

# REPORT

## July 2022



**3530**  
Migrants

**335**  
Collective protests

**10** Cases of suicide  
and attempted suicide

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
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## July 2022 report on social protests and social mobility



With a fluctuating pattern that continued for the seventh month in a row, the level of protest movements and social mobility declined for reasons which justifications appear to be political, as well as economic and social. The uncertainty and lack of visibility in the pattern of this evident confusion in protest movements has increased and is particularly shaken during political momentums, influencing the economic and the social. During June, the protest movement recorded an increase of 35.6% compared to May (795 protest movements compared to 586 protest movements in May), this is accompanied by many youth movements that reject the process and the threats that the new draft constitution would curb individual and public liberties. However, movements on the national level quickly declined during the month of July by 57%, coinciding with a referendum on a new constitution dated 25 July.



These indicators confirm that protest movements are persistent, even if they are local and not extended, and some of them may appear unable to mobilize. It is an indicator for accumulating anger about the overall situation in the country.

This apparent decline in the protest movement during the month of July (335 protest movements) was also accompanied by an increase in the number of Tunisian immigrants arriving irregularly to Italy (3,530 immigrants), as well as thwarting hundreds of irregular crossings and preventing thousands of others from arriving irregularly to Italy. Thus, irregular migration was another form of protest and an individual salvation resorted to by those who are angry at the economic and social reality, which is another aspect of the protest movement.

Despite the general situation in the country, July did not differ from the previous months, but, in its peculiarity, gives a preliminary indication about the features of the social situation in the coming months and the extent of its repercussions on the political and economic situation.



The month of July was a peak season for the spread of violent and hate speech that accompanied the electoral campaign for the organization of the July 25 referendum, and Facebook was the major platform used by political actors and human rights activists to disseminate the discourse of violence, treason and division. On the ground, the police reacted violently to the protesters by failing to comply with the law's provision for the use of force against demonstrators and the use of paralyzing gas directly in the face of protesters, which caused them serious injuries, such as the case of the president of journalists' union Mohammed Yassin Al-Jalasi who was injured while protesting peacefully and the journalist Yosra al-Sheikhawi who was violently assaulted while performing her duties.

These are a number of indicators that confirm the return of security hegemony and the restoration of the rule of authority, which are undoubtedly the result of a clear political performance that seems to depend on the policy of great disobedience to all.

This general violence, whether on Facebook, which is visited by more than 8 million Tunisians, or in the streets through police violence, had repercussions even on the level of participation in the referendum. Not interacting with what is happening or denying it. The electoral reluctance, which was in the range of 70%, can be categorized into three groups. There is the group that is not concerned with what is happening, and there is the group that is boycotting for political reasons, namely the opposition, and there is a frustrated group. There is also a group of voters who went to vote “yes” without even reading the draft of the constitution, which is another form of protest that relied on the punitive vote to break with the previous system. Therefore, the political climate was not free from protest movement, and the political was mixed with the social. It is also an invisible and unobservable form of protest, but it is an existing expression. There are also other political protests in various forms, in the form of seminars and conferences to discuss the content of the new constitution, read its initial version, and declare a boycott and rejection.

### **Economically and socially:**



The economic and social situation did not differ from the previous months, as the inflation rate continued to rise during the month of July to reach 8.2%, which has repercussions on the level of purchasing power leading to further deterioration of the living conditions which fuels the state of social tension.

The Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies, a structure affiliated to the Presidency of the Republic, warned during the first half of July that the national food stock data during the first six months of this year indicated a very significant deterioration in the purchasing power of the Tunisian citizen with an unprecedented rise in the food balance deficit, especially under the repercussions of The Russian-Ukrainian War. The Institute called for urgent measures to be taken to avoid further deterioration during the second six months of the year and next year.

The country has also not emerged from the dilemma of its financial crisis, and there are no signs of a near end to this crisis, with the continuation of the resorting to external debt and being subject to the conditions of reform required by the creditors.

As for public services, it seems that the authority adopted the liberal logic and stopped addressing the public financing crisis without paying attention to the clear decline in the level of quality of services provided to citizens, and consequently the public institution is experiencing two crises, the financing crisis on the one hand and the crisis of declining quality of services on the other hand, which is reflected in the expectations of the citizen and the extent of his confidence in state institutions. Moreover, the performance of the authority still depends on dealing with the citizen as a subject and not on the basis of the principle of full citizenship.



During the month of July, a qualitative shift was observed in the nature of the protest reactions, the most prominent are:

- In Utique (Bizerte governorate), in view of the crisis of thirst and the interruption of irrigation water for more than two months, farmers deliberately moved towards alternative individual solutions, which consisted in concentrating irrigation equipment on the banks of the river “Wadi Mejerda” to pump water and irrigate their agricultural products and trees, but the authorities intervened and seized the equipment. As a result, they reacted by blocking the highway Tunis Bizerte. In our previous reports, we had warned about resorting to alternative solutions to the authority's mismanagement of crises, which is the shift of rights holders towards individualism and the adoption of alternative solutions that may be at the expense of the rights of other individuals or groups.
- In Tamaghza, the residents protested to contravene the arrest of suspects in a case of religious extremism, by deliberately closing various administrative offices, such as the post office and others, and gave an ultimatum to release the detainees in order to reopen the offices. This form of protest, the closure of the various administrative headquarters, also appeared in the Al-Ala area in Kairouan, after protesters left the Chkakra region in reaction to thirst and the delay in providing them with drinking water.
- There is a tendency towards escalation when protesting. Protests quickly develop into blocking roads, burning wheels and closing administrative



headquarters, and this is an indication of a loss of confidence in state institutions in terms of their response to demands and their solution to crises.


- The return of the bread shortage crisis in some regions after the bakeries protested the delay in obtaining subsidies, and this confirms once again the inability of the authority to properly manage urgent crises with direct repercussions on the citizen.
- Similar to the interruption of drinking water, some areas are experiencing continuous electricity-power cuts, and this falls within the framework of austerity options taken by the authority due to the high cost of electricity production (the high price of a barrel of oil).
- The Ministry of Education takes the decision of reducing the number of admissions in the model school (pilot school) in Kairouan which led to students and parents protests, and this is an indication of a hot return of protests with an educational background in the coming weeks.

During the month of July, there were no prospects for dealing with the agricultural sector as a strategic sector, and crises have accumulated and still unresolved. At a time when livestock breeders are struggling with the high cost of fodder and the high cost of production, and while grain farmers are struggling with fires due to the aging fleet, vegetable and grain producers are facing a major crisis due to the absence of the amonitrate fertilizers and the shortage of manpower; there is no declared plan by the authority to deal with these crises despite their importance in relation to ensuring food security.


The authority also seems unable to manage crises, which would increase the complexity of all these problems and increase, as we mentioned in our previous reports, the gap between the citizen and state institutions.

### **July protests map**

During the month of July, there were 335 protest movements distributed according to a traditional protest map. Gafsa ranks first (79 protest movements) in terms of the most protesting areas due to the social and development problems in the region, including high unemployment rates followed by Tunis (66 protest movements).





According to the movements' mapping for the month of July, the southwestern region (Gafsa, Tozeur and Kebili) comes first with about a third (29.5%) of the total protest movements observed throughout July, followed by the eastern region (includes the greater Tunis region and the governorates of Bizerte, Nabeul and Zaghouan) With 28% the center, with its eastern two parts (49 protest movements) and western part (49 protest movements), also witnessed a third share of the total monitored protest movements. The North-West region comes next with 9.8% of the total observed protest movements, while the South-East region comes last with a rate of about 3.28%.





The monitored map of protests demonstrates the near equality of all regions in terms of the deterioration of the social and economic situation and the deterioration of citizens' services.

The random protests, that is, those that tend towards randomness in terms of disrupting the interests of citizens and obstructing the interests of the administration, witnessed a decline of about 16.1%, and they are undoubtedly related to the decline in the total size of the protests.





However, it remains important in some traditional protest areas such as Gafsa, in which the rate of random protests amounted to 86% of the total protests in July, while this percentage amounted to 96.9% of the total protests monitored in Tunisia throughout July and was within 90% of the total protests in Sousse.



The proportion of mixed genders protests reached 91.3% of the total monitored protests, thus recording a relative development from the previous month by about 3.8%, and this means sharing damages and claims as well, while the percentage of protests that men led is estimated at 7.8%.




Public sector protests have risen from 25% in June to 57% in July, which means dissatisfaction with public policy, including management services and the quality of those services, as well as public policies regarding equitable distribution and provision of services such as drinking water, electricity, health, transport and all basic services.

This situation clearly fuels social congestion and further deepens the tension between the social actor and State institutions. The social actor has declined his expectations from State institutions and now is seeking for solutions to individual salvation, including irregular migration, fringe labour, suicide, addiction and accession to organized crime.

11% of the July protests were related to the educational sector, especially in relation to the procedures for entering the model middle schools (pilot), 9 percent related to the environmental situation and 9 percent to the right to water, as protests of thirst were frequent, which affected people and trees. While 7% of the July protests were related to the legal aspect of a set of demands, and 4% of the July protests were related to the agricultural sector as well as to the security aspect.

## Sector



## protest demands


Protests with an economic and social background accounted for 78% of the total observed protests, followed by demands related to administration at 15%, demands related to political backgrounds at 8% and demands related to improving infrastructure at 2%.

## Typologie



The reasons for most of the protests were related to the right to work, at 39%, or an average of 128 protest movements out of the total protests observed during July. Employment related protests were distributed in different areas, including traditional areas of thirst, such as Kairouan governorate, followed by protests related to the right to water at 29% (61 protest movements), then protests related to the right to adequate working conditions and the dignity of workers, both in terms of the working environment and in terms of professional rights, with a rate of about 22%, as well as demarcation demand at a rate of about 13% of the total observed protests throughout July (41 protest movements). Then protests related to the deteriorating social conditions by 11%, which amounted to 36 protest movements out of the total observed protests. 9% of the protests were related to protesting against a decision, 4% with support for a person, and 2% with interruption of irrigation water, public utilities, monthly salaries and infrastructure.


**REASONS**




The Tunisian Social Observatory, organ of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, shall mention that the development-related protests were not observed among the July protests. This means that people's hopes and demands have been reduced to the level of the first line of human rights, which, as mentioned, is the right to food, medicine and water.

## Protest forms and actors


Sit-ins, is the most prominent form of protest adopted by the protesters in their expressions, with 48.1%, followed by vigils with 19.7%, then road closures with 8.7%, hunger strikes by 6%, and also strikes by 6%. Appeals through the media, burning wheels, disrupting activities and storming administrative institutions, detaining a person or means of transportation, issuing statements, declaring a general strike and other forms of protest were observed in varying proportions throughout the month of July.



The adult citizens were the most prominent actor in the July protests, with a percentage of 26%, followed by youth with 20%, or 65 protest movements, then the unemployed by 19%, those with high degrees who are unemployed by 19%, workers by 15%, immigrants by 10%, employees by 7%, and farmers by 4% and others (see accompanying table). We also recall that the decline in the protests of the unemployed means a decline in hope for solutions and prospects for employment.



The roads represented the most prominent protest spaces with a percentage of 23%, followed by the headquarters of the Tunisian Chemical Complex Company with a percentage of 19%, and the age of protesters increased by about 8% compared to the June protests. The social headquarters of ministries and sovereign headquarters represented the scene of 10% of the protest movements, while public places witnessed 4% of the protests. Among the spaces used by protesters is the media (7%). Hospitals also represented a space for the protest by 2%.





# **Irregular Migration**

## **in July 2022**



The election date and favourable climatic conditions in July 2022 represented an opportunity for Dreamers to cross into the North Bank, where the flow rate increased slightly, but compared to July 2021 the number of Tunisian arrivals to the Italian coast decreased by 12%, reaching 3,530 compared to 4,044 in the same month in 2022.

In July of this year, Tunisian authorities were able to thwart 226 crossing operations and 3,226 passers-by were prevented, so a marked rise compared with 2900 in the same period in 2021, Most of them were of Tunisian nationalities, at a rate of 53.24%, compared to 46.76% of non-Tunisian nationalities. Most of the operations by sea were also thwarted by 91%, compared to 8.8% by land.


Tunisian nationality ranks first in arrivals to Italy with 18% After the first six months, it remained in third place behind the Egyptian and Bengali nationalities. The number of Tunisian minors arriving in Italy reached 1242, while we estimate the number of families arriving since the beginning of the year at 300. Successful immigrants in reaching the European coasts by sea to Italy or by land via Serbia are keen to share their experience on social networks by documenting the journey in attached videos, expressing their happiness in reaching and success, or a video to present testimonies about the course of their migration.

The migratory route through Serbia still attracts dozens of Tunisians. But for many, it's less dangerous than the Mediterranean road.


As the economic, social and political crisis in which the country has been plunged for years continues and climatic factors stabilize, flows towards the north bank of the Mediterranean will continue despite the militarization of the coasts by land and sea, but this approach has neither prevented the flow nor reduced death on Tunisia's coasts.

## Comparison In the same period during the years 2019–2020–2021 – 2022


The number of arrivals to Italy



Number of frustrating passes




Number of passersby suspended




2022			2021			2020			2019			
Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	the month
1155	124	382	463	17	84	316	22	68	177	8	31	January
1036	95	308	1273	77	660	571	25	26	46	4	21	February
886	58	224	882	72	334	137	4	60	323	20	85	March
1515	87	345	409	42	307	99	6	37	166	11	116	Avril
2658	172	1024	2487	95	601	1243	60	494	249	19	94	May
2086	175	1714	2120	143	977	1611	119	825	254	23	249	june
3226	226	3530	2993	211	4044	2918	245	4145	608	44	262	July
12562	937	7527	10627	657	7007	6895	481	5655	1823	129	858	the total

## Distribution of arrivals to Italy by months during 2022




## Distribution of frustrating passes by authorities during July 2022




\*The presence of this sign does not mean that these authorities do not witness crossings, but the official data published in the notifications did not include frustrating crossings in these bodies.


## Distribution of passers-by by nationalities During July 2022



## Distribution of frustrating passes during 2022



## The tragedies of irregular migration on the Tunisian coasts during 2022



The number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast during 2022	The number of dead and missing in the Central Mediterranean Basin during 2022
429	842

## Violence Report for July 2022



July 2022 marked a clear and strong return to the violent security approach. It was mainly manifested during the second half of the month, which recorded a series of vigils rejecting the draft constitution submitted for a referendum, and was mostly faced with excessive use of force by the security forces, where activists, human rights activists, and politicians were targeted with beatings and violence against demonstrators and the use of paralyzing gas.

More-Over, July was also, as it coincided with the explanatory campaigns for the referendum, a temporal scene for the revival of all forms of invisible violence, especially in its cyber form, which reached the point of organizing systematic campaigns of electronic stalking and an unprecedented spread of slander, insults, insults, bullying and treason between the political parties, who were divided mainly among supporters The disciples of President Kais Saied and his opponents are defenders of the return of the Ennahda Movement.

In general, tension, disagreement and quarrels were the basis that governed the interaction between the various components of the political arena. The speeches of the President of the Republic, Qais Saeed, were filled with messages of division and separation. (Supporting the July 25 process is a patriotic citizen and opposing the path is a non-national citizen) The lack of trust and treason is matched by similar discourses that seek to dwarf, belittle and exclude anyone who disagrees with them by questioning their political weight and the size of their supporters.


### Sector





With the same features of the months that preceded it, the month of July was not known, as it retreated to the phenomenon of violence in the shared public space or in the private family familial space. Traffic, family and relational emotional violence was the most prominent observed headlines, and weddings and occasions were a framework for recording assaults, quarrels, and a change of violence using white weapons and hunting rifles. The roads represented an area for the manifestation of disputes, confrontations and violent incidents between road users. The space of families did not calm down, and in turn, disputes were recorded that resulted on more than one occasion with severe violence behind the death of one of its members.


Criminal violence maintained the top spot in the observed violence rankings during the month of July as well, as it alone monopolized three-quarters of the cases of violence observed throughout the month, followed by institutional violence by 14%. Then violence in the public space by more than 7%And let the economic violence maintain the same percentage of the previous month, which was around 4% of all recorded violence.



The Tunisian Social Observatory explains that the phenomenon of violence continues to spread within Tunisian society and in the public and private spheres alike, due to two main reasons, the absence of respect for the law and the controls of coexistence and the chaos that it creates, and the spread of a deep-rooted feeling of impunity and the oppression that the authority exerts on the individual, Unequal opportunities in his society and lack of access to his rights as a member of this society. In general, the crisis of chaos and this deep-rooted feeling of impunity have negative repercussions on the family, which in turn has become an incubator of violence.

Then, it is important to recall that, for months, the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, including the Tunisian Social Observatory, has alerted the deterioration of the phenomenon of violence in the public and private spheres, within the State's official frameworks, in the digital space and through social media. Violence is directed at escalation, extremism, brutality and uncontrolled.


The street and public road is the space in which the various forms of violence recorded where more than 60% of the violence observed was recorded during a July month, followed by the housing space as a private space incubating about 25% of the violence recorded.



In addition, the month of July does not depart from the general characteristics of the months preceding the year, where violence in its individual form often exceeds two-thirds of the recorded violence while violence in its collective product is within a third. Men are responsible for more than 57% of the violence observed in the control sample of all daily and weekly newspapers, websites, television and radio. Women who had recently engaged in violent behaviour were three times more present than in previous months to be responsible for 21% of the recorded violence after 6%.




The violence recorded during the month of July is not limited to its individual or collective form. It bears a number of cases of violence against oneself. Where 10 incidents of suicide and suicide attempts were witnessed,



males were the most prominent perpetrators.



The age group between the ages of 25 and 45 was the most fragile and was known 8 suicides and suicide attempts and was associated with a psychological situation of special or acute social and economic vulnerability.



Finally, The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights and the Tunisian Social Observatory caution the seriousness of the escalation of police violence in the context of narrowing, firing and considers that it will represent only a direct threat to the climate of democracy, freedom, justice and right and only the instrument of disorder and instability. At the same time, the Forum and the Observatory renew their call to study the phenomenon of violence in its various forms, both collective and individual, and against oneself, and to develop a national strategy that would establish a national project based on diversity, tolerance, diversity and acceptance.

## Conclusion

Considering all of these indicators mentioned in this report and based on the monitoring harvest for the month of July, the social situation will open up to many developments during the coming weeks in relation to the return to school and its flaws and shortcomings, as well as in relation to the return of peasants and its shortcomings.

The authority's handling of the file of protest movements also opens up to one option whose features have begun to manifest itself, namely the return of the security engagement with the protest movements and the return of criminalization and trials, which was confirmed by the events of July, where the security establishment will play a role in relation to the protests as long as economic solutions and positive interaction with the protesters' demands are absent. If we add to this situation the constant pressures on the human rights movement, the distortion of activists, and the treachery of the sons of the social movement and human rights activists, the protest movement will become in a state of isolation, and therefore the risks of escalation remain and the tendency towards randomness exists, which threatens the nature of the peaceful protests in Tunisia that continued throughout the previous decade.

### **Monitoring methodology for irregular migration:**

The totality of the data contained in this report represents what the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to gather from various sources and by the available means. The digital data remains incomplete, not detailed and subject to updating and may not fully reflect reality, but in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian official side (number of passes - number Passengers - their distribution according to age groups and gender - defining where they come from - their social status - the number of missing persons...) These data may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and significant transformations.

- **Frustrating Passes:** Reliance is placed on the Ministry of Interior's communiqués and the statements of the spokesperson of the National Guard in the various media. Most of them do not contain detailed data (sex, age groups, the parties from which the immigrants come...)
- **Arrivals to European coasts:** Many structures that emit digital data about arrivals to Europe, such as UNHCR, IOM, European countries' ministries of the interior and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The figures provided remain approximate and require continuous updating according to figures from official and civil structures that may be issued in subsequent reports but provide a reading of the evolution and change in the dynamics of irregular migration.

**Invisible numbers:** It's the number of migrants arriving in Europe across different routes without passing through local authorities or international structures does not have any effect on the census, which is important and varies according to the tactics of migrant smuggling networks. It also includes departures from the Tunisian coasts, which succeed in evading strict security controls, or those that are prohibited from passing them without issuing or without being announced.