals make up about half of public school students (Toumi, 2017b).

The country has not historically charged school fees or imposed other restrictions on migrant enrolment in public education. There have been discussions on a proposal to charge non-citizens about US\$1,100 to attend, with possible exceptions for students from countries where Bahraini children are eligible to receive free public education (Al Bawaba, 2018; Toumi, 2017a). In 2017, the education minister rejected the proposal: 'Providing free education for foreigners is in line with the policies of Bahrain and its legal and international commitments to promoting education free of charge.' The minister also noted that the approximately 4,000 children with Bahraini mothers but non-citizen fathers were considered non-citizens (Toumi, 2017a). The bill still appears to be under debate (Al Bawaba, 2018).

It may be noted that when Oman imposed fees on non-nationals in 2018, negative effects mostly fell on Arab migrant students (Al Mukrashi, 2018).


valued at some US\$13.2 billion in 2016/17 and expected to double to US\$26.2 billion by 2023, with almost 40% of the increase coming from increased tuition fees (Hoteit et al., 2018).

While private schools in GCC countries tend to serve migrants predominantly, nationals are increasingly enrolling (Dubai KHDA and FDI, 2016; Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau, 2019; *The Peninsula*, 2017). Oman is the only GCC country where nationals make up a significant majority of private school students (88%); the next highest share is in Bahrain (55%). Nationals account for 19% in Qatar and 17% in the United Arab Emirates (**Figure 3.8**).

Some governments encourage nationals to enrol their children in the private system. In Qatar, the government provides Qatari children with school vouchers (*The Peninsula*, 2017). Saudi Arabia removed quotas that had restricted Saudi students from enrolling in private schools (Kerr, 2013). It also simplified the process for opening private schools and set a target to increase total private school enrolment to 25% of all students by 2020, from 18% in 2018 (Hoteit et al., 2018; Strategic Gears Management Consultancy, 2018). The United Arab Emirates government provides private school scholarships to distinguished Emirati students (Dubai Government, 2019). In Dubai, United Arab Emirates, the number of public schools has been steadily shrinking; those remaining largely cater to poorer families (Dubai KHDA, 2011, 2019b).

FIGURE 3.8:
Most students enrolled in private schools in GCC countries are non-nationals

Distribution of public and private school student population in GCC countries, by citizenship



Note: Data were not available for private school students in Saudi Arabia.

Sources: Alayam (2015); Al-Sulami (2016); Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau (2019); Oman National Centre for Statistics and Information (2019); Statista (2017); Toumi (2017b).

While there are non-profit schools in the region, sometimes backed by foreign governments, for-profit private schools are dominant. Some 70% of private schools are for-profit in Qatar and 88% in the United Arab Emirates. The largest private school companies, such as GEMS Education, the world's largest for-profit school chain, which originated in the United Arab Emirates, operate schools at a range of price tiers and market themselves to families based on ability to pay. Low-fee schools often target the large numbers of Southern Asian students residing in the region, as well as some Arab migrants. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the average fee was US\$700 for Indian curriculum schools, US\$9,200 for British curriculum and US\$12,100 for American curriculum in 2014 (Ridge et al., 2015).

The financial impact on migrant parents whose children attend private schools in GCC countries can be considerable, and struggling to pay school fees is not uncommon (Ahmed, 2010;

Arab News, 2010; Nasir, 2018; Shaaban, 2018). In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Arab and Southern Asian migrants with children in private schools spent, on average, 19% and 22% of their income on fees; Western migrants spent, on average, 10% (Ridge et al., 2015).

Some parents send children back to their countries of origin for schooling, or homeschool them to reduce expenses (Bakshi, 2014; Issa, 2013; Dubai KHDA, 2014; Nasir, 2017). There are many cases of out-of-school children whose parents are unable to pay tuition at all (*Arab News*, 2010). In 2017, an estimated 20,000 Pakistani children were out of school in the United Arab Emirates due to lack of space in affordable schools (Khaishgi, 2017). In 2018, at least 460 children were out of school in Ras Al Khaimah because their parents could not afford to pay private school tuition (Shaaban, 2018).

Education quality often depends on the community served

National education authorities regulate private schools across GCC countries. They oversee licences, fee increases and inspections to varying degrees to maintain quality of provision. However, they may be more focused on school quality for nationals; there have been cases of private schools being declared unfit for nationals but acceptable for migrants. In 2018/19 in the United Arab Emirates, for instance, the Ministry of Education banned nationals from enrolling at 47 private schools that remained open to non-nationals (Team KT, 2018).

Private schools in GCC countries offer an extensive range of curricular options, mostly in line with the country of origin of the student body. The 194 private schools in the emirate of Dubai alone offer 17 different curricula (Dubai KHDA, 2018). Students are taught in the language of their home country or in English and use textbooks from the country of origin.

The prevalence of private schools likely influences the language and focus areas of national curricula in the GCC. Many national curricula have gone through stages of incorporating English, the language commonly used to communicate with migrants, sparking fears and debates about national children losing the ability to communicate properly in Arabic (Clarke, 2016). Reforms in Qatar have included switching language of instruction from Arabic to English (Nasser, 2017). Various reforms in the United Arab Emirates since 1994 have included teaching certain primary and secondary education subjects in English. Not only is English taught as a second language, but it is also the language of

instruction for sciences and mathematics (Kannan, 2008; Shaheen, 2010; United Arab Emirates Government, 2019).

In general, education ministries do not make substantive efforts to integrate migrant children, who are expected to be temporary residents, like their parents. Article 2 of Saudi Arabia's Foreign School Bylaw makes clear that migrant children are expected to return to their country of origin: 'This Bylaw regulates foreign schools of expatriates residing in the Kingdom to provide adequate education for their children within definite regulations, in order for them to be able to continue their education when they return home' (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Education, 1997).

However, some countries, including Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (particularly Dubai), have made efforts to ensure that all private school students learn Arabic to a good standard and are taught about the country through a common social studies curriculum (Alayam, 2015; Dubai KHDA, 2019a). Research into teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers in the region is limited. There have been no studies thus far specifically examining its impact on helping non-national students integrate (Sakho, 2012; United Arab Emirates Ministry of Education, 2017).

UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS FACE OBSTACLES IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION

As elsewhere, irregular immigration exists in the Arab States, although its volume is difficult to assess. Migrants may find themselves residing in GCC countries in an irregular situation because they have 'violated a law relating to lawful entry, legal residency status, legal employment status, or any other situation regarded by the host country, or a sending country, as a breach of the existing laws' (Fargues and Shah, 2017).

In Saudi Arabia, migrants may have entered the country by land or sea without obtaining a visa; over a period of 30 years, 99% of those arrested at the Saudi borders were Yemeni nationals. Others may have entered legally with umrah and hajj visas but overstayed, entered legally with work permit visas but left Saudi employers without consent, or been born in the country to undocumented parents. Children in that case have no nationality documentation or residency permit and cannot enrol in a public school or university (Alsharif, 2017). Reported examples include children born to nationals of Jordan, Myanmar and Sudan (*Arab News*, 2010). Related examples of Ethiopian and Indian children have been reported in the United Arab Emirates (Fernandez, 2017; Sankar, 2018).

The stateless, some of whom are migrants who fell afoul of immigration or nationality laws, are a special case. An estimated 10 million people worldwide are stateless, lacking a recognized nationality. The *bidoon* (without) in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (**Box 3.4**) also face difficulty accessing education services due to uncertainty surrounding their nationality (Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2017).

MOROCCO HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TO INTEGRATE RECENT IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES INTO ITS EDUCATION SYSTEM

An increasing number of sub-Saharan African migrants aiming to settle in Europe remain in transit countries, such as Morocco (Mourji et al., 2016). A precise estimate is difficult to determine. Officially, as of 2018, there were 84,000 foreigners in Morocco,

and earlier estimates suggested that immigrants of sub-Saharan African origin represented 27% (HCP, 2014). Two large regularization campaigns, in 2013 and 2017, enabled over 50,000 immigrants to gain regular status, including about 7,500 children (La vie éco, 2018). Other estimates put the number of migrants at 200,000 (Natter, 2018). Social media offers innovative and alternative data sources (Zagheni et al., 2017).

Morocco's 2000 education law limited access to education to Moroccan children, but the 2011 constitution recognized the right to education of all children. In 2013, the Ministry of National Education specified in a circular that all foreign children of compulsory school age living in Morocco could be integrated into the education system, whether formal or non-formal, public or private. At the time, some document requirements were difficult to meet (Caritas Maroc, 2015; Qassemy et al., 2014). For instance,

BOX 3.4:

Stateless people in Kuwait and other Gulf countries lack access to public education

The *bidoon* are a population in Kuwait without nationality (Vora, 2018). They fall into three categories: those born to people who did not apply for nationality, or did not have the necessary documentation, when Kuwait became independent in 1961; those who were employed by the Kuwaiti army and police forces and settled in Kuwait with their families in the 1960s; and those born to a Kuwaiti mother and a stateless or foreign father (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The government disputes the estimate of 100,000 *bidoon* (Human Rights Watch, 2019), considering 34,000 eligible for citizenship and the rest migrants or their descendants (Middle East Eye, 2016).

While the *bidoon* received social and economic benefits similar to citizens in the 1960s and 1970s, including free education, instability after the 1980s led to the removal of these benefits. Kuwait's nationality law became stricter, e.g. in 1980 Kuwaiti women's right to pass citizenship on to their children if the father was not Kuwaiti was taken away. The *bidoon* do not receive the civil identification cards necessary to enrol in most schools and training institutions. Instead, they receive security cards, which protect them from deportation and allow registration in private schools, to which they are limited.

In 1986, the government created a parallel private school system and transferred 50,000 *bidoon* students from public schools (Beaugrand, 2010). These schools are believed to be under-resourced and have lower standards than public schools. Parents pay annual fees of US\$860 to US\$1,550 plus textbook and uniform costs. The government set up a fund to subsidize 70% of these fees (Elgayar, 2014). While many *bidoon* children receive funds, not all do, including children who lack valid security cards or do not pass annual examinations (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Bidoon students are ineligible for scholarships to study abroad and have been banned from Kuwaiti universities since 1987. However, they have access to the Kuwait branch of the Arab Open University, which welcomes stateless people; one-quarter of its graduates were *bidoon* in 2007 (Beaugrand, 2010).

Some children are even barred from private schools. In the 1990s, the government launched a campaign encouraging *bidoon* to seek foreign nationality. This led to the sale of fake passports. The Kuwaiti authorities did not grant birth certificates to children of those holding such passports and refused to enrol them even in private schools (France 24, 2014).

The government has presented plans to grant citizenship to some *bidoon* while expecting others to obtain foreign passports, which would allow them to remain in Kuwait legally, for instance through an agreement with the Comoros to grant passports in exchange for infrastructure investments (Zacharias, 2018). The Ministry of Education recently rejected a proposal by the parliament to register *bidoon* children in public schools (Amnesty International, 2019). In the latest development, the government announced a 'radical and fair' solution to the issue (Sherbini, 2019).

Kuwait is the most visible example of a larger regional issue. For instance, Qatari women married to foreigners could not pass nationality on to their children, which led to expulsions and family separations. In 2018, these children were allowed to gain permanent residency, giving them access to public education. However, 100 residency permits are given per year, and the children are still deprived of Qatari citizenship. They may apply for it only after 25 years of permanent residency (MENA Rights Group, 2018).

the Casablanca Regional Academy of Education and Training required medical certificates, especially from Ebola-affected countries, for enrolment (Caritas Maroc, 2015; Qassemy et al., 2014). A non-government organization (NGO) estimated that less than half the 8- to 17-year-olds received in its Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier centres attended school in 2014 (Caritas Maroc, 2015).

In 2013, Morocco launched a comprehensive migration policy framework to facilitate immigrants' integration into Moroccan society in accordance with the constitution and international commitments. The 2014 National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum confirmed its strong political will to integrate immigrants and protect human rights. Education is the first programme area of the strategy, with three objectives: integrate immigrants and refugees into the formal and non-formal education systems, promote cultural diversity and teach students Moroccan languages and culture (Morocco Government, 2018). In 2018, the Ministry of National Education developed a toolkit to define a formal framework and guide immigrants' integration into the education system at the organizational, administrative and pedagogical levels (Morocco Ministry of National Education, 2018).

Immigrant students are evaluated, then usually integrated into classes based on level, not age (*L'Economiste*, 2019). Ministry support units include immigrants in their out-of-school children targeting efforts and the Child to Child and Caravane initiatives, and the ministry developed radio and TV spots to encourage immigrant children to enrol. In total, 5,500 immigrant children were enrolled in 2017/18 (Morocco Government, 2018). Programmes targeting disadvantaged Moroccan students have been extended to immigrants and refugees, including the King's One Million School Bags initiative, providing students with supplies since 2013 and access to housing and canteen services since 2015.

Schools do not provide language education to immigrant students (*L'Economiste*, 2019). The Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Immigration Affairs collaborate with international organizations and civil society organizations, such as Caritas Morocco, to improve education opportunities for immigrant children. As of 2018, about 1,600 immigrants were enrolled in civil society organization-run classes in Moroccan languages and cultures (Morocco Government, 2018). In 2017/18, 300 migrant youth

benefited from a non-formal education programme. The government also aims to open a second-chance school in Rabat.

Immigrant living conditions remain precarious, and levels of violence and hostility towards migrants are high (GADEM, 2018; Migration Policy Institute, 2019). The National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum seeks to raise awareness concerning immigration issues through campaigns in schools and adapted teacher training and school curricula. The Ministry of National Education developed a Values Guide for teachers to promote equity and tolerance, updated the Islamic education textbook to promote tolerance and aims to review all textbooks, and organized three arts competitions on migration for students at all levels (Morocco Government, 2018).

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION TAKES MANY FORMS

International student mobility is a form of skilled migration. Although it affects a minority of students and faculty, the internationalization of tertiary education has major implications for the flow and exchange of ideas and knowledge. Internationalization involves mobility not only of people but also of courses, programmes and institutions, affecting education at home and abroad (Altbach and Knight, 2007). The classification of education services as a commodity in the 1995 General Agreement on Trade and Services expanded global trade in education (Spring, 2015). Internationalization brings competition among providers and a risk of commercial and other interests overshadowing academic mission and values (IAU, 2012). To reap the benefits requires harmonizing education systems and recognizing academic qualifications across countries. At the same time, the potential loss of talent remains a concern for poorer countries.

STUDENT MOBILITY IS INCREASING IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD

Globally, 2.3% of the tertiary education student population is internationally mobile.³ Half of all international students go to five English-speaking receiving countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States (Project Atlas, 2017). Moreover, the shares of

3 This section is based on Bhandari et al. (2018).

international students have grown to 8% in France and 6% in Germany, in part because they increasingly offer postgraduate programmes in English (Brenn-White and van Rest, 2012). Three out of the five largest sending countries in 2016 were in Asia: China, India and the Republic of Korea accounted for 25% of outbound mobility. Europe was the second-largest sending region at 23%.

The Arab States display both higher inbound and outbound mobility than the global average. Both ratios have been rising in recent years. The outbound mobility ratio increased from 3.1% in 2009 to 4.3% in 2017, a trend also observed in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Southern Asia during the same period. The inbound mobility ratio in the Arab States increased from 2.3% in 2006 to 3.2% in 2017 (Figure 3.9a). While the average inbound mobility ratio is low, those of Qatar (35%) and the United Arab Emirates (49%) are among the world's highest (Figure 3.9b).

Overlapping individual, institutional and government factors drive student mobility. Students base decisions

about where to pursue tertiary education on availability of places at the best home universities, ability to pay, relative quality of education at home and abroad and opportunity for work experience after graduation. Institutional rankings also have a powerful influence, often determining student admission preferences and eligibility for national scholarship programmes (Hazelkorn, 2015; ICEF Monitor, 2016; Redden, 2016; Walcutt, 2016).


The main driver for recruiting international students is revenue. In 2016, international students brought an estimated US\$39.4 billion into the US economy – largely in living expenses and tuition – making international education one of the top export industries. Other countries seeing a large economic benefit include Australia (US\$24.7 billion), Canada (US\$15.5 billion) and the United Kingdom (US\$31.9 billion) (Global Affairs Canada, 2017; Maslen, 2018; Universities UK, 2017).

Countries may subsidize study abroad as a development strategy. Saudi Arabia launched the King Abdullah Scholarship Program in 2005 to fund overseas degrees.


FIGURE 3.9:

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates attract very high numbers of foreign students

a. Inbound and outbound mobility rate, world and selected regions, 1997–2017



b. Inbound mobility rate, selected Arab countries, 1997–2017



Source: UIS database.

Saudi students are among the five largest international student groups in the United States. Due to declining oil prices, it was reported in 2016 that there would be budget cuts and restrictions on academic eligibility requirements, fields of study and eligible universities (Kottasova, 2016). Not all governments promote study abroad. In 2009, Algeria sought to restrict overseas scholarships to the best baccalaureate graduates (Sawahl, 2009).

Faculty, courses, programmes and institutions are also mobile

Internationally mobile faculty play a key role in internationalizing tertiary education. Mobile faculty range from academics sought by elite research universities to those hired to address local shortages, along with 'transient' academics who continue academic careers in the countries where they obtained their doctorates (Rumbley and de Wit, 2017). Foreign academics may sometimes struggle to respond to the pressures of new cultural and institutional environments. Faculty hired by US branch campuses overseas (including in GCC countries) who are neither American nor locals are expected to teach in an American style, be fluent in American English and use an American curriculum, which may not be compatible with their training and experience (Dedoussis, 2007).

International skilled mobility for education extends to programmes and institutions. Massive open online courses (MOOCs) typically provide an interactive mix of videos, quizzes, discussion forums and, sometimes, peer-graded assignments. Offered through a wide range of education institutions and other providers, they have surged in recent years, with one estimate suggesting that 41 providers reached 81 million learners in 2017, although the number of new learners stagnated for the first time at 23 million (Shah, 2018).

Offshore, cross-border and borderless programmes also enable international education at home (HEGlobal, 2016; Knight, 2016). A study involving 10 countries, including the United Arab Emirates, found that the flexibility of transnational education facilitated coursework and degree completion while allowing 59% of students to remain employed (British Council, 2014). Branch campuses and, more recently, regional education hubs (e.g. tertiary education sector in Malaysia; Education City in Qatar; Global Schoolhouse in Singapore; the Knowledge Village in Dubai, United Arab Emirates) expand international tertiary education. Hubs involve various combinations of domestic

institutions, international campuses and foreign partnerships (Dessoiff, 2012).

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN GCC COUNTRIES

GCC countries have young tertiary education systems.⁴ The first public university in the region, King Saud University in Saudi Arabia, dates to 1957. It was followed by universities in the other five countries in the subsequent three decades. These were set up on the model of Arab universities, mainly by Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi academics (Badry and Willoughby, 2016).

A belief that this model was not producing graduates with the skills their economies required has led governments in the region to import tertiary education services in the last two decades. They have partnered with foreign institutions, established branch campuses (especially in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) and opened the education market to private actors as means of reforming their university systems. Reforms called for adoption of Western curricula and pedagogy, along with assessment criteria benchmarked on international frameworks (United Arab Emirates Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 2012). Their design was entrusted to international consultancy groups and their implementation to Western-educated expatriate faculty members, who make up the majority of academics in the private tertiary education system, e.g. 95% in Saudi Arabia (Hamdan, 2013).

Extraordinary expansion took place in the 2000s, particularly in the non-public sector, to meet increased demand from both nationals and expatriate residents. Oman has 27 non-public universities, and the number of tertiary education students increased from 6,000 in 1990 to 16,000 in 1998 and 132,000 in 2016. The United Arab Emirates has the most branch campuses in the world: over 180 (Badry, 2019b); the number of students increased from 8,000 in 1990 to 80,000 in 2007 and 160,000 in 2016. Abu Dhabi invited New York University and the Sorbonne but also encouraged the creation of several private universities. Dubai set up education free zones, such as Knowledge Village, Dubai Academic City and Dubai Health City, where branch campuses and private universities offer education services. Sharjah University City, established in 1997, follows the same model.

4 This section is based on Badry (2019).

The switch from Arabic to English as a language of instruction has been a key component of internationalization and is believed to be 'the primary tool for improving the quality of teaching and learning' (Barnawi et al., 2017, p. 213). In Bahrain, an expected outcome of the 2014–2024 National Higher Education Strategy, which focuses on internationalization, is to produce '[g]lobal citizens [who are] work-ready' (Bahrain Higher Education Council, 2014, p. 38). One desired attribute of the global citizen is an ability to communicate well in English. The Qatar Foundation, launched in 1995, established the Rand-Qatar Policy Institute to overhaul the country's education system. Qatar University's first major reform in 2003 included adoption of English as a language of instruction in most disciplines (Moini et al., 2009). Saudi royal decrees in 2004 and 2011 introduced English at the pre-university level to prepare students for tertiary-level study in English. In 2015, the Education for Career ministerial programme promoted English education at university (Barnawi and Al-Hawsawi, 2017).

Adoption of English as a language of instruction does not always align with official declarations on the importance of Arabic language and culture as a pillar of national identity. Oman's philosophy of education links citizenship with 'a feeling of belongingness to the country and to its Arabic and Islamic identity' (Oman Education Council, 2017, p. 20). In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 aims 'to strengthen, preserve and highlight [its] national identity ... by encouraging social development and upholding the Arabic language' (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016, p. 17). The United Arab Emirates' Vision 2021 asserts that 'Arabic will re-emerge as a dynamic and vibrant language, expressed everywhere in speech and writing as a living symbol of the nation's progressive Arab-Islamic values' (United Arab Emirates Government, 2010, p. 4).

Policies favouring English as a language of instruction have therefore been questioned by those who argue for the importance of Arabic as an identity marker. Practical problems also surfaced. For instance, although bridging programmes were introduced, many Qatari citizens struggled to qualify for admission and many Qatari faculty members could not teach in English.

In response, governments have, in some cases, attempted to reinstate Arabic as a language of instruction in public universities. A new law stipulates that 'universities and higher education institutions of the State of Qatar [must] teach in Arabic language

and conduct studies and scientific [research] as well in Arabic' (Abdulmalik, 2019). United Arab Emirates public universities adopted a similar approach (Mahboob and Ilyas, 2017), as did branch campuses. Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in Qatar introduced Arabic language learning for business and media majors to 'expand the ability to read and write in the clearest of Arabic' while studying in English. In 2012, the United Arab Emirates launched the Arabic Charter to promote the Arabic language and centres of excellence so as to develop the use of Arabic in digital technology and translation (Emirates24/7, 2012). In 2018, a project to create an Arabic Language Academy was announced (Ednet, 2018). Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, relative latecomers to internationalization, have been slower to roll out English as a language of instruction in their public education systems.

Very large immigrant populations have led to adoption of English as the lingua franca in the labour market. Moreover, partly due to the parallel formal and spoken versions and a lack of progress in teaching methodology, Arabic is perceived as difficult, generating negative attitudes among learners. While Arabic is the official language of GCC countries, the embrace of English risks leading to marginalization of Arabic.

Similar pressures face faculty, who have few incentives to carry out research and publish in Arabic. To compete globally and meet faculty recruitment and promotion requirements, academics must publish in indexed English-language academic journals (Kirkpatrick and Barnawi, 2017). The launch of the first Arabic Citation Index, an association between Clarivate Analytics and the Egyptian Knowledge Bank, projected to start in 2020, aims to 'facilitate access to Arabic scientific research ... [by] enhancing the Arabic academic footprint and ultimately improving university rankings' (Sawahel, 2018).

Internationalization has expanded the tertiary education landscape in GCC countries, contributed to gender equity in access to tertiary education and increased diversity of provision and student populations. However, it requires explicit dual language policies to maintain the role of Arabic as a vehicle of knowledge production. Otherwise, there is a risk of creating the perception that, to be part of a knowledge society, one needs to relinquish one's language and identity.

RECOGNIZING PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN REGULATED PROFESSIONS, MAXIMIZES THE BENEFITS OF MOBILITY

Recognition of professional qualifications facilitates and maximizes the benefits of skilled labour migration. Immigrants are often economically excluded because of discrimination, limited social networks, inadequate language skills and visa restrictions (OECD, 2014). Limited recognition of qualifications is a further impediment, which one out of eight immigrants in Europe rates as the main challenge (Eurostat, 2014). Immigrants whose qualifications are not recognized may not be able to practice legally in regulated professions, such as teaching and nursing, and often occupy jobs that underuse their skills. Over one-third of immigrants with tertiary education in OECD countries are overqualified for their jobs, compared with one-quarter of natives (OECD/European Union, 2015).

Legal concerns and public safety issues are obstacles in recognizing qualifications for regulated professions. Yet recognition is in the public interest, allowing immigrants to fill vacancies in the health and education sectors, among others, instead of working outside their fields (Girard and Smith, 2013). The European Union's Professional Qualifications Directive is one of the few examples of multilateral automatic recognition for regulated professions. It allows architects, dentists, doctors, midwives, nurses, pharmacists and veterinary surgeons who hold an approved qualification to practise in any member country (Sumption et al., 2013). However, automatic recognition agreements such as this involved a long process of harmonizing standards and quality assurance mechanisms and even longer economic and political integration. Establishing and maintaining such agreements requires substantial political commitment and resources (IOM, 2013).

TEACHER MIGRATION BRINGS BENEFITS AND RISKS

Teacher migration has attracted considerably less research than migration of other skilled professionals, such as nurses, doctors and engineers. Like other migrants, teachers may be motivated by a mix of economic and other push and pull factors. Political instability, discrimination and poor training facilities and working conditions are other factors that contribute to teacher migration (Ridge et al., 2017).

Migrant teachers may be recruited through bilateral processes or recruitment agencies, or simply be employed as individuals who come to a country independently, often ending up in temporary positions. But teaching is typically regulated, subject to specific, often rigid qualification requirements that vary by jurisdiction. Designated authorities assess and recognize competences and qualifications, and gatekeeping mechanisms limit access to teaching positions to those with country-specific professional qualifications.

As teacher qualification regulations often relate to language skills, many large flows are between countries with linguistic and cultural commonalities. Teachers from other English-speaking countries, particularly the United Kingdom, are among the largest groups in Australian schools, while Australians are well represented in the UK teaching force. Migration based on language fluency includes the relatively recent trend of hiring international native English speakers. This is especially the case with international private schools, which also work to attract teachers from abroad. There were 8,000 private English-language schools worldwide in 2016, and their number is projected to have doubled by 2025 (OFSTED and Wilshaw, 2016). In 2015, 18,000 teachers left the United Kingdom and about 100,000 British teachers worked abroad full time in international schools during that school year, making the United Kingdom the world's biggest 'exporter' of teachers (Wilshaw, 2016).

These factors have also played a role in the evolution of Arab teacher migration to GCC countries over two generations. Their education systems expanded dramatically from the mid-20th century with the discovery of oil and gas. Although the countries had no teacher training programmes until the 1960s, they could offer high salaries, attracting teachers from other Arab countries to scale up their systems (Kapiszewski, 2006; Ridge et al., 2017).

Initially, recruitment was via government-to-government circular labour migration programmes. Over time, formal opportunities declined as many GCC education ministries stopped requesting teachers through these programmes. Arab teachers continued to move to GCC countries, however, seeking jobs independently or through employment agencies (Ridge et al., 2017).

Arab teachers in GCC countries faced numerous challenges, both economic and non-economic.

Working conditions were often unstable and long-term contracts lacking. Teachers often supplemented their salaries by tutoring. A study of grade 12 students in the United Arab Emirates found that 65% received private tutoring by mostly male tutors, 65% of whom came from Egypt and 29% from other Arab countries (Farah, 2011).

Expatriate Arab teachers maintained a strong presence until relatively recently. In Qatar, they made up about 87% of teachers in government schools in 2013. In the United Arab Emirates, 90% of teachers in government boys' schools and 20% in girls' schools were expatriate Arabs in 2010/11. However, in that academic year, the Abu Dhabi Education Council instituted a new curriculum model to introduce English as the language of instruction by 2030 (Ridge et al., 2017). This policy initiative reflected rapid cultural changes. In a survey of Arab youth aged 18 to 24, two-thirds of respondents in GCC countries reported speaking more English than standard Arabic in their daily lives (Arab Youth Survey, 2017).


Egyptian and Jordanian teachers in Emirati schools are being replaced by English-speaking recruits, largely from high-income countries, who are hired under much more favourable terms and afforded generous benefits. By contrast, Jordanian Emirati teachers reported wage discrimination and absence of support (EI, 2016).

International teacher recruitment is a lucrative business that attracts commercial agencies. A survey found that 64% of respondents with experience as migrant teachers reported using an agency. Nearly one-quarter reported paying a placement fee: less than US\$1,000 in most cases, but some paid US\$10,000 or more. One out of five would not use the same agency again or was unsure they would recommend it due to concerns about harassment, high fees and lack of transparency (EI, 2014).

LOSS OF TALENT IS NOT NECESSARILY DETRIMENTAL

Skilled worker mobility and the associated loss of human capital, a phenomenon known as brain drain, can negatively affect the countries with the highest emigration rates. Estimates for this report suggest that emigration rates of the highly skilled were above 20% in over one-quarter of 174 countries. Among the Arab States, Lebanon and Morocco had the highest rates of skilled migration, with one out of four of the highly skilled working abroad. Half of skilled Lebanese migrants appear to have returned between 1990 and 2010, after the end of the civil war. Overall, the skilled migration rate has declined in most countries in the region (Figure 3.10).

FIGURE 3.10:
In Lebanon and Morocco, one out of four highly skilled people emigrated
High- and low-skilled migration rates, Arab States, 1990 and 2010



Source: Deuster and Docquier (2018).

Skilled migration is increasingly seen as having more positive effects on education and skills for both origin and destination countries than was previously thought. In addition to the well-documented benefit of remittances, the prospect of skilled emigration to prosperous regions can spur education investment in sending countries.

Research for the 2019 GEM Report on the effect of skilled migration on human capital accumulation in sending countries provides updated estimates that account for these opposing forces. It found that a net high-skilled migration rate of 14% generated the highest positive effects on human capital accumulation and continued to generate positive effects at migration rates as high as 33%. Further generalizing the model to account for the characteristics of origin and destination countries, as well as for low-skilled emigration rates, showed that emigration prospects generated net brain gain in 90 countries and net brain drain in 84 countries. On average, the net effect was small in low- and middle-income countries (Deuster and Docquier, 2018).

One factor that can mitigate the effects of brain drain is return migration, a phenomenon typically neglected because of the perception that migrants leave with no intention to come back. However, migrants may return deliberately as part of their individual migration strategies or following incentives that governments in origin countries provide to attract talent from the diaspora (Agunias and Newland, 2012). Migrants may also return involuntarily, for instance when they are expelled and banned from re-entering destination countries or when changing economic conditions in destination countries adversely affect their job opportunities.

In either case, return migrants and their families have specific education-related needs, which are often not met. First, they can face qualification recognition challenges. Governments can provide advice or offer validation and recognition services

to ease their reintegration into the labour market. In the Philippines, under the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, six agencies oversaw the Permanent Returning Overseas Filipino Workers Network, while Davao province's Skills Registration Database linked returnees to recognition services and prospective employers (ILO, 2010). Second, return migrants tend to seek self-employment opportunities or establish a business. However, countries find it challenging to adapt their skills development policies to support returnees' needs (Bardak, 2014).

CONCLUSION

International migration is a global phenomenon with major economic, social and cultural implications. Education is a driver of migratory flows but is also significantly affected by movements of people. Depending on the context, migration can be a bridge to improve the education status of children and youth from low- and middle-income countries. While they may struggle and fall behind native peers, most eventually catch up, fulfilling the dream of a better life.

Nevertheless, many immigrant children and youth face several serious obstacles that exclude them from national education systems and prevent them from making the most of opportunities in their new environment. Governments need to remove barriers related to access. Some lessons learned from countries with long migration experience can apply in the Arab States, with their unique migration characteristics.

The internationalization of tertiary education has taken various forms in recent years. Countries compete to attract more foreign students, who are a source of valuable income. To facilitate student mobility, countries harmonize standards, deepen quality assurance mechanisms and recognize qualifications. At the same time, attention to potential side effects on the development of national systems is needed.

Palestine refugee students on their first day in UNRWA schools in the second semester, in Gaza.

Credit: Rushdi Sarraj/UNRWA



CHAPTER 4

International displacement

The Education 2030 Framework for Action recognized that ‘conflicts, and the resulting internal and cross-border displacement, can leave entire generations traumatized, uneducated and unprepared to contribute to the social and economic recovery of their country or region’ (UNESCO, 2015). It summed up the purposes education should serve in such contexts when it emphasized that education should be ‘immediately protective, providing life-saving knowledge and skills and psychosocial support to those affected by crisis’. It called upon countries to ‘develop inclusive, responsive and resilient education systems’ to meet their needs (UNESCO, 2015). However, the position of refugees who rely on host countries to extend international rights to education is not identical to those of people displaced within their home countries and whose governments bear specific responsibilities to fulfil their citizens’ rights.


In the case of refugees, as part of the September 2016 New York Declaration, all UN member states committed ‘to provide quality primary and secondary education in safe learning environments ... within a few months of the initial displacement’. Countries have since worked out responsibility-sharing arrangements in refugee responses as part of the Global Compact on Refugees, which further commits them to ‘contribute resources and expertise to expand and enhance the quality and inclusiveness of national education systems’ for both refugee and host populations. These arrangements are being piloted among the 15 countries where the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is being rolled out.

At the end of 2018, there were 25.9 million refugees, of whom 5.5 million were Palestinian. Excluding the latter, 82% of refugees came from 10 countries. The top three were the Syrian Arab Republic (6.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million) and South Sudan (2.3 million). Another Arab country, Sudan (0.7 million), was also in the top 10. Ten countries hosted 63% of the world’s refugees (still excluding those from Palestine); the top three were Turkey (3.7 million), Pakistan (1.4 million) and Uganda (1.2 million). Also in the top 10 were Sudan (1.1 million), Lebanon (1 million)

and Jordan (0.7 million). In addition, Lebanon (0.5 million) and Jordan (2.2 million) hosted Palestinian refugees (**Figure 4.1**). In total, the Arab States hosted 32% of all refugees. Unique challenges arise from multiple displacements (**Box 4.1**).

These numbers do not include people who have fled to countries that are not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol or that do not consider certain conditions to constitute persecution. In May 2015, Lebanon instructed UNHCR to stop the

FIGURE 4.1:
Refugees are concentrated in a few countries
Number of refugees, top 10 host and source countries, 2018



Source: UNHCR (2019j).

BOX 4.1**Extreme examples of displacement create unique challenges**

Some extreme examples of displacement are particularly tragic. By 2013, after the outbreak of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, about 80,000 Palestinian refugees, along with an unknown number of unregistered refugees, fled to Lebanon. In the camps there, the new arrivals mixed with local Palestinian habitants, raising tensions, including in education. UNRWA organized separate classes in its schools for the two groups because of their different backgrounds and the fact that the Syrian Palestinian refugees spoke only Arabic (Meier, 2016), while the Lebanese curriculum is mainly taught in English or French (UNRWA, 2016a).

Libya has provided scholarships to thousands of Sahrawi – and Palestinian – refugees since the 1970s. The Sahrawis, who fled from Western Sahara to Algeria in 1975, have lived in camps with limited secondary and tertiary education opportunities. As part of a transnational education programme, Libya gave full scholarships to hundreds (at times, over a thousand) Sahrawi students per year

between 1990 and 2011. At the outbreak of the crisis in Libya in 2011, it was estimated that over 900 Sahrawi children and youth were in Libya and evacuated by Algeria. As these refugees had migrated for education purposes, their cases raised questions about their rights in circumstances of double displacement (Fiddian-Qasmieh, 2012).

Ethiopian migrants have used Yemen as a gateway to the Gulf countries. Recently, however, many have been stranded by the civil war in Yemen without any means of continuing their journey or returning to Ethiopia. In 2019, there were 14,000 registered Ethiopian refugees in Yemen (UNHCR, 2019a). The IOM started a voluntary humanitarian return operation for Ethiopians in Yemen. As of May 2019, it had returned 2,742 Ethiopians to their home country (United Nations, 2019a). Back in Ethiopia, the IOM supports their reintegration, including through education, psychosocial support and small business grants (IOM, 2019a).

registration of Syrian refugees, who had then reached 1.2 million. Around 500,000 Syrians who were never registered by UNHCR or were registered through sponsorship by a Lebanese national are excluded from refugee status under the new policy (Janmyr, 2018). In 2015, Tunisia officially hosted fewer than 1,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2016a), even though some 1 million Libyans may have fled there from the civil war (Karasapan, 2015) (**Box 4.8**).

Two aspects of the refugee population composition are particularly important. First, globally, about 52% are under age 18. Second, about 39% of refugees with available accommodation data live in managed, self-settled or transit camps or collective centres (UNHCR, 2018a), mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. However, most refugees, especially those who fled from the Syrian Arab Republic, live in individual accommodations in urban areas (UNHCR, 2018a) where they seek security, anonymity, job opportunities and better access to services.

This chapter addresses provision of inclusive education for those who flee from or seek refuge in the Arab States: the extent to which they are included in national education systems, together with the challenges and opportunities in policy and practice for ensuring that this education is relevant and responsive.

DISPLACEMENT SEVERELY AFFECTS EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES

Estimating the education status of refugees is complex due to missing information. With few exceptions, the only figures reported with some degree of confidence are on school enrolment of refugees living in camps. It is difficult to collect information on the education status of the 58% of refugees living in urban areas. Few countries identify refugee status in school censuses explicitly. UNHCR estimates that, globally, 61% of refugee children were enrolled in primary school, 23% of refugee adolescents in secondary school and 1% of refugee youth in university in 2017. About 4 million 5- to 17-year-old refugees were out of school in 2017 (UNHCR, 2019b).

In the case of the Syrian crisis, as of December 2018, there were 2.1 million school-age refugee children in the five largest host countries in the region. Only 61% of them were enrolled in formal or non-formal primary or lower secondary education (**Table 4.1**). The rate was below 25% in upper secondary education in all host countries except Egypt. Refugee boys were 5% less likely to be enrolled than refugee girls. The main challenges to participation and learning remain the socio-economic situation of refugee families, lack of

TABLE 4.1:**Number of school-age Syrian refugee children and education status in five host countries, December 2018**

Country	Total	In formal education	In non-formal education	In education	Out of education	%
Turkey	1,047,536	645,140	17,727	662,867	384,669	37%
Lebanon	666,491	290,102	67,456	357,558	308,933	46%
Jordan	235,616	134,121	17,575	151,696	83,920	36%
Iraq	66,919	29,730	16,629	46,359	20,560	31%
Egypt	47,507	42,557	1,269	43,826	3,681	8%
Total	2,064,069	1,141,650	120,656	1,262,306	801,763	39%

Source: No Lost Generation (2019a).

safety, lack of birth registration and documentation, restrictive policies at decentralized levels and the consequences for children of violence at home, at school or elsewhere in their environment (No Lost Generation, 2019a).

In late 2018, the intensity of fighting decreased in several parts of Syria, while violence and displacement continued in others (Voluntās, 2019). The stabilization in certain areas led to increasing calls in host countries for Syrian refugees to return. Nevertheless, the number of returnees fell from 77,000 in 2017 to 56,000 in 2018, as conditions for a voluntary return in safety and dignity were not yet in place (UNHCR, 2018c, 2019d). Given the level of uncertainty, the need for education in host countries is expected to remain high (UNHCR and UNDP, 2018).

Turkey, where 93% of Syrian refugees live outside camps, supplemented its education management information system (EMIS) in public schools with a parallel system for 'foreign students,' which monitors temporary education centres. The primary net enrolment ratio of Syrian students increased from 25% in 2014 to 83% in 2017. However, their secondary net enrolment ratio rose much less, from 16% to 22% (Arik Akyüz et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2018d).

Assessing whether education attendance and attainment of Syrian refugees have suffered compared with before the civil war depends on whether the Syrian population in a host country is representative of the Syrian population as a whole. In Jordan, Syrian children who started their education between 2005 and 2010 had very high dropout rates at the peak of the crisis in 2011–2013: 50% had been continuously enrolled in 2016, while 34% had dropped out and 16% had dropped out but returned. By 2016,

primary attendance rates had caught up with pre-war levels, considering Syrians in Jordan came from disadvantaged communities. Secondary attendance rates had not recovered to pre-war levels (Sieverding et al., 2018).

The influx of Syrian refugees does not appear to have had a negative effect on enrolment in host countries, despite the huge shock to their systems. In Jordan, using two measures of the intensity of refugee influx (the proportion of Syrians in the total population in a native Jordanian's locality of birth and the proportion of Syrian students enrolled in a native Jordanian's school), no effects were found on the enrolment, repetition or test scores of Jordanians (Assaad et al., 2018). In Turkey, the refugee influx actually increased native Turks' enrolment rates, especially among young men whose parents had lower education levels. That could mean this group, which stood to lose more from an influx of low-paid refugees into the labour market, responded by investing more in education (Tumen, 2018).

DISPLACED PEOPLE NEED TO BE INCLUDED IN NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEMS

Faced with crises, most governments used to provide parallel education systems for refugee populations. Provision reflected the home country system, as is still the case with Malian refugees in Mauritania (Box 4.2). However, consensus has gradually emerged that this is not a sustainable solution. Displacement is often protracted, parallel systems usually lack qualified teachers, examinations are not certifiable, and funding risks being cut at short notice. Parallel education therefore diminishes the chance of refugees being

BOX 4.2:**Malian refugees in Mauritania follow the Malian curriculum**

Since 2012, Malians have fled their country's conflict into neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. As of 2019, Mauritania hosts 57,000 Malian refugees, including about 36,000 children under age 18, of whom 19,300 are of school age (5 to 17 years old). Although a peace agreement was concluded in 2015, no important return of Malian refugees is expected imminently, since persistent violence in northern Mali also affects central parts of the country (UNHCR, 2019).

Most Malian refugees settle at the M'Berra camp in one of the country's poorest areas. It has six preschool centres, six primary schools and one lower and upper secondary school, which were set up in cooperation with the Mauritanian government but follow the Malian curriculum. UNICEF and partners ensure their operation (UNICEF, 2019). The Regional Education Directorate and Departmental Education Inspectorate provide capacity development activities for teachers as well as supervision. Every year a Malian delegation goes to the refugee camp to supervise and validate school-leaving examinations.

Until 2019, when UNICEF built a secondary school, secondary education was delivered in tents. Future prospects and the education's relevance also loom over questions of attendance. In June 2019, 5,300 children were enrolled in primary school but just 365 adolescents in secondary school, while 47 refugees attended university through the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI), UNHCR's higher education scholarship programme. A household survey in 2017 asked families why children were not in school even though schools were available and free. Some 62% reported the main reason as lack of interest in school; 14% cited poverty. One out of five expressed a variety of other reasons related to nomadic background, language difficulties and preference for Koranic school; indeed, some households favoured the latter over camp schools for girls in particular (UNHCR, 2019c).

included and leading meaningful lives in their first countries of asylum, where their protection has been guaranteed (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018).

The UNHCR 2012–2016 Education Strategy urged countries for the first time to offer refugee children access to accredited and certified learning opportunities to enable continuity in education (UNHCR, 2012). The long-term benefits of such a move can be considerable for both host governments and refugees. The objective is to include refugees fully in the national education system, studying in the same classrooms with natives after a short period of catch-up classes, if necessary, to prepare them for entry at appropriate age-for-grade levels.

The degree of refugee inclusion varies across displacement contexts. Geography, history, resource availability and system capacity all affect the evolving nature of inclusion.

In some cases, the move towards inclusion has been gradual, following developments on the ground and an increasing understanding of the potential benefits. Turkey, with an affected population of 3.8 million – the largest in the world, mainly from the Syrian Arab Republic but including refugees from other countries, people in refugee-like situations and asylum-seekers whose cases are pending (UNHCR, 2018d) – decided to include all Syrian refugee children in the national education system by 2020 and phase out separate provision (**Box 4.3**). This response provides useful insights into the education policy choices governments make in response to large-scale refugee movements and transitioning from short-term, immediate solutions to more institutionalized, systemic and sustainable approaches in protracted refugee situations.

There are several cases where, despite a commitment to inclusion, it is not fully achieved. Refugees may be included in the national system, sharing host curriculum, assessment and language of instruction, but with some degree of segregation. Partial inclusion may result from concentration of refugees in distinct locations, such as camps, producing geographical separation. Resources can be a key constraint. Jordan and Lebanon have the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. They have adopted double-shift systems, with one group attending in the morning and another in the afternoon, producing temporal separation.

DOUBLE-SHIFT APPROACHES, AS IN LEBANON, ARE INEVITABLE BUT HAVE LIMITATIONS

As of 2019, the Lebanese government estimates there are 631,000 Syrian refugees aged 3 to 18 in the country, equivalent to 70% of enrolled Lebanese students (914,000). In fact, only 30% of Lebanese students enrol in public schools, which means capacity would have to more than double to absorb all Syrian students (Centre for Educational Research and Development, 2019; Lebanon Government and United Nations, 2015).⁵

Along with national and international partners, the government developed the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, a multisector plan outlining a targeted response to the refugee crisis and the associated costs.

5 This section is based on Adelman et al. (2019).

BOX 4.3:**Turkey has committed to including Syrian children in its education system**

As of 2018, Turkey hosted 3.5 million refugees, 1 million of whom were school age. The first Syrian refugees crossed into Turkey in April 2011. Between 2013 and 2018, the share of Syrians living in urban areas increased from 64% to 93% (3RP, 2018). As the refugee population increased and spread beyond camps, philanthropists, NGOs and faith-based organizations established informal schools, staffed by volunteer teachers, which offered instruction in Arabic and used a modified Syrian curriculum. They were largely unregulated, operated outside the national system and had very limited quality assurance and standardization of certification at the end of grades 9 and 12.

In late 2014, the Ministry of National Education established a regulatory framework for these temporary education centres (TECs). Syrian families could choose enrolment in TECs or public schools (Turkey Ministry of National Education, 2014). Education provision, data management and regulation of organizations supporting TECs were further standardized in the following two years, and TECs not meeting regulations were closed. In August 2016, the government announced that all Syrian refugee children would be integrated into the national education system. It is estimated that, of Syrian children attending school, the share of those enrolled in TECs fell from 83% in 2014/15 to 37% in 2017/18. The remaining 318 TECs are expected to close by 2020 (Figure 4.2).


The government mandated all TECs to offer 15 hours of Turkish language instruction per week to prepare students for transition to Turkish schools. Inclusion also has serious implications for school infrastructure and teacher preparation. The process has been supported by Promoting Integration of Syrian Children to the Turkish Education System, a project that received EUR 300 million as part of the European Union's EUR 3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey (Delegation of the European Union in Turkey, 2017). Two-fifths financed school construction; the rest was allocated to Turkish and Arabic language courses, catch-up and remedial classes, free school transport, education materials, an examination system, guidance and counselling,

training of 15,000 teachers and hiring of administrative personnel (Arik Akyüz et al., 2018).

Part of the resources also funded a communication strategy, including a website, TV spots, short films and other tools to raise awareness about education opportunities open to Syrian children (Arik Akyüz et al., 2018). Parents need to understand their rights and how to enrol their children. However, even if they are aware of their rights, some refugee communities may resist inclusion in national education systems, not consenting to their children being educated in a language they themselves do not understand (Dallal, 2016).

FIGURE 4.2:

All Syrian refugee children in Turkey are to attend public schools by 2020
Distribution of enrolled Syrian refugee children in Turkey, by school type



Source: Arik Akyüz et al. (2018).

Updated annually since 2015, it includes strategic objectives related to Syrian refugee education that are expanded upon in Lebanon's guiding policy framework for refugee education: Reaching All Children with Education (RACE). RACE I ran between 2014 and 2017; RACE II is to run until 2021. The framework aims to improve the public education system through teacher education, school governance, community engagement, and technical and managerial capacity development (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2014, 2016).

At the start of the crisis, Syrians were permitted to enrol in public schools alongside Lebanese students. However, as the conflict deepened and the number of refugees grew, public schools in many locations were unable to accommodate an exponential increase in student population. In response, since 2013/14 the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) has run a second shift in the afternoon, open only to Syrian refugees, covering compulsory education up to grade 9. It begins between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., allowing for a 30-minute break between the two shifts,

and ends between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. It includes five periods (the first shift has five periods in grades 1–6 but seven periods in grades 7–9). It covers only the basic subjects, including Arabic, foreign language, mathematics, science, geography and civic education, as well as history in grades 7–9 (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2015).

Syrian refugees who had enrolled in the first shift by 2015 and had Lebanese mothers could continue attending that shift, although principals were not required to continue accommodating these students and could move them to the afternoon if the second shift was available or if there were no longer spaces in the first shift. All others were required to enrol in the second shift (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018a). There is increasing pressure to move all Syrian students to the second shift.

Aided by a back-to-school campaign between 2015 and 2018, enrolment in the second shift increased from 30,000 students in 2013/14 to almost 156,000 across 348 public schools by 2018/19. In addition, about 44,000 Syrian students enrolled in the first shift. By comparison, around 228,000 Lebanese students are enrolled in public schools. However, as dropout rates among Syrian students ranged from 25% at the end of kindergarten to 61% at the end of grade 7, the student distribution was skewed, with 78,500 enrolled in grades 1–3, 7,000 in grades 7–8 and 1,400 in grade 9 in 2018/19 (Centre for Educational Research and Development, 2019).

About 37,000 Syrian students are enrolled in paid private schools and 12,000 in free private schools, such as religious schools or schools run by private institutions. In addition, non-formal education opportunities for refugees with gaps in their education that prevent them from joining the formal system include community-based early childhood education, basic literacy and numeracy for children and youth, and accelerated learning for students out of school for more than two years. In 2018, 67,500 Syrian and Palestinian children from Syria were enrolled across the three programmes (No Lost Generation, 2019).

National and international NGOs also run diverse education programmes, which are not accredited or certified. Some are structured to prepare students for entrance into the Lebanese education system; others follow different curricula (e.g. Syrian), while still others

focus on non-academic skills or vocational training (Ahmadzadeh et al. 2014; Shuayb et al., 2014).

To deal with the doubling of enrolment, MEHE has employed about 2,000 administrators, 9,000 teachers and 1,000 psychosocial support and health counsellors. Two-thirds of the new teacher hires are contract teachers, many of whom have minimal teaching experience and limited knowledge of how to manage the diverse needs of refugee students. There have been few opportunities for education personnel to receive targeted training. Most professional development sessions have focused on technology in the classroom and differentiated teaching techniques (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018b; UNHCR, 2017a).

The RACE budget, which includes supporting both Lebanese and refugee students in the public system, increased from US\$177 million in 2014 to US\$381 million in 2019 (Lebanon Government and United Nations, 2019). The additional cost per student is US\$363 in the first shift and US\$600 in the second shift (World Bank, 2017). As Lebanese public school students historically had to pay parent council and school fund fees, per-student expenditure includes these contributions (US\$60 and US\$100, respectively). In an effort to support all students, donors offered to cover these fees as well as to offset second-shift teacher salary costs. Teachers in the second shift receive about US\$12 per hour, compared with US\$16 in the first shift (Lebanon Government and United Nations, 2019). Despite rising costs, donor contributions have steadily declined. In 2015, donors fully funded the education sector appeal, providing US\$267 million, but Lebanon reported a funding gap of US\$30 million in 2018 (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018b).

Donors have provided additional support to Syrian refugee students, beyond the sector appeal. For instance, national and international NGOs have provided school transport, after-school support and community outreach to help enrol students in formal and non-formal education programmes. Bilateral donors have made in-kind donations, including stationery, school bags and other school supplies. UNHCR and partners have run a homework support programme (attended by mostly Syrian students and facilitated by Syrian community volunteers), parent community groups and an education community liaison programme. The latter was designed to address

internal divisions in the refugee student community that had led to violence and a need for respected community members to act as advisers (UNHCR, 2019d). Further, public school teachers have taught a remedial language support programme in public schools in the morning, attended equally by Lebanese and Syrian students.

The double shift has offered an opportunity to make the Lebanese education system stronger and more inclusive

Given Lebanon's tenuous historical relationship with the Syrian Arab Republic, the inclusion of all refugee children in the public education system was a major accomplishment, ensuring that Syrian students could certify their learning in Lebanon. That being said, as 46% of children are not in education and employment is severely restricted for refugees, the challenge of integration looms large.

Counter-intuitively, the inclusion of Syrian refugees in Lebanese public schools was an opportunity to channel new resources to a historically underfunded education system and better support all students. This would be the case with interventions to include children with disabilities and develop new teacher training content on differentiated instruction and technology in classrooms. Meanwhile, a new inter-ministerial child protection policy and a focus on socio-emotional learning and counselling in the education system, necessitated by the refugee influx, could also benefit the morning shift. However, donors have not fully funded capacity development and system strengthening initiatives, as suggested by persistently high dropout rates. A divide between humanitarian and development funding persists.

The proliferation of actors forced MEHE to strengthen its oversight through the RACE framework. It adopted a regulatory role to harmonize curricula across non-formal education programmes and created defined pathways for out-of-school Syrian students to transition to public schools. Organizations with official permission to deliver early childhood, basic literacy and numeracy, and accelerated learning programmes must adhere to guidelines outlined in MEHE standard operating procedures. While regulation was essential, the oversight role strained ministry relationships with national and international NGOs, which have complained about a lack of consistent communication and formal meeting opportunities to share information.

Significant questions about the efficiency and sustainability of the double shift remain

There has been insufficient investment to help public schools cope with the second shift. A 2014 survey found 75% of 1,275 public schools needed repairs and some were structurally unsafe. Instruction time, which is shorter in the second shift, is further truncated in winter, when power cuts prevent students from seeing their textbooks or the blackboard after sunset. Pupil/teacher ratios are higher in the afternoon. In schools with a second shift, all principals and close to 25% of teachers work both shifts (Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018b). In addition, some teachers work at private schools in the morning and public schools on a contract basis in the afternoon. Teachers report exhaustion and lack of patience with a cohort that needs the opposite. They also complain about often waiting months for compensation. Policies guiding the second shift have shifted towards structure and content decisions being made at the school and classroom levels, leading to significant variation across schools (Adelman, 2018).

Lebanon had fragile social cohesion even before the crisis (UNICEF, 2011). The Lebanese are concerned that the influx of Syrian refugees may destabilize an already precarious balance (International Alert, 2015). The temporal model of inclusion in education is not ideally suited to addressing these concerns; there are no opportunities for Lebanese and Syrian students to build relationships. In fact, the second shift start time was adjusted to avoid Lebanese and Syrian students crossing paths. While Lebanese teachers, a key link, have supported Syrian students' academic progress, they have avoided discussions about students' experiences in Syria and social integration in Lebanon, lacking training and viewing the students' presence as temporary (Adelman, 2018). While some NGO-run non-formal education programmes have attempted to bridge such gaps, many were one-off, largely donor dependent and of limited scale.

The sustainability of the second shift programme has also been questioned. Contract teachers, the bulk of the teaching force, have been demanding permanent civil servant status. Donors have questioned the underuse of first shift staff. There are reports that few Lebanese children are in the first shift, while the second shift is crowded with refugees. The ministry's parallel system to manage the refugee education programme has also raised doubts. It enabled a quick response to the crisis, as the project management unit reported directly to the minister, but its long-term effectiveness

is questionable, having created uncertainty in decision-making authority.

Despite significant challenges, it is difficult to envision how Lebanon could have supported such a large influx of new students without introducing a second shift. Even if Syrians had continued to enrol in the first shift, schools in areas with higher refugee concentrations would not have had space to accommodate them fully. To strengthen the programme requires the government to strengthen its teacher and school administration professional development; donors to link their short-term humanitarian response with long-term development system-strengthening interventions; non-formal education actors to be incentivized to create programmes that bring Lebanese and Syrian students together to develop empathy and understanding; and all actors to prepare for the eventual dismantling of the second shift and the consequences for further inclusion of those who may choose not to return.

THE SAHRAWIS HAVE THEIR OWN LIMITED EDUCATION SYSTEM IN EXILE

The Sahrawis are one of the oldest refugee populations. When Spain abandoned its former colony of Western Sahara in 1975, a conflict erupted among the Sahrawi people, Morocco and Mauritania (Dreven et al., 2016). Most of the Sahrawis fled and settled in five camps around the city of Tindouf in south-west Algeria. As of 2017, the camps accommodated about 173,600 refugees, including 44,300 school-age children. UNHCR considers 90,000 Sahrawi refugees particularly vulnerable, as they are almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance (UNHCR, 2019e).

The camps are administered by the Polisario Front, which has given importance to education from the start, having set up mixed schools (Crivello et al., 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009). The Sahrawi Ministry of Education is in charge of the school system (Dreven et al., 2016), which is run by Sahrawi refugees with a total of 2,320 education staff (UNICEF, 2019b). The curriculum is bilingual, with Arabic as the language of instruction and Spanish as a compulsory second language from grade 3 on. The ministry has developed textbooks in Spanish (San Martín, 2010). The Centre for Education and Integration in Smara camp was the first-ever specialized school in a refugee camp (Dreven et al., 2016).

Education is free and school is mandatory for children aged 6 to 15. As of late 2018, the primary enrolment rate was 100%, a population of 38,500 children (UNHCR, 2019f). However, there are only 10 lower secondary schools, among them the Simon Bolivar School, which uses Spanish as the language of instruction, and the 27th of February School for girls (Dreven et al., 2016). Given the lack of secondary schools, most of the over 2,200 lower secondary school graduates in 2017 had left for secondary schools in other cities. Many students attend Algerian boarding schools several hundred kilometres away (UNHCR, 2018e).

Camp schools face infrastructure, supply and equipment challenges. Most were built in the 1980s without foundations and need to be rehabilitated. Floods in the autumn of 2015 and heavy rains in the summer of 2016 further damaged or destroyed 57 out of the 64 kindergartens and schools, as the sand-and-mud brick buildings often break down under heavy rainfall (Lecat, 2016; UNHCR, 2018e; UNICEF, 2019b). With funding from the European Commission, UNICEF rehabilitated or constructed classrooms and sanitation facilities according to international standards in a kindergarten, six primary schools and nine secondary schools in 2017 (UNICEF, 2018).

There is a long-term decline in other international funding. According to the Sahrawi Red Crescent, US aid has dropped from US\$10 million to US\$6 million, European Commission aid from US\$15 million to US\$9 million and UNHCR aid from US\$8 million to US\$6 million due to a rise in global conflicts (Sahara Press Service, 2018). Given the funding shortfall, UNHCR has difficulty meeting international standards (United Nations, 2019b).

As there is no tertiary education institution in the camps, many students continue their education at universities in Algeria or abroad (Dreven et al., 2016; UNHCR, 2018e). Cuba started providing scholarships to Sahrawi refugees as early as 1977 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015). These have benefited tens of thousands of Sahrawi youth (Dreven et al., 2016). UNHCR currently supports 142 students studying at Algerian universities through the DAFI scholarship programme (UNHCR, 2019g).

PALESTINE REFUGEES ARE EDUCATED IN A PARALLEL SYSTEM

In several contexts, education for refugees continues to be in separate, non-formal community-based or private schools. Such schools may be initiated and supported by international organizations or by refugees and local communities themselves. They may or may not be certified. The parallel education system for Palestinian refugees is a unique case.

UNRWA has provided accredited basic education for Palestinian refugees for close to 70 years, in partnership with UNESCO. It currently provides free basic education to some 526,000 refugee children in 711 schools across the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic (UNRWA, 2018b). The agency also operates eight vocational training centres for over 7,000 refugee youth and two education-science faculties providing degree-level teacher education for over 1,800 refugees (UNRWA, 2017b). This comprehensive parallel education system encompasses all aspects of education, from curriculum to inclusive education practices and teacher professional development. UNRWA students have outperformed those in public schools in Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza by an entire year's worth of schooling (Abdul-Hamid et al., 2016).

A parallel refugee education system requires alignment and close cooperation with host governments to ensure the smooth transition of students into the national system, including recognition and accreditation of their qualifications. While UNRWA, as a UN agency, has operational independence, it aligns with many aspects of host government education systems, such as curricula, examinations and timetabling. This is in line with good practice for refugee education (UNHCR, 2015c). But the approach has not been without serious challenges (**Box 4.4**).

The average cost of the UNRWA education programme is US\$826 per child per year. The primary source of funding is voluntary contributions from UN member states. In 2017, the United States contributed the equivalent of 25% of the programme and 32% of the total budget of UNRWA (UNRWA, 2018a). In August 2018, the United States announced it would cease its support to UNRWA (BBC, 2018). While other donors have either brought forward or pledged to increase their contributions, this financial instability poses a threat to the continuous delivery of education and other services.

UNRWA has developed its response to emergencies over seven decades

UNRWA has faced a series of crises of varying scale and scope, including the latest Syrian crisis. Increasingly, conflict and crisis vie with stability in defining UNRWA's operating context. Between 2011 and 2016, 44% of all UNRWA schools were 'directly impacted by armed conflict and violence, either causing physical damage to the schools or significantly disrupting education services' (UNRWA, 2016a).⁶

In 1948–1950, UN humanitarian relief did not prioritize education. Instead, the dedication and commitment of refugees, local communities and voluntary organizations, such as the American Friends Service Committee, helped refugee children gain access to education and supported the creation of schools for them. Cooperation between the voluntary organizations working under the auspices of UNRWA's predecessor (the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees) and UNESCO eventually prompted the UN to take up education activities.

The occupation of Gaza in 1956–1957 and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 halted cross-border movement. Students and teachers were displaced and schools were used as shelters. Although UNRWA understood the detrimental impact on student morale and well-being, its responses were administrative and logistical, focusing on the physical (re)integration of students into existing or new classes and schools to restore education services to pre-crisis levels.

The protracted Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) made evident the limits of this approach. UNRWA's bureaucracy and relocation from Beirut to Vienna compromised oversight of school contingency plans. Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the departure of the PLO from the country, the 1982 Sabra and Shatila camp massacres, and increasing threats against refugees in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza during the rest of the 1980s amplified the need for refugee protection, requiring UNRWA to expand its mandate beyond basic service provision. A school counsellor programme began in 1985.

The impossibility of school-based learning during the first intifada (1987–1993) forced staff to consider alternative teaching approaches, such as developing self-learning materials and delivering education through television programming, although not all

⁶ This section is based on UNRWA Education (2019b).

BOX 4.4:**The curriculum for Palestinian refugees has faced relentless scrutiny**

In their effort to articulate social, economic and political objectives, curriculum development processes are heavily contested. And none less so than the curriculum for Palestinian refugees, both in host countries and in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).⁷

After the 1948 Arab–Israel war, as a temporary, non-sovereign aid organization, UNRWA had no role in policy-making or curriculum development. Hence it decided to align its education programme with host country systems. Although this meant operating in four allied but differing education systems with four different curricula and sets of textbooks, the rationale was clear: Since UNRWA had no resources to provide secondary education, refugee students needed recognized and accredited qualifications to transfer easily to host country schools and national labour markets. Alignment was also financially efficient, as creating a Palestinian curriculum would have been highly technical and expensive.

Starting with Gaza, which used Egyptian curriculum in 1949, use of the host country curriculum was formalized in 1952, with two modifications. First, ‘useful manual activity’ for six to eight periods per week would be offered for all children above age 12 as an incentive to retain children in upper primary grades. Second, the geography and history of Palestine would be taught in UNRWA schools and in host country public and private schools that took in Palestinian children.

The first major curriculum dispute occurred a month after the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli authorities informed UNRWA that they were compiling a dossier proving schoolchildren were being systematically indoctrinated with hatred of Israel. The situation was complex, as Israel effectively controlled two areas where UNRWA operated.

In June 1968, the UNESCO Executive Board established a commission of six independent experts to review the appropriateness of textbooks used in UNRWA schools and make recommendations to the Director-General of UNESCO, who would in turn negotiate with host countries and Israel. The commission set two inviolable criteria to guide its qualitative assessment: It would not adopt an attitude towards political problems and would not tolerate any incitement to violence, calls for the destruction of a state or the expulsion or extermination of its nationals, or disparaging remarks about a community.

The commission examined 127 textbooks and reached three conclusions: The account of historical events could not be deemed a mark of systematic hostility from one community to another; in the context of the anti-colonialism struggle, a discussion of the concept of national liberation could not be denied; and it was the right of refugees to have curricular content that reflected dismay and despair at their situation. The commission praised the moderate tone of the textbooks in this regard but also found that the presentation of some historical content could suggest to children

that violence should be supported. Its recommendations fell into three categories: textbooks to be banned, textbooks to be revised and textbooks that could remain as they were.

Both host countries and Israel protested. Although UNRWA advised teachers not to use Jordanian and Syrian textbooks not authorized by the commission, such textbooks were being delivered. Protest would likely have irked governments whose cooperation UNRWA needed to keep the schools open. Israel unilaterally banned the import of textbooks it deemed inappropriate. Hence, as of 1967/68, there were almost no textbooks in Gaza, and children in the West Bank were missing about one-third of those required. To address this, UNRWA produced teaching notes in 1969/70 that effectively reproduced the banned textbooks without the contested parts. This period also saw the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization, whose education agenda clashed with some UNRWA principles, including through the publication of children’s books, which teachers may have used despite UNRWA policy.

The formation of the PNA in 1994 brought the next major challenge for UNRWA’s curriculum. The PNA immediately assumed responsibility for education in the West Bank and Gaza. The First Palestinian Curriculum Plan was completed in 1998 and phased in between 2001 and 2006. The elaborate process was not without internal disagreement or vocal external criticism that the curriculum promoted hatred and intolerance towards Jewish people and Israel. The Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education has been the most vocal critic, and its reports have had significant traction in international media and politics, even though independent scholars have found it has made unsubstantiated accusations and misrepresented texts.

UNRWA’s 2011 education reform led to the adoption of a policy on education for human rights, conflict resolution and tolerance, incorporated within the framework of the World Programme for Human Rights Education. UNRWA also introduced a curriculum framework in 2013 to review host country curricula and ensure compliance with the reform’s pedagogical standards. In about 4% of cases where curricular content was found non-compliant, UNRWA developed ‘alternative’ or ‘complementary’ enrichment materials for teachers to use alongside the textbooks. This in turn raised concerns about UNRWA undermining Palestinian identity and the national prerogative to determine education content.

In 2015–2017, the US Government Accountability Office conducted a review of the oversight and funding of US education assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, with a special focus on whether education materials used in schools included ‘potentially controversial language’. No adverse finding or recommendation for action emerged, which could suggest that the new UNRWA textbook review system was functioning as intended.

7 This section is based on UNRWA Education (2019a).

initiatives were implemented. UNRWA also adopted a more explicit stance on the importance of refugee protection, including in and around its schools. It used media to highlight threats and increased international staff to deter acts of violence.

The dual concerns of service provision and protection marked UNRWA's operations during the second intifada (2000–2003), the war in Lebanon (2006) and the blockade on Gaza (since 2007). In 2011, UNRWA embarked on a systemic, agency-wide education reform with an innovative programme, Education in Emergencies, which emphasizes protecting and supporting refugees, continuously strengthening education staff capacity to deliver good-quality education, building a community of practice in the school and fostering close links with parents and the community (UNRWA, 2017a). Its online Interactive Learning Programme, developed in Gaza in 2009, and education satellite channel, UNRWA TV (also available on YouTube), developed in 2012, reflected new technological possibilities.

While a number of lessons emerge from seven decades of operation, UNRWA's planning and budget requests should primarily consider the following contingencies: additional teacher salaries, transport costs and non-school-based learning activities; and refugees' worsening socio-economic status, reducing their ability to pay for school-related costs, such as textbooks and supplies.

SEVERAL OBSTACLES TO INCLUSION NEED TO BE OVERCOME

Faced with the pressures of displacement but united by a commitment to include displaced students in national education systems, governments and their partners need to develop flexible plans to ensure coordination and coherence. Effective planning can promote safety, resilience and social cohesion. Planning challenges emerge at the domestic and, especially, international level, where there is an acute need to bridge the international humanitarian and development aid budgets. Plans need to recognize a wide range of issues, from lack of documents to limited language proficiency, education interruptions and poverty.

THE PRESSURES OF DISPLACEMENT ON EDUCATION NECESSITATE DATA AND PLANNING

Difficulties related to inclusion are most acute in contexts where education systems are already weak. The UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning has developed guidance on transitional education plans (TEPs) until a full education sector plan is developed. Whereas a full plan takes years to develop, a TEP generally takes less than 12 months and focuses on immediate needs (GPE and UNESCO IIEP, 2016). Between 2011 and 2017, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) supported 11 TEPs (GPE, 2016).

Chad (with an affected population of 410,000, mainly from the Central African Republic and Sudan) became the first country to include refugees in its TEP in 2013. A participatory assessment, conducted in 12 camps, raised three concerns from Sudanese refugees with respect to the transition to the Chadian national education system: the change of language of instruction, recognition of diplomas issued in Chad upon return to Sudan, and the threat of loss of nationality, culture, religion and national identity (UNHCR, 2015a). These concerns were taken into account in the plan. Chad subsequently accessed US\$7 million of its agreed GPE allocation in 2015 for an emergency programme covering school lunches, school construction and pedagogical materials (GPE, 2016). In 2018, the government converted 108 schools in 19 camps and refugee sites into regular public schools (CRRF, 2018).

In December 2017, in the Annex to the Djibouti Declaration on Regional Refugee Education, the education ministers of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda committed to 'integrate education for refugees and returnees into Education Sector Plans (ESPs) by 2020' (IGAD, 2017b). The annex includes examples of possible actions, such as establishing minimum learning standards for refugees and returnees, integrating refugees into the national EMIS and establishing a regional committee for monitoring implementation of plans (IGAD, 2017a).

To plan refugee education, countries need to improve their EMIS. Chad developed an integrated system, which includes data collection forms for each camp, covering pre-primary to tertiary education and non-formal literacy programmes. This has improved the quality of data available, ensuring harmonized data

collection, entry, compilation and sharing (UNESCO, 2016). Jordan's Ministry of Education has also integrated the education status of refugee children in an EMIS platform (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018).

LACK OF IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CREDENTIALS IS A KEY FACTOR IN EXCLUSION

Refugees frequently lack documentation, such as birth certificates, school-leaving certificates and diplomas, which makes inclusion in national education systems more difficult. Constraints on education in destination countries vary, as Syrian refugees have experienced.

Until recently, Jordan required refugees living outside camps to register with the Ministry of Interior and obtain service cards for access to schools. Obtaining a service card requires a birth certificate. Refugees who fled without their birth certificates or who had not registered the births of their children during displacement were ineligible (Human Rights Watch, 2016). In a move towards greater flexibility, in late 2016, the Ministry of Education began allowing public schools to enrol children without cards.

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees could enter secondary school if they could prove refugee status and had completed primary school in Lebanon or the Syrian Arab Republic. Many students fled without proof of primary school certificates, making private school the only education option, if they could afford it. Since UNHCR was instructed to stop registering refugees in May 2015, it has been harder for Syrians without refugee status to gain access to school (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018).

Recognition of education credentials can also pose problems for displaced children and youth. In Lebanon, out-of-school children sit a placement test or may enter a bridging programme before enrolling in the appropriate primary school grade. At the secondary school level, they need to provide their grade 9 certificate to resume studies. However, those who hold certificates from education institutions in areas previously controlled by the Syrian opposition may face challenges, as the curriculum used in those areas is not recognized. Likewise, while there has been overall progress in recognizing the equivalence of grade 12 certificates for university entrance, it has been reported that students who sat the grade 12 examination in opposition-held areas have enrolled in vocational schools at grade 11 and studied for two years so as to overcome enrolment constraints (UNESCO, 2018b).

In Sweden, the Education Act stipulates that unaccompanied minors from age 7 have the right to enrol in upper secondary school and to be assessed and placed at the appropriate level within two months of arrival. School attendance can also qualify them for prolonged residence permits when permanent asylum is not granted. Guidance material is provided to school staff, focusing on literacy, mathematics and specific subject content knowledge (Sweden National Agency for Education 2018a, 2018b).

In Turkey, children undergo an equivalence assessment by the provincial education directorate to determine the appropriate grade in which to enrol. When no documentation is available, the determination is based on an interview or a short written assessment (ECRE, 2018; UNHCR, 2017b). The government of Turkey relaxed documentation requirements for Syrians wishing to enrol in tertiary education and provided for the recognition of secondary graduation certificates issued by Syrian authorities. The Ministry of National Education also made special dispensation for those who had completed grade 12 in TECs to sit ministry-administered examinations that conferred certificates recognized in Turkish university applications (Yavcan and El-Ghali, 2017).

In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, access to university requires equivalence recognition of students' high school certificates. The Ministry of Education can issue a temporary equivalence based on a stamped copy of the Syrian diploma, which allows students to register. In theory, students need to present the original document within 20 days to receive official equivalence, but until recently the period for submission was extended up to the time of graduation. However, in 2018/19, the ministry issued new instructions halting temporary equivalence, creating a serious concern for refugees who might risk having to return to Syria or obtain their original certificate by dangerous means in order to have access to tertiary education (UNESCO, 2018b).

THE COST OF EDUCATION TO THE DISPLACED IS NOT LIMITED TO FEES

Fees and other education costs can be particularly high for refugees, especially when their freedom of movement and right to work are constrained. Humanitarian aid often subsidizes school transport: In Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, the IOM and UNICEF introduced a school bus service, enabling 35,000 Syrian children to attend (Kompani, 2018).

Public education in Lebanon is nominally free, but registration, uniforms, textbooks, transport and school meals can make it unaffordable for refugee families. The World Food Programme (WFP) introduced the Emergency School Feeding (ESF) programme in Lebanon in 2015/16. As elsewhere in the region, ESF used both cash-based and food modalities. The government and UNICEF jointly piloted the cash component, *Min ila (To from)*. It offered cash to Syrian children attending the afternoon primary school shift to cover transport and compensate households for income forgone when children attended school instead of working. An evaluation showed that, while enrolment was unaffected, attendance increased by 0.5 to 0.7 days per week, or about 20% relative to the control group (de Hoop et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the intervention was discontinued, as it could not secure financial support from MEHE.

The food component includes milk or peanuts and an apple or a banana (equivalent to 250 calories per day). It is delivered to vulnerable Lebanese children in the morning shift and Syrian refugee children in the afternoon shift in selected public primary schools in areas with high poverty and refugee density. The number of beneficiaries grew from 10,000 in 2016/17 to 24,000 in 2018/19 in 39 schools. In 2019, the WFP and MEHE jointly introduced kitchens in six schools, aimed at diversifying snacks, forming links with the community and improving sustainability. These cold kitchens accommodate fruit, vegetables and sandwich preparation, reaching around 10,000 more children (WFP, 2018a).

In Turkey, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, the Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Red Crescent Society and UNICEF are extending the national conditional cash transfer programme for education to Syrian and other refugees with support from the European Commission, Norway and the United States. Public school, TEC and accelerated learning programme students receive US\$8 to US\$13 per month, depending on gender and grade, conditional on regular attendance. In addition, a one-time payment of US\$22 is planned for each child per semester. As of July 2018, the programme had reached 368,000 children and expected to reach 450,000 by July 2019 (Arık Akyüz et al., 2018).

DISPLACEMENT CONTEXTS EXACERBATE TEACHER MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING ISSUES

Displacement intensifies the usual pressures on teacher management systems in terms of availability, financing and planning. In Turkey, it is estimated

that 80,000 additional teachers would be needed if all school-age Syrians were to enrol (Sirkeci, 2017). Coordination of teacher recruitment, compensation and development is often further compromised where multiple humanitarian and development aid agencies operate under different rules (Kirk and Winthrop, 2013).

Teachers in displacement contexts require tailored professional development. Instead, they often teach in challenging conditions with limited, sporadic support. In Turkey, teachers appointed by the education ministry lacked the training to teach Turkish to foreigners (Coşkun and Emin, 2016). European Union-funded 30-hour orientation training has since been provided to 6,200 contract and 8,800 public school teachers, covering areas including conflict management, teaching methodologies, guidance and counselling skills (Mendenhall et al., 2018).

In high-income countries, including Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, teachers may be trained and certified but need new skills to address refugee needs (Bunar et al., 2018). Education policy in Germany is decentralized across the 16 states, and refugee-specific responses vary among them, depending on the refugee caseload, experience with migrant students and local policy orientation. States have made definite if mixed progress in preparing teachers for language support. Between 2012 and 2015, 10 states began providing explicit content for language support, although only 6 had made language support pedagogy mandatory by 2017 (Baumann, 2017).

One solution for teacher shortages in displacement contexts is to include refugee teachers in national training programmes. Refugee teachers are generally excluded: They may be denied the right to work, or strict professional regulations may prevent them from legally joining the national teaching force. Even when retraining is possible, it is often lengthy and costly, requiring full-time study (Mendenhall et al., 2018).

Chad boasts one of the most promising examples of professional pathways for refugee teachers. In response to the protracted crises in the Central African Republic and Sudan, the government, with support from national and international organizations, made refugee schools use a Chadian curriculum; deployed more Chadian teachers to refugee camps to teach French, civics and geography; and scaled up refugee teachers' qualifications so they now have opportunities to be fully certified by the Chadian education authorities and work in Chad's public schools (UNHCR, 2015a). From 2012 to 2016, 341 Sudanese

refugee teachers were certified by the Abéché Bilingual Teacher Training College after a two-year teacher education course offered in summer. Additional cohorts of Sudanese teachers are undergoing training, and a few teachers in Djabal camp are working as temporary teachers in Chadian schools. The governments of Chad and Sudan signed a joint agreement with UNESCO, UNICEF and UNHCR to ensure that certification and equivalence are recognized when Sudanese teachers return home (Mendenhall et al., 2018).

There are also initiatives in high-income countries. The Refugee Teacher Programme of the University of Potsdam in Germany enables Syrian and other refugee teachers to return to the classroom, where they can act as bridge-builders for new arrivals in German schools. The programme supports Germany's efforts to integrate refugees and asylum-seekers into the workforce. The 11 month course consists of several months of intensive German language and teacher education, along with classroom practice in school. The university received more than 700 applications for 25 places and plans to expand access (Mendenhall et al., 2018; Potsdam University, 2017). In Sweden, teacher unions created a guide for newly arrived teachers who want to stay in the profession. It explains the teaching standards in the country and provides information about relevant government agencies (Bunar et al., 2018).

TEACHERS NEED SUPPORT TO RESPOND TO LEARNERS WITH TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES

Displaced learners have often had traumatic experiences of violence and conflict. Studies in high-income countries have reported post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) prevalence rates ranging from 10% to 25%; in low- and middle-income countries, rates as high as 75% have been reported (Fazel, 2018). The large variation in prevalence rate estimates may be due to misreporting in the absence of appropriate instruments to diagnose PTSD (Morina et al., 2018).

The psychosocial effects of trauma can also depend on the displacement context. Among Syrians, PTSD rates were 32% for the internally displaced and 23% for those who found refuge in the Netherlands. However, depression rates were significantly higher among refugees (44%) than among the internally displaced (16%). The difference may be due to the fact that the internally displaced continued to live in their homeland, albeit amid conflict, while refugees experienced loss of identity, homeland, community and family (Al Ibraheem et al., 2017).

A review of 34 studies on refugee learning found that, in addition to displacement trauma, learners faced several risk factors in their new learning environments, including parental misunderstanding of education expectations, stereotyping and low expectations by teachers, bullying, and discrimination by staff or peers. These experiences can result in mental health problems and disruptive behaviour, which hamper teaching and learning (Graham et al., 2016).

Recognizing and addressing children's trauma is complex; in severe cases, the engagement of trained mental health professionals is crucial. In the absence of mental health services for children, schools may often provide the only access to psychosocial support. Teachers can provide solutions for less acute situations with routine education practices that focus on promoting growth and building individuals' skills rather than emphasizing migrant and refugee problems (Nilsson and Bunar, 2016). They can maintain relationships with students and their families, learn their histories, observe student behaviour for signs of distress and seek help from specialized personnel, such as trauma-trained school psychologists (Sullivan and Simonson, 2016). While they need continuous professional development, for instance in constructive classroom management or use of referral mechanisms, they lack trauma and mental health training. In the Syrian Arab Republic, 73% of surveyed teachers had no training in providing psychosocial support for children in their classrooms (Mendenhall et al., 2018).

Four levels of mental health and psychosocial support are aimed at addressing trauma (IASC, 2007). Interventions at the first level relate to establishing basic services and security for all children affected by trauma and can be implemented with minimal specialized training. UNRWA's 708 schools consider psychosocial well-being a shared responsibility, from teachers and school counsellors to parents and caregivers. In times of emergency, psychosocial support activities are scaled up, including through increased recreational activities, enhanced community engagement and deployment of additional counsellors (UNRWA, 2017).

The second level is aimed at children in mild psychological distress and includes supportive generalized activities, led by trained teachers, parents and volunteers. Social and emotional learning approaches build skills related to self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship building and responsible decision-making, which

can be damaged by the uncertainty and dangers of displacement (INEE, 2016).

For instance, creative expression programmes can develop such skills through art, music or drama. Such programmes may include grief-focused art activities, child-centred play therapy and role-playing (Tyrer and Fazel, 2014). In Turkey, the Maya Vakfi Foundation, with guidance from the Ministry of National Education, has run the Trauma-Informed Schools project since 2016. Eight week art therapy workshops aim to provide Syrian refugee children with skills to help them deal with trauma and social and cultural adjustment. In the Build Your Own Superhero activity, children are encouraged to talk about their emotions and told they have a superhero inside them. They are asked to paint or decorate these superheroes and describe their powers or features (Maya Vakfi, 2018; Watt, 2019).

Social support-building activities share some features with arts programmes. They aim to improve children's well-being through improved peer and teacher-student relationship-building. A youth football project in the Za'atari refugee camp in Jordan engaged about 3,000 Syrian boys and girls. It trained coaches in ways to encourage children's development and raise awareness of social issues to promote well-being (Boateng, 2017).

Mind-body activities involve managing stress, improving focus and regulating emotions. The Better Learning Programme administered in Jordan and Palestine by the Norwegian Refugee Council is a complex set of interventions, including mindfulness, that aims to establish a sense of safety among students, promote self-calming and self-regulation, increase community- and self-efficacy (how to find, give and receive support) and instil a sense of mastery and hope (Shah, 2017a). An evaluation in Palestine showed that the programme had improved children's skills in recognizing and managing fear (Shah, 2017b).

The third level provides focused, non-specialized support for children demonstrating greater needs, with activities facilitated by highly trained teachers and social workers, actively supervised by mental health professionals. At the fourth level, the children in the most need participate in more individually targeted specialized mental health services conducted by mental health specialists (IASC, 2007; INEE, 2016). Such interventions require specially trained therapists and are beyond teachers' skills and responsibilities (Sullivan and Simonson, 2016).

TECHNOLOGY CAN SUPPORT EDUCATION FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE

Forced displacement often overwhelms education systems that are already weak and unable to absorb large influxes of people rapidly. Even in protracted displacement situations, complex settings limit displaced people's access to formal or non-formal education of good quality. These constraints have motivated a search for alternative solutions for their education needs. Some challenges are well met by advantages promised by technology-based solutions, namely scalability, speed, mobility (the technology can reach displaced people) and portability (displaced people can carry the technology). Well-designed programmes can be distributed widely to anyone with a connected device, such as a smartphone or tablet (UNESCO (2018c).

Digital solutions can often build on existing infrastructure and be downloaded and disseminated rapidly at minimal additional cost. Many general-purpose technology tools, notably mobile phones, are ubiquitous even in refugee camps and prove useful and popular in communities affected by displacement, including for education. Thus the potential for technology to enhance existing learning environments or create virtual learning environments is gaining increased attention from actors in the technology, humanitarian and education fields.

A challenge of such interventions is that, as they are led by technology firms, there is a tendency to put more emphasis on the technical aspects of installing a platform than on decisions related to content, where actors operate in parallel. The key question is how these supplementary resources, which appear in several often overlapping forms, can be linked effectively to curricula, especially given efforts to include refugees in national education systems.

Two examples of e-learning resources from the Syrian refugee crisis have explicitly attempted to align with national curricula. Tabshoura (Chalk), provided jointly by the NGO Lebanese Alternative Learning, two international NGOs and a university education faculty, has developed online resources for preschools in Arabic, English and French, building on Moodle, a learning management system. Work focused from the outset on developing resources aligned with the 2015 Lebanese curriculum by grade, subject and project. Teachers created activities suitable for both an interactive platform and meeting the curricular learning objectives. The activities were translated, edited, validated, adapted and digitized, and have been

used with Syrian refugees as a supplementary resource (Fahed and Albina, 2016).

Launched in 2012, Nafham (We Understand) is a free online education website with video content relevant to students from pre-primary to upper secondary. In addition to offering its own original videos, it encourages teachers, students and parents to create videos, which make up one-third of the more than 10,000 videos. These cover over 75% of the Egyptian national curriculum, sorted by grade and subject. The business model is based on online advertising and private sector partnerships. Originally intended to help families that relied on expensive supplementary private tuition, it expanded to include 1,000 videos covering about 35% of the Syrian curriculum. They have been used as a supplementary resource by the Rumie Initiative's Learn Syria, which provides tablets loaded with education materials to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Turkey, including e-textbooks from the Syrian Education Commission (GBC and Theirworld, 2016; Rumie, 2018; Wimpenny et al., 2016).

Another potential technology contribution involves important areas not included in curricula, such as psychosocial support. In Lebanon and Jordan, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), in its Vroom programme, adapted a model developed for low-income families in the United States. It uses videos and animation, delivered through WhatsApp and Facebook, to provide parenting techniques in the form of games and advice. These are combined with parenting skills sessions and home visits to get to the most difficult-to-reach families. An impact assessment suggested that parents who received science-based messages were more likely than those who received the parent-focused text to click on the link and watch the associated video (Wilton et al., 2017).

Most programmes come with support for teacher professional development. With funding by the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the IRC developed the Connect to Learn initiative, targeting 160 Syrian refugee teachers at Domiz refugee camp schools in Dohuk province, Iraq. Ericsson provided hardware and software, and AsiaCall supported the internet connection. The initiative gave teachers access to custom-made training materials and let them connect with peers to share experiences. The objective was to prepare teachers to implement Healing Classrooms, which focuses on providing psychosocial support to children affected by conflict through a compassionate classroom environment and instructional videos. The professional development programme focused

on transforming technology tools into education resources (GIZ, 2016).

As with technology interventions in much of the world, impact evaluations often involve implementing organizations, with the result that a robust, objective research basis is lacking (Tauson and Stannard, 2018). Overall, two areas of concern remain. A striking feature is that most initiatives provide content prepared for very different learning contexts than those in which refugees generally find themselves. Despite attempts to adapt content, compatibility with host national education systems is the exception. This poses a risk for international organizations that support such initiatives and also adopt the principle of inclusion of refugees in national education systems, as such organizations have a responsibility to work with governments, which are absent from such interventions. It is important to recognize that technology cannot replace participation in formal schooling and that most technology-based interventions can work as complementary or interim solutions.

Second, many initiatives involve private sector technology firms, including giants such as HP and Microsoft. There is a sense that the emphasis on technology solutions may have been excessive. A survey of 144 non-state actors in education for Syrian refugees found that 49% were engaged in developing and distributing technological education innovations (Menashy and Zakharia, 2017). International organizations, which support such partnerships with few strings attached, are responsible for ensuring that these initiatives are well coordinated and serve the ultimate aim of including refugees in national education systems.

A LIFELONG PERSPECTIVE IS NEEDED FOR REFUGEE EDUCATION

While the emphasis traditionally falls on children of compulsory education age, the international community has committed under SDG 4 to ensure lifelong learning opportunities for all. Early childhood education, youth technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and tertiary education opportunities for refugee populations are receiving increasing attention.

REFUGEE ACCESS TO EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND EDUCATION REMAINS LIMITED

Globally, children under age 5 make up 16%, or more than 4 million, of the displaced (UNHCR, 2018b). Such adversity affects young children in the short

and long term. Exposure to violence and the stress of dislocation can have devastating effects, particularly in the early years when the brain undergoes its most rapid period of development (Britto et al., 2017). Even children not victimized by physical violence can be traumatized by separation from family and home. Without adequate intervention and protective, caring relationships, displacement and conflict can lead to a generation suffering long-term mental health, social and economic problems (Center on the Developing Child, 2007; International Rescue Committee, 2017).

Evidence on the positive effects of early childhood care and education (ECCE) on life trajectories is abundant and growing (*The Lancet*, 2016). The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Art. 82) called on UN member states to support early childhood education for refugees (United Nations, 2016a). Yet Humanitarian and Refugee Response Plans show little commitment to early childhood development. A review of 26 active plans showed that nearly half made no mention of learning or education for children under 5, and less than one-third specifically mentioned pre-primary education or ECCE (Bouchane et al., 2018).

With public ECCE activity limited, NGOs often fill the gap. In Turkey, although Syrian children can attend early childhood education in public schools, shortages of places and resources have led many NGOs and international agencies to provide services. In June 2017, UNICEF-led initiatives enrolled 12,800 Syrians aged 3 to 5. Some NGOs (e.g. Mother Child Education Foundation, Support to Life, Mavi Kalem Social Assistance and Solidarity, Yuva Foundation) provide teacher education, education materials, home visits, psychosocial and mental health support, and learning and recreational activities. In late 2017, the MacArthur Foundation announced a US\$100 million grant to the Sesame Workshop and the IRC for early childhood development intervention in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, the largest initiative of its kind in humanitarian response (MacArthur Foundation, 2017).

MANY BARRIERS PREVENT MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM FURTHERING THEIR SKILLS

Refugees' right to employment may be restricted; only 75 of the 145 parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention grant refugees the right to work as Articles 17–19 stipulate, and it is often subject to restrictions (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016). Some countries have taken steps to address this problem. Between 2016 and mid-2018, Jordan issued or renewed over 100,000 work permits for Syrian refugees (ILO, 2018). In 2016,

BOX 4.5:

A unique pathway to employment for a uniquely excluded group: Youth in Gaza

Gaza, home to more than 1.4 million Palestinian refugees, has one of the world's highest population densities. The protracted crisis since the blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt in 2007 has debilitated the economy, creating one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. About 52% of Gaza's labour force was unemployed in 2018, including two out of three youth (World Bank, 2019).

The Qatari Education Above All foundation, through its programme Al Fakhoora, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), launched the E-Work project in the Gaza Strip in 2018. The programme provides employment opportunities for youth, 70% of whom are refugees. It provides them with technical and soft skills and links them to job opportunities in the information and communication technology sector. Over 200 trainees with relevant work experience were selected for the technical skills development phase. It included training courses on the most in-demand job skills worldwide, such as graphic design, web development, mobile development and game development.

About half the selected trainees were qualified to take part in the subsequent freelancing phase, where they received one-to-one and group mentoring, coaching sessions and soft skills training in co-working spaces. Over a three-month period, the trainees experienced various online freelancing platforms and secured 834 jobs, yielding overall earnings of about US\$100,000. Most continued earning income through freelancing platforms after the end of the project.

The project improved not only trainees' technical skills but also their soft skills, including communication and English language facility, to make them competitive in a global market. Linking youth to external markets led Al Fakhoora to adopt it as an essential part of Dynamic Futures, a scholarship programme aimed at building a cadre of educated and trained people who are civic-minded and professionally skilled to become community, business and national leaders.

Turkey allowed 600,000 Syrian refugees to work (Karasapan, 2017). Some high-income countries have policies to distribute refugees across their territory, but employment prospects may not be a criterion of dispersion (OECD, 2016c). Even where opportunities exist, limited contacts or extreme circumstances mean refugees often lack information, leading to unemployment (**Box 4.5**).

Language barriers may discourage refugees from investing in their skills once they are established in the labour market. In Sweden, translating learning materials into various languages helped lower

BOX 4.6:**TVET programmes have been set up for Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries**

The Syrian crisis led to a number of TVET programmes for refugees. International partner support has been critical. The latest estimate is that 100,000 Syrian refugees are participating in TVET programmes in the five host countries in the region (No Lost Generation, 2019a).

In Jordan, the Amaluna (Our Hope) project partnered with the private sector to provide vulnerable Jordanian and Syrian 18- to 24-year-olds with employment opportunities. It has so far reached about 2,500 youth, of whom 1,500 have been interviewed and 537 enrolled. Of those, almost four out of five graduated, and one-third were employed. The next step is to scale up the programme to reach more than 30,000 vulnerable youth (UNICEF, 2018b). The Norwegian Refugee Council offered courses to Syrian youth in tailoring, hairdressing, welding and computing. The three-month courses include life skills, literacy and numeracy. More than 770 youth graduated in 2013–2015 (UNICEF, 2015).

Since 2009, the Better Work Jordan programme has focused on improving the working and living conditions of immigrant workers in the garment industry, including by providing training, and has reached 65,000 workers in 73 factories. A unified contract agreed in 2015 ensured the same recruitment and employment policies for all migrant workers and clarified their rights. Since 2016, the programme has overseen modifications to the contract to include coverage for refugees, coupled with the issuance of 2,000 work permits for Syrians (Better Work Jordan, 2016a, 2016b).

The German Corporation for International Cooperation has supported the Water Wise Plumbers project in Jordan, which aims to reduce water losses in households, in line with the National Water Strategy, the National Employment Strategy and the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis. It trains qualified plumbers, recruiting trainees particularly among Syrian refugees, with an emphasis on women. Graduates have created autonomous cooperatives that promise to make a long-term contribution to social objectives (ETF, 2017a).

UNICEF, UNDP, the European Union and the multidonor European Regional Development and Protection Programme fund the Makhzoumi Foundation vocational training programme. It works with UNHCR to offer eight-week courses to refugees over age 14 in Lebanon, training about 4,500 people, mostly women, annually. Subjects covered include information technology, languages, cosmetology, labour market orientation, entrepreneurial skills and cross-cultural communication. It teaches hands-on, practical knowledge, confers nationally recognized certificates and makes links with employers (ETF, 2017b). Evidence suggests the courses improved beneficiaries' incomes and offered new career pathways.

In Turkey, the national employment agency is working with several international organizations to overcome the administrative obstacles for making jobs accessible to Syrian refugees and to develop vocational training programmes (Kirişci et al., 2018).

vocational training course dropout rates. Beyond general language courses, Sweden responded to the need for skills development programmes for migrants: TVET institutions developed packages to accelerate vocational language proficiency by integrating language tutoring into vocational education and training specific to a trade or industry (Wedekind, 2018).

TVET providers and public employment services need to connect new arrivals with employers to help them gain work experience linked with previous occupations. Internships and volunteering can build the social capital necessary for employment after training (CEDEFOP, 2011). Willkommenslotsen (welcome mentors) in Germany support small and medium-sized enterprises in recruiting newly arrived skilled workers, including refugees. In 2016, 150 trained mentors provided services in 100 local chambers of commerce and industry and placed 3,441 refugees in training or employment (Germany Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2017b).

TVET content and teaching quality can increase the chances of migrant and refugee integration. UNRWA's TVET programme provides practical training to 7,200 Palestinian youth per year through eight training centres. In Gaza, trainees achieved higher final examination scores than the national average (UNRWA, 2015). The programme in Lebanon has one centre, a career guidance and orientation unit and employment service centres. It is flexible in subjects offered and course duration, is learner centred, ensures strong links with employers and aligns curricula with labour market needs. Several countries in the region offer programmes for Syrian refugees (Box 4.6).

MANY BARRIERS PREVENT MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM USING THEIR SKILLS

Displaced people may be unable to carry their academic and vocational or professional qualification documents with them when they flee. Their contact with home institutions may be constrained, since the latter may also be affected by conflict or may refuse to provide documents. There is little information on how many refugees lack all education documentation. Partial documentation may be sufficient to overcome problems, and organizations in host countries need to be flexible (Loo, 2016).

While mechanisms to recognize academic qualifications exist, over two-thirds of the parties to the Lisbon Recognition Convention have taken few or no measures to implement Art. VII on recognizing refugee qualifications that cannot be fully documented

(UNESCO and Council of Europe, 2016). To address this issue, in November 2017, the Lisbon Recognition Convention committee adopted the Recommendation on Qualifications held by Refugees, Displaced Persons and Persons in a Refugee-like Situation (UNESCO, 2017).

Due to the refugee influx in Europe since 2014, European Network of Information Centres-National Academic Recognition Information Centres (ENIC-NARICs) have faced increased requests for qualification recognition (ESU, 2017). The ENIC network, in a project led by Norway, established a toolkit for recognition of refugees' qualifications, based on the 2017 Lisbon Convention recommendation, for institutions to use to evaluate insufficiently documented qualifications (ENIC/NARIC, 2018; NOKUT, 2018).

A publication by the Canadian Information Centre for International Credentials on establishing a qualification assessment procedure for refugees without documents includes 5 approaches, 13 recommended best practices and guidelines, and a practical worksheet (TAICEP, 2018). World Education Services (WES), a non-profit organization, following one of these approaches, implemented a pilot project that examined any Syrian refugee request for recognition that was accompanied by at least one of several types of evidence of previous study. For instance, a complete or partial transcript or degree certificate would be assessed, whether an original, a photocopy or an electronic copy. At the end of the process, WES issued an advisory report on the nature of the credential and its equivalence in Canada, along with information on the method used and the Syrian education system to assist interpretation of results. As the results of the pilot were positive, it will extend the service to refugees from other countries and will implement a similar pilot in the United States (WES, 2018).

TVET degrees may be less portable than academic degrees because of TVET systems' variability. National qualifications and education quality frameworks to measure prior learning facilitate the process. However, for Syrian refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, no learning and competence assessment exists besides formal national education systems and official, non-formal second-chance programmes accredited by ministries of education (ETF, 2014).

A key challenge is recognizing prior learning without documentation. Not recognizing, validating and accrediting refugees' informal learning compromises their ability to gain access to decent work or further

education and training (Singh, 2018). Recognition of prior learning (RPL) identifies, documents, assesses and certifies mainly non-formal and informal learning outcomes against standards used in formal education and training. RPL processes are still at an early stage of development (UIL, 2018). Even when countries have well-structured RPL systems, an inventory showed that refugees were under-represented as target groups (ETF, 2015).

Under the Federal Recognition Act, Germany offers opportunities to identify and evaluate undocumented professional and occupational competences against the German reference qualifications framework, e.g. via a specialist oral examination or work sample. Over half the applications by Iraqi and Syrian refugees resulted in full equivalence. Providing information in Arabic and introducing a multilingual recognition app in 2016 made it easier for refugees to take advantage of the service (Germany Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2017a).

In 2013, Norway introduced a national Recognition Procedure for Persons without Verifiable Documentation. Expert committees appointed by the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education use academic assessments, take-home assignments and mapping of work history. An applicant survey suggests that over half the refugees whose skills were recognized in 2013 either found a related job or entered further education (OECD, 2016d).

REFUGEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM TERTIARY EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES

The prospect of participation in tertiary education contributes to greater primary and secondary enrolment and retention (UNHCR, 2015b).⁸ Tertiary education has the potential to nurture a generation of change-makers who can take the lead in identifying sustainable solutions to refugee situations. Yet it only receives coordinated attention once displacement becomes protracted. Challenges variously highlighted in this report intersect in tertiary education: recognizing credentials and previous learning, learning host languages and overcoming prohibitive costs. In protracted refugee contexts, tertiary education comes at the end of cumulative education disadvantages that prevent many from qualifying. Moreover, refugees' tertiary education rights often extend to non-discrimination at most.

8 This section is based on Ferede (2018).

The Syrian crisis throws the issue into stark relief. Historically, displacement affected populations with low tertiary education participation, but up to one-fifth of young Syrians had access prior to leaving. The proportion fell precipitously in the aftermath of the war, to an estimated 5% or less, prompting calls for 'no lost generation' (European Commission, 2016). Even in as welcoming and familiar an environment as Jordan, challenges are manifold, from lack of academic and career counselling to lack of financial support (Al-Hawamdeh and El-Ghali, 2017).

Displaced populations have severely limited access to tertiary education. The lack of physical access in or around refugee camps motivated technology-based initiatives. UNHCR and the University of Geneva co-lead the Connected Learning in Crisis Consortium, which provides tertiary education opportunities in conflict, crisis and displacement contexts through face-to-face and online learning. Since 2012, connected learning courses have reached over 7,000 students from refugee and host communities (UNHCR, 2018b).

International tertiary education scholarships for refugees emerged long before scholarships became part of the official global development agenda. Among the largest and best-known programmes, DAFI has supported refugees with scholarships through UNHCR since 1992. In 2018, there were 6,866 DAFI recipients, a substantial expansion from 2,321 in 2015. Around 41% were female. DAFI remains a flexible programme whose geographical coverage is continuously adjusted to reflect refugee movements and education needs (UNHCR, 2019h).

Other scholarship programmes support study in high-income countries. Tertiary education is increasingly recognized as an alternative or complementary pathway to a safe host country, not only by individuals (Kirkegaard and Nat-George, 2016), but also by institutions, such as the European Union, which officially recognizes refugee admission through scholarships and study programmes as a protection tool (ERN+, 2017).

The Student Refugee Program of the World University Service of Canada is a sponsorship agreement holder that supports university-based local committees in sponsoring refugees for resettlement and university study. Since 1978, it has allowed more than 1,800 refugees from 39 countries to study at more than 80 colleges and universities across Canada. In 2017/18, 160 refugee youth were sponsored, more than half of whom originated in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, Lifeline Syria, a similar but more narrowly targeted network of Toronto-based universities also operating under the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, has sponsored 1,074 Syrians through 248 private sponsor groups as of September 2018 (Lifeline Syria, 2018).

Academics are as much a part of tertiary education as students. Established in 2000, the Scholars at Risk (SAR) programme has in recent years provided sanctuary and assistance to more than 300 academics per year who need protection, arranging temporary research and teaching positions at institutions in its global network. In 2002, it partnered with the Institute of International Education, whose Scholar Rescue Fund supports some beneficiaries. A key advocate of academic freedom, SAR also investigates and speaks out against attacks on tertiary education communities.

The United Kingdom's Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA) is a SAR partner that provides urgent support to academics forced into exile or, particularly, in immediate danger in home countries, offering multiyear packages instead of short stipends. In 2016, CARA launched a programme for Syrian academics displaced in Lebanon and Turkey aimed at allowing them to develop an international network to draw on in rebuilding tertiary education once it is safe to return. In a pilot phase, workshops in Turkey on academic skills development and English for academic purposes laid the foundations for further collaboration. UK universities hosted the first fellows on short-term research visits. In late 2017, the programme launched a second phase, funded primarily by an Open Society Foundations grant, which was to last 18 months. In addition to workshops, it envisaged 'research incubation visits', a CARA-commissioned research project and a research funding initiative.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS TO FULFIL ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO FINANCE REFUGEE EDUCATION

Since the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, refugee education has been receiving greater priority within a broader effort to improve humanitarian aid efficiency and effectiveness. The establishment of the Education Cannot Wait fund, agreed at the summit, was the clearest sign of a renewed commitment to education in emergencies. Other general initiatives included the Grand Bargain, which involved a set of efficiency-increasing proposals (Metcalf-Hough and Poole, 2018), and the New Way of Working initiative, intended to strengthen collaboration in analysis, planning and financing between humanitarian and

development aid, including through a Joint Steering Committee on Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (OCHA, 2018).

Indeed, humanitarian assistance is not the largest, let alone the only, source of funding for refugee education. Analysis for the 2019 GEM Report, which excluded EU support to Turkey, showed that of the US\$1.3 billion allocated to fund refugee education in 2016, two-thirds was covered by development assistance (UNESCO, 2018a). That being said, estimating the amount spent on refugee education still requires project-by-project analysis. The fragmentation of refugee education aid data is one manifestation of fragmentation in the overall effort to raise funds for refugees, as response to the Syrian crisis shows (**Box 4.7**).

BOX 4.7:

A complex process to raise funds for the Syrian crisis added to the difficulty of tracking aid to refugee education

To address the financial implications of the Syrian crisis, three pledging conferences were organized between 2013 and 2015 in Kuwait. Only a small group of donors provided significant funds in the beginning, as they did not anticipate the scale and duration of the crisis (Watkins and Zyck, 2014). In 2016, the Supporting Syria Conference took place in London, where it was agreed with host countries in the region to enrol all refugee children by the end of 2016/17 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Three annual conferences on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region also took place in Brussels between 2017 and 2019 (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2017a). In 2017, a total of US\$6 billion was pledged for 2017 and US\$3.7 billion for 2018–2020 (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2017b). In 2018, US\$4.4 billion was pledged for 2018 and US\$3.4 billion for 2019–2020 (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2018). In March 2019, US\$7 billion was pledged for 2019 and US\$2.4 billion for 2020 and beyond (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2019). Breakdowns of the pledges for education were not provided.

Refugee education needs have been outlined in three UN humanitarian plans: the 2012 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP), the 2013 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in late 2014. For 2015–2016, 3RP aimed to enrol 830,000 children and youth aged 5 to 17 in primary and secondary formal education and 423,000 in non-formal education; train 41,000 education personnel; and construct, renovate or rehabilitate 482 education facilities (UNDP and UNHCR, 2014).

Launched in 2013 and co-led by UNICEF and three international NGOs, the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative is part of the 3RP and SHARP and the main vehicle for achieving the education objectives of the RRP in Syria and

Iraq. It aims to ensure that children and youth affected by the crises in Syria and Iraq have access to education and protection services and participate in their communities and society. It provides an overarching framework, as well as a platform for joint advocacy at the regional level. It creates intersector links, combines immediate response with strategic investment and mobilizes resources for underfunded sectors (No Lost Generation, 2019b). Country-level programming for NLG is ensured through the RRP coordination mechanisms.

As related above, the government of Lebanon and its international partners developed RACE, which outlines education funding requirements. The Jordan Response Plan 2018–2020 includes requirements of about US\$1.15 billion (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018). The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey allocated US\$595 million for education in 2018. The latest post-Brussels conference tracking report, based on bilateral data and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, suggested that education received US\$1.3 billion in 2018 (Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, 2018, 2019).

Nevertheless, unmet pledges or delayed disbursement can undermine host governments' planning. For instance, donors did not fulfil their pledges for Jordan and Lebanon in 2016. Jordan received US\$208 million but needed US\$250 million, and Lebanon received US\$223 million but needed US\$350 million. Identifying the cause of funding shortfalls is hampered by a lack of consistent, detailed and timely reporting by donors, including information about the projects they fund and when they disburse. Education targets set by donors and host countries have also been inconsistent (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

There are three solutions for increasing funding for refugee education. First, donors could continue to increase their humanitarian aid allocations, holding the share of education constant. The volume of total humanitarian emergency aid increased from US\$9.1 billion in 2012 to US\$22.3 billion in 2016. However, continuing the increase of humanitarian aid is not a sustainable solution, and the rise is more likely mainly to reflect the consequences of the Syrian crisis.

Second, donors could prioritize education within humanitarian aid, given how low education's share has been. In May 2018, a new EU policy framework increased the share of education in emergencies and protracted crises to 10% of the overall humanitarian aid budget in 2019, compared with 1% in 2015. EU institutions collectively allocated US\$2.2 billion to humanitarian assistance in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). The FTS shows that the share of education in the Syria 3RP also increased, from 2.4% in 2015 to 7.4% in 2016, and remained above the average at 6% in 2017.

Accordingly, the third solution is to tap into more development aid. For instance, since 2013, the GPE has made its support to countries affected by fragility and conflict more flexible to respond to emergencies. It allows them to develop interim education sector plans and receive up to 20% of their indicative GPE allocation in eight weeks or less. Yemen has used this facility (GPE, 2018). In April 2016, the GPE and UNHCR agreed to strengthen country-level cooperation to improve education for refugees and host communities. This includes participation of humanitarian actors in local education groups, a coordination mechanism hitherto available for development actors (UNHCR, 2016b).

Multilateral development banks play an increasingly important role in financing emergency responses beyond the humanitarian aid architecture. The World Bank established a Global Crisis Risk Management Platform in 2016 to coordinate its diverse

financing tools. It created a US\$2 billion financing tool, the IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities, to help the poorest countries manage refugee crises. For middle-income countries, it established the Global Concessional Financing Facility, first tested in Jordan and Lebanon in 2016. Each US\$1 in grants is leveraged to create about US\$4 in concessional financing, and the facility also offers improved coordination. By mid-2017, it had raised US\$372 million in pledges and had approved US\$193 million for implementation. None had been allocated for education yet, although it is within the facility's scope (World Bank, 2016, 2017c, 2017d).

CONCLUSION

The growing number of displaced people and the longer duration of displacement have forced a radical rethink of how best to deliver education to affected populations, especially in the Arab States. A key lesson is abandoning the response of placing refugees in separate schools, a solution which excluded them from both host communities and sustainable livelihood opportunities.

Ensuring inclusion, however, is not straightforward and can be affected by geography, history, resources and capacity. It requires governments to exert considerable efforts to coordinate authorities, unify procedures (from data collection to teacher payroll), engage refugee and host communities and design programmes that allow children and youth whose education has been interrupted to re-enter the education system at an appropriate level.

Education for refugee children and youth is critical to restoring a sense of normalcy, but sharing host curricula, textbooks, teachers and infrastructure is only a first step towards inclusion from a social and cultural perspective. Direct contact alone will build neither belonging nor social cohesion.

BOX 4.8:**Libya has faced complex population movements, affecting education**

Many countries in the region face overlapping challenges of migration and displacement, both internal and international. In recent years, Libyans have fled to – and many since returned from – Tunisia; others were and remain internally displaced. Migrants from various countries have had to be evacuated to their countries of origin, and new sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees have entered Libya in transit to European destinations. The continued conflict has negatively affected education delivery, coverage, retention, quality, efficiency and effectiveness (UNESCO, 2018c).

Tunisia experienced a huge influx of refugees when the Libyan crisis erupted. In 2011–2012, an estimated 660,000 Libyans and 220,000 others, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, crossed the country's borders. Officially, according to the Tunisian Institute of Statistics, there were fewer than 9,000 Libyan residents in Tunisia in 2014. Since most Libyans did not register as refugees, their number is highly underestimated. One estimate suggested that they made up 10% of the Tunisian population (Bel-Air, 2016). In 2014/15, over 50% of registered Libyan school-age children and youth in Tunisia were enrolled in primary school and 25% in secondary school, with nearly 25% out of school, mainly due to administrative or financial difficulties or having exceeded the legal school age. More than half the Libyan students were enrolled in Libyan schools and almost 40% in private schools, as access to Tunisian public schools was difficult. In 2015/16, the Ministry of Education authorized the enrolment of 500 additional Libyan students in public schools (Mouley, 2016).

While many Libyans have returned home, Libya still faces the challenge of internal displacement as a result of a volatile security situation. In 2019, there were 220,000 internally displaced out of

a total population of 6.4 million, giving Libya the fifth-highest per capita displacement rate in Africa (IOM, 2019b; UNHCR 2018f). Kidnapping of children and armed attacks against children, teachers and schools continue to be reported (UNHCR, 2018f). In 2018, 489 schools were affected (UN OCHA, 2018). Displacement puts pressure on overcrowded schools. About one out of five internally displaced people (IDPs) in Libya live in warehouses or schools that were converted into accommodation (REACH, 2018; UNICEF, 2019c). Libya's previously high enrolment rates have steadily declined since 2011: 87% of school-age children were enrolled in 2018, with IDPs at particular risk of not attending (REACH, 2018).

Libya remains a gateway for sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees heading for Europe via the Mediterranean. From January to May 2019, coast guards returned 2,417 individuals to Libya, and 321 deaths were recorded (IOM, 2019c). In 2019, more than 57,000 refugees and 640,000 migrants were registered. They represented more than 39 nationalities: 65% from sub-Saharan Africa and 29% from North Africa (IOM 2019c; UNHCR, 2019i). Children from sub-Saharan Africa have particular difficulty with school access because of discrimination, language barriers and, in the case of girls, early marriage. In 2018, an estimated 62,000 school-age refugee and migrant children were registered in Libya, of whom about 53,000 needed support for education access. No unaccompanied and separated children interviewed by UNICEF had access to education (UN OCHA, 2018). Education is not free for many of these children (Carter, 2018). Learning opportunities for those who cannot gain access to formal schools are scarce, and non-formal education is nearly non-existent. Some migrant and refugee parents have set up very basic informal community schools (UN OCHA, 2018).

Iraq. Two young girls run towards the gate of the Al Waser Center for temporary learning, supported by Save the Children, in Kirkuk. The centre brings together urban IDPs and local children.

Credit: Dario Bosio/DARST/Save the Children



CHAPTER 5

Internal displacement

Conflict has severe negative effects on the education of internally displaced people (IDPs) through mechanisms linked to security, livelihood, access to decent housing, and infrastructure. Internally displaced families may lack documentation needed for enrolment. They may be unable to work in their place of refuge, which may mean they cannot cover education costs or have to send their children to work. They may be forced to live in informal settlements on the outskirts of urban areas, too far from schools to attend. Even when children continue their education, the language of instruction may be different or the classroom or schoolyard environment may be hostile. In any case, the trauma of displacement affects children's psychosocial health and ability to excel in school. In turn, early school leaving affects the precariousness of their future livelihoods, which can feed into intergenerational effects (Figure 5.1).


The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that everyone has the right to education and that 'the authorities concerned shall ensure that such persons, in particular displaced children, receive education which shall be free and compulsory at

the primary level. Education should respect their cultural identity, language and religion' (UNHCR, 1998). However, the political dimensions of many displacement crises sometimes hamper recognition of the additional challenges involved in delivering education to the people affected.

At the end of 2018, 10 countries hosted 75% of the world's 41.3 million people internally displaced by conflict, of whom 10.8 million were newly displaced in 2018. Out of the 10 countries with the largest IDP populations, 4 were Arab countries: Iraq, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. The Syrian Arab Republic leads the list with 6.1 million, including 1.6 million newly displaced in 2018 (Figure 5.2). This chapter focuses on the experiences of these four countries with the highest IDP populations in the region, and the approaches taken to address their education needs.

Conflict is not the only driver of internal displacement. Natural disasters increasingly drive such forced movements. While this is less likely in the Arab States, 69,000 people in Iraq and 121,000 in Sudan were

FIGURE 5.1:
Internal displacement affects education through multiple channels
Links between internal displacement and education




Source: Based on IDMC (2018a).

FIGURE 5.2:

Four Arab states are among the 10 countries with the largest internally displaced populations

Number of people displaced by conflict, by country, 2018



Source: IDMC (2019a).

displaced as a result of disasters in 2018 (IDMC, 2019a). Organized state activity can also drive displacement, as with the Negev Bedouins in Israel (**Box 5.1**).

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council has a comprehensive monitoring platform displaying information about reports of conflict or natural disasters, which aid in estimating numbers of IDPs. A machine learning tool reads, filters and analyses news and UN or non-government reports and extracts information, which is then validated (IDMC, 2018b). While many of the sources are familiar, non-traditional data sources, such as satellite imagery and social media data, are also used (IDMC, 2018c). Non-traditional sources can circumvent security concerns and registration

systems that hamper easy identification of the displaced in many contexts. Self-identification may be very biased, as many of the displaced do not want to be identified for fear of persecution (Baal and Ronkainen, 2017).

IN IRAQ, DISPLACEMENT RELATED TO ISIS HAS COMPLICATED EDUCATION DELIVERY

At the height of the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (better known by the acronym ISIS) in March 2016, there were 3.4 million IDPs in Iraq.⁹ As security forces retook ISIS-held territory, IDPs gradually began returning home. There are currently 1.6 million IDPs, almost 700,000 of whom live in the Kurdistan region. About 90,000, or 5%, live in camps. IDPs have been displaced for periods ranging from a few months to more than five years. Returns have slowed and vary significantly among populations. From April 2018 to April 2019, the overall number of IDPs declined by 21%, with a reduction of 29% in the number of IDPs living in federal government areas and a reduction of 13% of those living in camps. In the Kurdistan region, which offers security and a higher standard of living than other areas of Iraq, the return rate was 6% (IOM, 2019d).

About 64% of surveyed IDPs planned to remain in displacement during 2019 (IOM et al., 2018). Infrastructure and homes have been damaged, destroyed or occupied, public services are limited and economic opportunities are few. Some areas have not been cleared for return due to persistent insecurity or explosive remnants not yet removed. People perceived to have been affiliated with ISIS are housed in detention centres and camps where there is little support, and although camp life is difficult, these IDPs are especially unlikely to return to their communities, where they would be subject to isolation and revenge. Nevertheless, the Iraq government is closing camps, reducing salaries of displaced civil servants and discontinuing services for IDPs in the Kurdistan region to accelerate returns (IOM, 2019d).

Most IDPs are Arab and Sunni, but other ethnic and religious groups are also represented, including Assyrians, Kakais, Kurds, Shabaks, Turkmens and Yezidis, whose varied experiences and tense relationships make delivery of standardized support difficult (Shanks, 2019). However, the Ministry of

⁹ This section is based on Oswald (2019).

BOX 5.1:**Non-conflict-related internal displacement: The Negev Bedouins in Israel**

The Negev Bedouins are part of the indigenous Arab population in Israel (Abu-Saad, 2016). In 2017, there were roughly 240,000 Bedouins, making up about one-third of the Negev population (Rotem and Gordon, 2017). Their livelihoods, which traditionally depended on nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism, were subject to an enormous transition to urbanization imposed by the Israeli government (Abu-Saad, 2016). Since the 1960s, the government has confiscated Bedouin land and endeavoured to concentrate Bedouins in townships constructed specifically to integrate them into the national system (El-Meccawi and Degen, 2016; Mihlar, 2011). This has led to internal displacement of thousands of Bedouins. Today, 29% of the Bedouin population continues to live in roughly 35 unrecognized villages, some of which existed before Israel's establishment (Rotem and Gordon, 2017).

Israel's education system is characterized by segregation. While Bedouin education is part of the Israeli Arab education system, a separate body, the Bedouin Education Authority, administers it. In general, the authorities have neglected the public education system in Bedouin towns and villages (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2006). The government policy of concentrating Bedouins in towns is reflected in the education

infrastructure. While authorities provide transport to children aged 3 to 5, they refuse to set up kindergartens in unrecognized villages. In 2016/17, out of 118 Bedouin schools, 11 (all of them primary schools) were in unrecognized villages (Rotem and Gordon, 2017).

Children living in unserved unrecognized Bedouin villages walk several miles to get public transport to towns and recognized villages. Distance to school is a major factor of exclusion for girls at the secondary school level, as parents worry about sending them outside their village (Mihlar, 2011). Dropout is high. In 2013/14, 36% of Bedouin students dropped out, compared with 20% of Arab and 6% of Jewish students. Moreover, 14% of 20- to 29-year-olds in Israel were enrolled in universities or colleges, compared with 8% of Arabs and 4% of Bedouins (Abu-Saad, 2016).

The Bedouin population has filed several petitions to the High Court of Justice requesting improvement of infrastructure and services in existing schools and establishment of new schools in both recognized and unrecognized villages. While the government has maintained its overall policy, some schools have benefited from infrastructure improvements (Rotem and Gordon, 2017).

Education responded rapidly to the last displacement crisis by establishing three representative offices in the Kurdistan region, which acted as satellite offices of the education directorates of affected governorates, staffing schools, registering students and organizing primary and secondary examinations. They also coordinated support from UN agencies and NGOs.

Among the challenges for Arabic-speaking IDP children in the Kurdistan region have been the small number of Arabic-language schools and uncertainty over whether qualifications from Kurdistan region schools will be recognized, as the curriculum is different. Hence the federal Ministry of Education established schools for IDPs in the Kurdistan region that teach the official curriculum in Arabic. However, schools may be far from home for IDPs living in host communities. Transport costs can be a burden for families, and the distance to schools may create safety concerns that prevent families from sending children to school, particularly for second- or third-shift classes, which end late.

Most IDP schools in the Kurdistan region have been hosted in school buildings belonging to the Kurdistan regional Ministry of Education. Education directorates and school administrators in the region have adapted school schedules and activities to accommodate shifts for IDP students. While a few schools had been established in rented buildings,

the Kurdistan ministry offered to accommodate all IDP schools in its own school buildings when the federal government indicated that it would close schools, even though the federal government does not contribute to maintenance or electricity costs. The accommodation has made it possible for IDPs living in the Kurdistan region to continue studying in conducive learning environments.

UNICEF, in coordination with education directorates and supported by Education Cluster members, has organized back-to-school campaigns before the beginning of each school year. These inform IDPs about registration processes and the location of the nearest primary or secondary school. Policies established before the conflict to standardize registration make it difficult for children to return to school after disruption. Students can register only during the first 50 days of the school year, and children who miss the deadline cannot register until the following school year, a practice not responsive to IDP mobility. Education Cluster minutes record that some administrators have refused to register children without documentation or require students to present documents by the end of the school year as a prerequisite to continuing their studies and sitting examinations (Humanitarian Response Iraq Education, 2019). However, ISIS destroyed many school records, and it can take up

to six months and require legal assistance to obtain replacement academic or identity documents.

The federal ministry and directorates have not been collecting data on IDP enrolment, attendance and other key performance indicators. Education Cluster estimates suggest that there are 776,000 school-age IDPs (UN OCHA, 2019c). A 2018 needs assessment indicated that 42% of IDP children and youth aged 6 to 17 living in camps attended formal education, compared with 60% of IDP children living in host communities and 73% of non-displaced children. Although most IDP families surveyed reported that they had access to a primary or secondary school within 5 km, schools are often damaged and lack sanitation, furniture, teachers and learning materials (REACH Iraq, 2018b).

Learners who have missed more than two years of school cannot return to a regular school but must attend accelerated learning centres, which are scarce, particularly in rural areas. The federal Ministry of Education with UNICEF support has developed an updated accelerated learning curriculum and materials for IDP students. However, those aged 12 to 17 represent 68% of out-of-school children, as accelerated learning centres cover only primary school curriculum. There are no other structured and officially recognized opportunities for adolescents to develop academic skills (UN OCHA, 2019c).

Assessments by UNESCO indicate that 35% of grade 4 IDP students surveyed were unable to complete simple addition problems, and 36% could not read at a sentence level (UNESCO Iraq Office, 2018). Analysis of learning outcome data also indicates a correlation between longer displacement and lower literacy and numeracy skills (Palmer, 2018).

The federal Ministry of Education and its partners provide textbooks and kits for more than 160,000 students and 1,500 teachers. Some partners distribute school uniforms, provide transport to school or make direct cash transfers to help vulnerable families pay school costs. An estimated 269 school buildings have been rehabilitated or expanded. Tents and prefabricated trailers have been used to create temporary classrooms and offices for formal and non-formal education. Partners deliver equipment to make learning spaces appropriate for both summer and winter temperatures. Overall, national and international NGOs and UN agencies supported education activities for almost 240,000 IDP children in 2018, from preschool to technical and vocational education (Iraq National Education Cluster, 2019).

The European Union, Norway and the United States are the main donors.

In the Kurdistan region, IDP students are taught by IDP teachers paid by their home governorates' education directorates. Gaps in staffing are supplemented by untrained parents and community members working as volunteers or for a small stipend paid by UN agencies or NGOs. In 2018, education partners paid incentives to 2,215 volunteer teachers, who fill gaps in contract teacher numbers, teach remedial classes or facilitate after-school psychosocial activities (Iraq National Education Cluster, 2019). But in many cases, poor coordination among partners has led to service gaps, pay disparity among teacher categories and tension among partners. The Education Cluster in Erbil brought partners together to agree on a coordinated incentive scale, with standard rates for teachers and other types of workers (Mendenhall et al., 2018).

The federal Ministry of Education has added programmes offering psychosocial support to its education television broadcasts. Education partners delivered training to almost 1,000 formal and non-formal teachers on pedagogy and classroom management, including Teaching in Crisis Contexts training adapted for the Iraqi context. NGOs have established sports, art and drama after-school activities for 40,000 IDP children and provided individual psychological case management to children needing additional support. Many organizations have established teacher learning circles and peer mentoring to reinforce skills learned in training and build support networks. However, few teachers are trained in modern pedagogy or strategies to offer psychological support for traumatized students.

Education Cluster partners supported non-formal education activities benefiting almost 80,000 children, including rehabilitation of accelerated learning centres, intensive remedial classes based on government curriculum after school or during vacation time, and literacy, numeracy and life skills classes for young adult IDPs. In coordination with the federal and regional ministries of education, higher education and labour, UNESCO developed a technical and vocational qualification framework to standardize curricular and certification requirements across Iraq. Once finalized, it will allow young IDPs studying at government TVET colleges in displacement to have their studies recognized in their home communities.

IN SUDAN, THE DISPLACEMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DARFUR CONFLICT PERSISTS

Sudan has experienced extensive periods of unrest, conflict and displacement, especially during the civil war, which broke out in 1983 and resulted in the secession of South Sudan in 2011.¹⁰ Conflict over inclusion of Blue Nile and South Kordofan states has resulted in periodic clashes and displacements. Conflict also broke out in Darfur in 2004, when government forces moved in to suppress an uprising, resulting in what the international community largely considers a genocide, in addition to more than 300,000 refugees in Chad and more than 1 million IDPs. A peace agreement in 2010 officially ended the conflict, and security has improved in recent years, with more than 350,000 IDPs returning to the five Darfur states (North, South, East, West and Central) since 2016. However, the area has remained restive. As of March 2019, there are an estimated 1.9 million IDPs, of whom 1.6 million live in camps (UN OCHA, 2019d).

Sudan has some of the world's lowest primary gross enrolment ratios (72.5%) (Sudan Federal Ministry of Education, 2018), including 52% in Blue Nile, 50% in South Darfur and 40% in the Jebel Marra, areas host to large numbers of IDPs and affected by continuing conflict. Security issues vary by place and time, making it challenging to determine how they affect the education of various IDP groups. In addition, Sudan's nomadic population lives in or travels through conflict areas. For instance, 24% of South Darfur's population is nomadic (UNICEF, 2014). The precarious situation of IDPs and nomadic communities is further exacerbated by food insecurity, economic hardship and protection concerns. An estimated 73% of 11-year-old nomadic children were out of school (UNICEF, 2014).

The Ministry of Education supports 360 primary schools in camps across the seven most affected states, serving about 260,000 children (Sudan Federal Ministry of Education, 2018). Although most of these communities have been displaced for years or even decades, the government assumes IDPs will be resettled or return home and offers only temporary arrangements, including provision of supplies and construction. Camp communities therefore construct and annually reconstruct these temporary learning spaces. The locally available materials are vulnerable to floods and fires.

While direct conflict has destroyed many schools, others have been abandoned and succumbed to neglect. About 21% of schools in South Kordofan and 13% in West Darfur are unusable (UN OCHA, 2019d). Occupation and attacks on schools have also been documented. The UN-sanctioned humanitarian Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism reports that six schools are occupied by military forces in Abyei, South Darfur and South Kordofan, making them unavailable for children. In a school occupation incident in early 2018, IDPs fleeing armed conflict in Jebel Marra occupied the Golo El Gadeeda School in Central Darfur.

Teacher availability and qualifications constitute a major challenge in these states. Many teachers are volunteers, and around half are not trained as teachers (UN OCHA, 2019d) (**Box 5.2**). Training for the other half typically consists of a two-week course at most. The Ministry of Education does not supervise, train or pay volunteer teachers. Schools and alternative learning centres recruit volunteer teachers, usually from the local community. Each school's parent-teacher association raises community funds to pay teachers.

IDP children also attend schools outside camps, but it is difficult to ascertain their numbers because the Ministry of Education does not maintain separate enrolment records for them, as they follow the standard registration and enrolment procedures. These children often find it challenging to enrol because they do not have a birth certificate, pre-primary certificate or national index number. Even when they do, they sometimes enrol after the start of the academic year; some schools therefore hold additional catch-up classes for them.

NGOs and UN agencies run education in emergencies programmes, providing direct support to IDP children in formal schools, alternative education and temporary learning spaces, in the form of teaching and learning supplies and materials, uniforms, dignity kits for girls and teacher training, including on psychosocial support. The WFP has supplied school meals in Darfur; in 2018, up to 980,000 children were assisted with nutrition-sensitive school feeding, including 772,000 IDPs and residents (WFP, 2018b).

¹⁰ This section is based on War Child Holland and UNICEF Sudan (2019).

BOX 5.2:**Addressing IDP learning needs requires flexibility**

IDPs need education opportunities for which access is easy and that overcome the lack of trained teachers. The Can't Wait to Learn programme engages children with games that match government-approved reading and mathematics curricula and support autonomous, self-paced, continuous learning. It aims to make basic education available without formally trained teachers. The games, which do not require an internet connection, only solar panels for charging, can be accessed at flexible times, when children are free from household responsibility. The approach, introduced by the NGO War Child Holland, is being implemented in partnership with education ministries and other agencies in Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan and Uganda.

In Sudan, where the programme began in 2011 as e-Learning Sudan, it includes the Ministry of Education, Ahfad University for Women

and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research as partners. An essential component is a digital mathematics game based on the Sudanese national out-of-school curriculum, which was part of an innovation research pilot that showed significant effects on learning. A large-scale roll-out, led by the National Council for Literacy and Adult Education in collaboration with UNICEF, aims to reach 65,000 children by the end of 2021 and was to begin in 2019 in three states, including Blue Nile, which hosts about 47,000 IDPs. The council will identify appropriate spaces and ensure provision of water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. The initiative aims to strengthen family and community participation and engagement with policy-makers to ensure the programme's sustainability. A data management plan is also being used to ensure that data from tablet use are stored safely and become inputs for further programme development and implementation.

IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, BATTLE LINES AFFECT EDUCATION

While Syria's conflict appears to have taken a decisive turn (Çonkar, 2019; Shatz, 2019), there remain more than 6 million refugees and more than 6 million IDPs; of the latter, 52% are children and 86% live in urban areas (UN OCHA, 2019a).¹¹ Many IDPs have experienced multiple displacements; a study in Idlib suggested this was the case for half of those surveyed (REACH, 2015). As of April 2019, there are still secondary displacement incidents across north-western and north-eastern Syria (IDMC, 2019b).

In recent months, there has been relative stability in five zones of political and military control: areas held by the government; Free Syrian Army-held parts of Idlib, western Aleppo and northern Hama; Turkish- and rebel-held parts of northern Idlib and north-western Aleppo; areas in the north-east held by the Kurdish self-administration; and small enclaves in Deir-ez-Zor and Deraa populated by ISIS affiliates (Chughtai, 2019). Some IDPs, either convinced that their areas of origin are secure, or pushed out of their areas of displacement by barriers to social services, have begun resettling. However, 76% of IDPs said they did not plan to resettle in 2019; IDPs in Damascus and Idlib are more likely to settle there than to return to their areas of origin (UN OCHA, 2019a).

The 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview found that 5.9 million children required education services, of whom at least 29% were internally displaced.

More than 2.1 million children in Syria are out of school, and 1.3 million are at risk of dropping out, representing 49% of the estimated school-age population. About 85% of assessed communities reported that child labour was preventing school attendance (UN OCHA, 2019a).

Multiple factors affect access to and quality of education. Roughly one-third of Syrian schools, mostly in the north, where 60% of IDPs live, are unusable due to acts of war and the use of schools for purposes other than education. Attacks on schools continue, with an increase in 2018 over 2017, mostly in Idlib (UN OCHA, 2019a). Anecdotal evidence suggests that unexploded ordnance is a growing concern among parents and children. A 2018 report found that 13% of children required specialized psychosocial support in the classroom to facilitate learning and well-being (Physical Rehabilitation Working Group on Disability and Access to Healthcare in Syria, 2018).

About 40% of teachers have left the sector since the conflict began. In addition, 31% of teachers confirmed increased absenteeism due to low morale, insecurity and the need for additional jobs. Teachers made between 28% and 44% of their pre-conflict salary (Integrity Global, 2019). Internally displaced teachers often remain under home district management, leading to risk and administrative hurdles that make collecting salaries virtually impossible. The Syrian Arab Republic government requires teachers to return to government-controlled areas to collect their salaries every month; teachers report that colleagues making

¹¹ This section is based on Steele (2019).

the journey have been arrested or detained, deterring others from attempting (ACU, 2017).

Education attainment certification pathways are fraught with complication. There is little consistency in authorities' provision of certification or course completion documents by area or grade level (Assistance Coordination Unit, 2018). Widely recognized certification is available only through government-affiliated schools. Displaced children in opposition-held areas seeking access to examinations in government-held schools face risks, including exposure of their families' names to government authorities, physical security threats at checkpoints and the insecurity of areas between zones of control. A kidnapping by ISIS affiliates of Kurdish students travelling for examinations provides an example of the threats IDPs face (Harkin, 2014).

Education authorities in the main zones of control oversee their own education service delivery. While curricular coherence was largely in place by 2018, with most authorities using a variation of the government curriculum, assessment, progression, placement and other standard policies are either largely missing or in nascent stages of development or revision. Despite the existence of the Whole of Syria coordination function, political agendas and security constraints have limited cross-border and cross-line cooperation on shared goals. Aside from donor-sponsored programmes, no known initiatives specifically target IDPs.

The government continues to be the main provider of education in most of the country, with international NGOs, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNRWA supporting its work. Modification of the government curriculum was completed in early 2018. While it was intended to be significant in scope, efforts to introduce topics related to psychosocial well-being did not come to fruition.

In north-western Syria, although education is influenced by the government, the so-called Syrian Interim Government (SIG) leads provision. With support from the UK National Recognition Information Centre, separate certification pathways were established to facilitate Syrian secondary school graduates' access to the UK tertiary education system.

While administratively affiliated with SIG, education in the areas of control in north-western Aleppo is effectively overseen by the Turkish government. Although schools in the area teach SIG's modified

curriculum, Turkish authorities have further modified some of the content and political references. Turkey's Ministry of National Education has announced on several occasions that it intends to replace the existing curriculum with the Turkish state curriculum and has discussed recognizing SIG certification for access to Turkish universities.

The Kurdish self-administration in north-eastern Syria has established a Kurdish curriculum and certification pathway. Kurdish language classes were introduced from the primary stage, and several private institutions were established to teach Kurdish, which was not feasible before 2011. However, the government curriculum is now predominant, as parents were concerned about limited recognition of certificates outside areas controlled by the self-administration.

Donors and international NGOs support education across Syria, although most have supported areas held by non-Islamist, non-state armed groups in north-western and north-eastern Syria and, until June 2018, south-western Syria. However, only 46% of required funding had been received by September 2018 (Whole of Syria Education Sector, 2018).

IN YEMEN, SHARP DIVISIONS HAVE PREVENTED IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLICY TO PROTECT IDP RIGHTS

Yemen has suffered from instability and conflict that first brought about displacement in 1994.¹² The trend intensified in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011. In 2013, there were 307,000 IDPs (NRC, 2014), and a national policy was developed to guide the government's response to chronic internal displacement crises. Yemen was the second country in the region, after Iraq, to develop an IDP policy (Yemen Executive Unit For Internally Displaced Persons, 2013), but it was not implemented.

The policy was to ensure IDP rights and determine authorities' responsibilities through principles and standards. A section on education stressed the need to guarantee that right to all IDPs, whether or not they lived in camps. IDPs had to be accepted whether or not they carried certificates; it would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education to address missing education records and not delay the registration and enrolment of IDPs in schools in host communities. Accelerated education courses would be provided to ensure IDP inclusion in education. IDPs had a right

¹² This section is based on Fathi Al-Aswadi (2019).

to non-formal education and TVET. The ministry would reform curricula and train teachers and staff on psychosocial support to raise awareness of the consequences of displacement.

In September 2014, the Houthi movement captured Sana'a. Armed groups occupied many schools, using some as barracks. Following parent and community appeals, armed forces withdrew from some schools but remained in many, even though the school year had started. In early 2015, as the Houthis tightened their control, the government and president fled to Aden. Armed clashes erupted between the Houthis and the national army, supported by a Saudi-led coalition since March 2015. As a result, the country has been divided into a northern part, ruled by the Houthis in Sana'a, and a southern part, ruled by the internationally recognized government in Aden.

Examinations were strongly affected from the outset. The Ministry of Education ended the school year in March instead of May 2015. Except for grades 9 and 12, the last monthly examination results of the second term counted as the final ones in non-affected governorates, while the first-term examination results counted as the final in war-affected governorates. For grades 9 and 12, examinations were postponed from July to August, and did not take place until October in some southern governorates. The ministry lacked financial resources to print examination sheets because air strikes had damaged the Examination Printing and Control offices. The ministry gave power to district and sub-district education offices to grant IDP students numbers allowing them to sit the examination in any school.

There are no fees for primary and secondary school other than annual registration fees. These can be unaffordable for some families in a country where more than 20 million people suffer from food insecurity, including about 10 million suffering from hunger (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2019b). The Houthi-controlled ministry could not oblige schools not to charge registration fees because they receive no operations budget and need the income.

But with the number of IDPs surging to 2.5 million, the ministry exempted IDPs from registration fees and authorized schools to accept IDPs without documents or certificates. In practice, schools still ask IDP students to fill out an education history form and bring an approval note from the nearest education

office. Ministry officials say the records cannot be lost because schools send lists of students' names with a certificate copy for archiving in district education offices. However, if schools or education offices were damaged and students lost their original copy during displacement, they cannot prove their past studies. The verification process may require paying education office employees an informal transport allowance to accelerate the process. There were some attempts to conduct placement tests, but as most IDPs come from rural areas, where education is of lesser quality, many were placed in lower grades and so the practice was abandoned.

As of December 2017, 5% of school-age children were internally displaced (GCPEA, 2018). There are 1,272 IDP-hosting sites (812 centres and 460 settlements) sheltering 465,000 people (Shelter Cluster, 2019). Most do not hold temporary classes unless the camp is more than 5 km from the nearest school. What temporary classes are available are only for grades 1 to 5. IDP students may therefore need to walk long distances to the nearest public school and brave landmines, unexploded ordnance and other hazards. Most warring parties have recruited children: A report by the UN Secretary-General's office found that, in 2018, 370 children were serving fighters, participating in combat and guarding checkpoints or public buildings (United Nations, 2019c).

Overcrowding has worsened since 2015. Many schools are damaged and classroom construction has stopped. In addition, schools are the public buildings most frequently used to shelter IDPs (Al-Sabahi and Motahar, 2017). The number of school-age children continues to increase, while IDPs and students leaving private schools for financial reasons add pressure. Even schools that agree to enrol IDPs often make them sit on the ground, at the back or at the windows. They are more likely to be discriminated against because of their dialect or appearance. Some are mocked. For instance, students in southern areas call students from northern areas names that imply lack of manners; in northern areas, IDPs from Taiz are called names that imply troublemaking.

There are few accelerated education programmes. In 2015, the ministry, with support from the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), developed a Compensational Learning Programme to cover important topics of the previous year, but these classes did not cover all schools. With funding from Japan, Save the Children has been providing a temporary

learning project that reached 2,100 out-of-school children in 2019, mainly IDP and marginalized Muhamasheen students in the Amran and Amant Al-Asimah governorates. The project gives basic education classes at the grade 1 to 4 levels to children below age 13 in private centres. Children sit final examinations after four months of study, and those who pass join the nearest public school.

Like other civil servants in Houthi-controlled governorates, teachers have not received their salaries since the Yemen Central Bank was moved from Sana'a to Aden in September 2016. The Houthis suspended many humanitarian programmes in 2017 to put pressure on them to pay teacher salaries. With a US\$70 million grant from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, UNICEF started making incentive payments to teachers in 11 Houthi-controlled governorates. Payments are equivalent to US\$50 per month and are subject to deductions for absenteeism. The first payment to 97,000 teachers, for September 2018, was delayed because the Aden-based ministry wanted incentives paid according to the 2014 teacher list, as it claimed the list submitted by the Sana'a-based ministry for UNICEF approval included Houthi followers.

As teachers search for other sources of income, absenteeism has increased. Many community initiatives have tried to help schools by collecting money and paying incentives to teachers to cover their transport costs. The Houthi-controlled Ministry of Education has replaced absent teachers with volunteers but has not provided them with training. At IDP hosting sites, in coordination with the ministry, NGOs contract with volunteer teachers who are camp residents and have secondary or higher certificates, make incentive payments to them and provide them with preparatory training using official manuals. The Aden-based government has also been unable to pay civil servants' salaries in all governorates and has hired no new teachers, not even to replace retirees.

In September 2016, the government appointed a minister in Aden, while in November 2016, the Houthis appointed their minister. The political division has affected several aspects of the education system. The two zones' school calendars differ. The Houthis have struggled to print textbooks after donors withdrew funding because of politically charged edits to the Arabic, religion, history and social studies textbooks. The presence of two ministries is a challenge for humanitarian actors. In addition, organizations

must coordinate with the National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery, which slows processes down.

With almost 50 partners, the Education Cluster plays the leading role in education programme implementation, mostly through national NGOs due to security concerns. In 2018/19, there were nine main areas of activity: damaged school rehabilitation; desks; school bags with stationery, teacher kits and textbooks; semi-permanent and temporary learning places plus alternative learning opportunities; teacher training in psychosocial support, education in emergencies, basic reading and numeracy skills, active learning strategies and school management; ministry staff training in education management in crises (by GIZ); hygiene awareness; school feeding; and support to grade 9 and 12 examinations. In 2019/20, the Education Cluster aims to increase the number of functional schools and introduce specialized child-centred programmes in hard-hit areas and temporary learning classrooms for IDPs, in addition to the teacher incentive payments.

CONCLUSION

In many ways, the situation for IDP children 'may be more complex than that of refugee children, and access to education even more difficult' (Kirk, 2009, p. 35). Not only do IDPs outnumber refugees but, as this chapter has shown, providing education services to them may be fraught with more challenges due to complex notions of state sovereignty, neutrality and impartiality.

System strengthening should be accompanied by revision of practices and policies that support children's right to education and are conflict sensitive. These include registration and enrolment requirements, examinations and certification, alternative pathways to facilitate return to school, and reform of teacher qualification, placement, supervision and payment practices.



These Syrian refugee children used International Organization for Migration (IOM) transportation to access this school, which is far away from their camp.

Credit: Muse Mohammed/IOM

CHAPTER 6

Reforming education to tackle migration and displacement challenges is a test case for the Arab States

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is inextricably linked with the commitment to leave no one behind. *Transforming our World*, the foundation document of the agenda, includes ‘refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants’ among those ‘who are vulnerable [and] must be empowered’. One of the vulnerabilities – but also one of the strengths – of migrant and displaced people is education. As the UN Secretary-General put it in his endorsement of the 2019 GEM Report: ‘People on the move, whether for work or education, and whether voluntarily or forced, do not leave their right to education behind.’

This report took the broadest definitions of migration and displacement, covering any population movement in the Arab States that had an influence on education. It touched upon the challenges of internal migration. While such movements are less intense than in other parts of the world, they still affect children and young people living in slums or nomadic communities.

International migration has two faces in the Arab States. One subregion, comprising the six GCC countries, is a prime global migrant destination, albeit one with special characteristics. In three of these countries, migrants, especially from Southern Asia but also 6 million from other Arab countries, constitute more than half the population. A system that favours short-term contracts and does not favour family reunification means there are fewer migrants of school age, but still enough for a parallel private education system to emerge, which increasingly uses English for instruction, a trend also affecting the growing internationalization of tertiary education. Meanwhile,

about 6.4 million migrants, mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, have emigrated to European countries, mostly to settle there. The education chances of their children and the quest for their inclusion form a major education policy issue in the host countries.

The report also looked at the plight of the rapidly growing number of people displaced by conflict, inside or across borders. The Arab States, despite accounting for 5% of the global population, account for 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of the global population of conflict IDPs. Despite the overwhelmingly positive response by the five countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region, 4 out of 10 are out of school. The quality of education opportunities for refugee and IDP populations is affected by remoteness, language obstacles, unqualified teachers and lack of resources, often combined with sheer lack of experience in responding to sudden influxes of people fleeing their region or country. Efforts to include IDPs and refugees but also the stateless in education systems are often mired in complex social and political challenges.

Migration and displacement are charged political issues. This is because they are usually intertwined with multiple layers of cultural, historical, social and economic complications. But education for migrants and refugees is not only a matter of appealing to a basic human right. It also has operational and instrumental dimensions. The cost of excluding these populations can be huge in terms of people not fulfilling their potential and increased social tensions.

HOW SHOULD GOVERNMENTS APPROACH THE EDUCATION ASPECTS OF MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT?

On the first anniversary of the two global compacts for migrants and refugees, this report calls on governments in the Arab States to develop a plan for the fulfilment of their respective commitments. They need to address the education needs of migrant and displaced populations, and those of their children, with the same attention they give to host populations.

PROTECT THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE

The principle of non-discrimination in education is recognized in international conventions. Discriminatory barriers, such as birth certificate requirements, should be explicitly prohibited in national law. Existing regulations should have no loopholes or grey areas left open to interpretation by individual local or school-level officers. Governments must protect migrants' and refugees' right to education irrespective of identification documents or residence status and apply laws without exception. An example where action is needed is the case of the stateless in Kuwait.

Respecting the right to education must go beyond legislation and administrative process. National authorities should mount awareness-raising campaigns to inform migrant and displaced families of their rights and of school registration processes. Planning authorities should ensure that public schools are within reach of informal settlements and slums and that they are not neglected in urban regeneration plans, as Morocco is trying to ensure.

INCLUDE MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

Some education systems treat immigrants and refugees as temporary or transient populations, different from natives, as in the case of Malian refugees in Mauritania. This is wrong; it impedes their academic progress, socialization and future opportunities, and undermines progress towards diverse, cohesive societies. Public policy must include them in all levels of national education.

Inclusion of immigrants has several dimensions. While a new language of instruction necessitates preparatory classes, students should be separated as little as possible from their native peers. Admittedly, Arab migration to Europe differs considerably from South Asian migration to the Gulf. But steps can be taken to improve inclusion. Bahrain has allowed non-nationals to attend public schools. Gulf countries should monitor and enforce regulations on non-state providers of a parallel education system catering for immigrant students, ensuring equal quality standards are provided for all.

Governments need to make sure that refugees' education is interrupted as little as possible. While exceptional circumstances – e.g. physical isolation of refugee communities or host system capacity constraints – may prevent full inclusion, governments need to minimize time spent in schools not following the national curriculum, in different classrooms from natives, as in Lebanon, or in courses not progressing towards recognized certificates, as such time compromises education trajectories.

The internally displaced are at particular risk of being neglected. Countries should go beyond just formulating policies for them, as Yemen did in the beginning of the recent crisis. They need to act to ensure that these policies are implemented and fully funded. Some lessons could be drawn from the experience of refugee education, as in Chad, which developed a temporary education plan that was funded by GPE during a period of emergency.

UNDERSTAND AND PLAN FOR THE EDUCATION NEEDS OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE

To ensure inclusion is successful, governments need to invest in better data on migrant and refugees, as Jordan has done. Sometimes countries need to invest in special monitoring mechanisms to track hard-to-reach populations. Tunisia has done so on a pilot basis for female child domestic workers.

School environments have to adapt to and support students' needs. Those whose education was interrupted will benefit from accelerated education programmes enabling them to catch up and re-enter school at the appropriate level. The provision of such programmes in countries with large numbers of displaced populations, such as Iraq, has been limited.

Refugee inclusion in education will be more likely to succeed if it extends to social protection programmes to allow refugees to benefit, for instance, from conditional cash transfers that cover hidden school costs, as in Turkey. In the case of internal migrants, notably children of nomads, governments should consider flexible school calendars and curricula relevant to their livelihoods.

Governments should address in their education plans the need for adults to be able to develop their competences through TVET and to overcome constraints, such as low-skill occupations or high training costs, that discourage their investment in skills. These plans should include financial education programmes so they can manage their economic circumstances, make the most of remittances and avoid fraud or financial exploitation, as Morocco has done.

ACCURATELY REPRESENT MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT HISTORIES IN EDUCATION TO CHALLENGE PREJUDICES

Building inclusive societies and helping people live together requires more than tolerance. Governments must review education content and delivery, adapting curricula and rethinking textbooks to reflect history and current diversity. Education content needs to bring to the fore migration's contribution to wealth and prosperity. It also needs to recognize the causes of tension and conflict, as well as the legacy of migrations that displaced or marginalized populations.

Pedagogical approaches should promote openness to multiple perspectives, foster the values of living together, and appreciate the benefits of diversity. They should challenge prejudices and develop critical thinking skills so learners can overcome uncertainties in interacting with other cultures and resist negative media portrayals, with UNRWA being a positive example in recent years.

PREPARE TEACHERS OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE TO ADDRESS DIVERSITY AND HARDSHIP

Teachers need support to become agents of change in school environments increasingly shaped by migration and displacement. Current teacher education programmes addressing migration tend to be ad hoc and not part of the main curricula. Governments need to invest in initial and ongoing teacher education that builds core competences and ability to manage diverse contexts, which also affect native students. Raise awareness of all teachers about migration and displacement, not just those who teach diverse classrooms. Aspiring and practising teachers and school leaders should be given the tools to confront stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination in the classroom, the schoolyard and the community, and to strengthen immigrant and refugee students' self-esteem and sense of belonging.

Teachers in displacement contexts also need to be sensitive to the particular difficulties displaced students and parents face, and reach out to their communities. While teachers are not counsellors, they can be trained to recognize stress and trauma and refer those in need to specialists, especially in the Syrian Arab Republic. If there are no specialists, teachers should be prepared to serve as some families' only access to such services. Teachers of refugees and displaced teachers suffer additional stress themselves. Management policies need to recognize and relieve the extreme hardships under which some teachers work, regulate and ensure equality among types of teaching professionals to maintain morale, and invest in professional development.

HARNESS THE POTENTIAL OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE

Migrants and refugees possess skills that can help transform not only their and their families' lives but also both host and home economies and societies, whether they return or support from a distance. Using this potential requires simpler, cheaper and more transparent and flexible mechanisms to recognize academic qualifications and professional skills (including those of teachers) and to account for prior learning that was not validated or certified. These processes should not discriminate against displaced people who may be coming from disadvantaged parts of their country, as in Yemen.

Countries need to follow up on Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration commitments regarding mutual qualification recognition, and to act on the responsibilities emerging under the Global Convention on the Recognition of Higher Education Qualifications, adopted in 2019. Assessment agencies, licensing bodies and academic institutions should harmonize requirements and procedures at the bilateral, regional and global levels, working with governments and regional and international organizations. Common degree standards, quality assurance mechanisms and academic exchange programmes can support qualification recognition.

SUPPORT EDUCATION NEEDS OF MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID

While two-thirds of international migrants are destined for high-income countries, 9 out of 10 refugees are hosted by low- and middle-income countries, which require support from international partners. Meeting needs would require a tenfold increase in the share of education in humanitarian aid. A more sustainable solution is for the international community to fulfil the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework commitment to link humanitarian and development aid from the early stages of a crisis, supporting inclusive education delivery for refugee and host populations.

Education should be included in response design, especially as regards early childhood education and care. It should also be part of a holistic package of solutions involving other sectors, e.g. shelter, nutrition, water, sanitation and social protection. Donors need to reflect these reforms in their humanitarian interventions. They need to develop need-assessment capacity and join up planning to bridge the humanitarian–development divide and catalyse predictable multiyear funding.

ARAB STATES

Migration, displacement and education:

BUILDING BRIDGES, NOT WALLS

This first regional edition of the *Global Education Monitoring Report* examines the nexus of education, migration and displacement in the Arab States.

The Arab States have long been characterized by massive population movements: growth of megacities such as Baghdad, Cairo and Casablanca through internal migration, large-scale emigration from the Maghreb to western Europe, generations of Palestinian and Sudanese refugees. Oil-rich countries such as Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates experience the highest immigration rates in the world with the majority of their population being foreign.

As a result of the Syrian and Yemeni wars and with the Mediterranean having become a high-risk migration route, the Arab States are now the region most affected by migration and displacement. They account for 5% of the global population but for 32% of the global population of refugees and 38% of the global population of people internally displaced by conflict. Lebanon and Jordan have the highest percentage of refugees as a share of the population. Five countries in the region feature among the top 12 in the world in terms of the percentage of internally displaced people as a share of the population.

As the 2019 *Global Education Monitoring Report* showed, migration and displacement interact with education through intricate two-way relationships that affect those who move, those who stay, those who host migrants and refugees and those who may do so. Displacement due to conflict, in particular, deprives millions of children, adolescents and youth of an education, undermining the prospects of a generation. The humanitarian crises in the region have taken their toll on education development. For instance, the Arab States have been overtaken by Central and Southern Asia in terms of the enrolment rate at the lower secondary level and the gap is rapidly closing at the upper secondary level.

On the first anniversary of the two global compacts for migrants and refugees, this report reviews the layers of challenges migration and displacement pose to education systems and calls on governments in the Arab States to develop a plan for the fulfilment of their respective commitments.

Education is a human right and a transformational force for poverty eradication, sustainability and peace. People on the move, whether for work or education, and whether voluntarily or forced, do not leave their right to education behind. The 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report underscores the huge potential and opportunities of ensuring that migrants and displaced persons have access to quality education.

António Guterres,
United Nations Secretary-General



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