

# REPORT **JUNE 2022**



**795**

Collective protests

**6**

Cases of suicide  
and attempted suicide

**1745**  
Migrants

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## June 2022 report on social protests, suicides and its attempts

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The protests chart monitored throughout the month of June shows a change in the level of the most protested territories to highlight the North-East Territory in first place with 228 protest movements out of a total of 795 protest movements observed over the month of June, nearly a third of the observed protest movements.

The reasons for this Territory's progress stem from the nature of the protests that took place during the month of June, which were mostly movements with a political and legal background in the light of current political developments related to the writing of the Constitution and the publication of its version, which will be the subject of the July 25 referendum.

Therefore, the observed protests chart during the month of June shows two directions of protest movement. A first upward curve and a clear increase over recent weeks, characterizing the movements of the political actor and activists, whose focus is on political, legal and human rights, in interaction with the country's political path since 25 July, which is characterized by the vertical relationship between the President and the rest of the political landscape, civil society organizations and the street.

A second curve has been steadily declining since January and concerns citizen protest movements with an economic, social and environmental background. According to the monitored indicators, this decrease does not necessarily reflect a state of satisfaction with the situation and fulfilled the demands as much as the lack of clarity of vision regarding the interaction with the demands put forward and thus shows a state of anticipation and waiting from public institutions or rather disappointment. In our previous reports, we have explained how it has become an impetus to seek alternative solutions for public institutions. In order to engage in lobbying networks, interest networks, individual orientation and work in parallel sectors.

## **Juan Month's Economic and Social Climate:**

The indicators of the economic and social situation did not move towards improvement during Juan, but inflation rose to 8.1% according to the data of the National Institute of Statistics. Consequently, inflation has continued to rise over the past months, further complicating the living situation. It is a result of sustained prices increases and the implications for livelihood which it has also driven further prices increases. Therefore, the central bank and inflation control often go towards establishing an increase in the directorate's interest rate, which in turn has repercussions on the level of interest and consequently on the level of higher production costs and entering into a new cycle of prices increases.

This situation cannot in any way be comfortable for the consumer and for the producer as well. The implications are greater if they are fuelled by crisis mismanagement, especially in strategic sectors such as the agricultural production sector. The prices of straw and hay have increased significantly since 2020 according to educators in most parts of the country. The prices of the straw bale range from 17 to 22 dinars, while the prices of the hay bale range from 10 to 12 dinars. Despite the rainfall recorded in March, the price of the items continues to rise compared to normal years, rising by between 200 and 300 percent. The profession people explain these increases in rough feed by lack of supply and growing monopoly and speculation in view of the weak financial resources of the majority of breeders, as more than 80% of the quantities produced by traders were acquired to store and promote them during periods of shortage and drought.

Not only ranching, but the rise in prices and the cost of production is threatening the agricultural production system as a whole, the distress of apple producers in minors was observed during the month of Juan after the season recorded a decline of 40% in production due to the crisis in the sector and a rise in the cost of production to 100%. The ageing of the fleet used to harvest the grain crop also caused a large number of fires that came during the first 10 days of Juan on about 100 hectares. The agricultural logging crisis is opening to further developments over the next month due to the high cost of production and the implications for agricultural production, vegetable and cashier farming and livestock farming. The agricultural sector's crisis shows a mismanagement of the crisis through the

absence of urgent and strategic solutions to avoid collapse first and then to strategically advance the system.

The crisis mismanagement does not stop there. Besides, the renewed thirst crisis that forced people in areas of constant thirst to go out and protest did not cost the management of the Water Exploitation and Distribution Company Sonad to adopt a clear communication plan in order to reassure people about the full supply of drinkable water, also to apologize and intervene quickly in case of interruption, which sometimes lasts for long weeks in many areas. Furthermore, during the month of June, no official statement was issued by Sonad to announce its plan to ensure supply throughout the summer months, thereby increasing the distancing between citizens and state institutions.

The crisis mismanagement also applies to the south crossings management, as the Ras Gedir crossing again witnessed the protests of traders due to the crossing mismanagement and the absence of strategic solutions to regulate the transit of persons and goods.

Overall, solutions in crisis management come from a real-life diagnosis so that they can be understood and have solutions, but the Government of Najla Boden and next to it President Kais Saeed's governance plan that does not seem to have this diagnostic capacity, or that it is unrealistic, so you first fall in a communication letter that does not carry any messages of calm and reassurance, and second in crisis mismanagement that gets bigger, like a snowball the more it rolls. If this policy shows something, it indicates the adoption of the "under country" plan.

In the meantime, social expressions grow, first of all, demands for the first generation of human rights, like the right to have food, water and health care, therefore the indicators of violence and emotional reactions, especially to vulnerable groups specially children and women, So qualitative development in violence including the killing of Mrs. Amina Bahrouni (43 years old) by her husband in Hafud stabbed with a knife, in front of her 12-year-old daughter, as a result of persistent disagreements fuelled by the family's collapsing living conditions.

### political climate:



The political climate during the month of June was not free of violence, hate and electronic rhetoric for anyone who disagrees with opinion. It is a climate that in no way can provide positive messages to the recipient as much as multiplying tension and pressure and charging the overall climate. Dissenting rhetoric has become a cause for electronic defamation slander and distortion, and it is inevitably a major motive for the growth of violence and hatred, fueling emotional reactions and attempts to eliminate the other.

### June protests:




The month of June recorded 795 protest movements and thus an increase of 35.6% in social movement compared to the movements of May. And the month of June 2021 recorded a decrease of 18.87% compared to the previous month, knowing that the period was characterized by a global crisis situation, whose complexities have been increased by a severe wave of Corona virus spread and the increase in the daily death rate to become in the tens and hundreds. Thus, the previously recorded slight decrease may be under pressure from the fear of the spread of Corona and following the physical distancing plan.

More realistic is this upward curve of protest movements recorded during June, which may be the beginning of the escalation of the social mobility curve in the coming weeks, especially with the approaching date of school return and the start of the agricultural season and its tainted problems.

Also, the rate of random protests during June 2022 exceeded the rate of random protests recorded during June 2021, which means that any possible social shake-up is threatened to be marred by randomness in terms of disrupting the interests of citizens at the level of road traffic and at the level of administrative work.

As mentioned earlier, the June Month protest scene has produced a new protest map in terms of the progress of the North-East Region (including Tunis, Bizerte, Nabel and Zaghwen) and its transformation into a protest pole, this is linked to the nature of protest movements with a political, legal and human rights background. Followed by the south-western region (Gafsa, Touzeur and Tribal) with 168 protest movements and 148 protest movements in the central west.

795 movements			
North-East	228	North-West	71
Center-East	107	Center-West	148
South-East	73	South-West	168




Regionally, Gafsa is still at the forefront of the most protested areas, with 122 protest movements, followed by Tunis, with 106 protest movements.

Add to that, Gafsa is a traditional place for protest, where operation is often the most prominent of the demands raised without any interaction from the authorities.


However, previous and current governments have failed to resolve the social profile of the entity and to find alternative solutions that provide employment and develop the entity in various fields of agriculture, industry, tourism and others, and not only to extract phosphate, a natural wealth that has transformed from a blessing to a curse in the region.



795 movements			
Ariana	31	Ben Arous	22
Bizerte	22	Tunis	106
Zaghouan	22	Manouba	22
Nabeul	3	Beja	22
Jendouba	24	Siliana	25
Le Kef	0	Sousse	59
Sfax	26	Monastir	22
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	49
Kasserine	25	Kairouan	74
Tataouine	23	Gabes	22
Medenine	28	Tozeur	24
Kebili	22	Gafsa	122



Indiscriminate protests accounted for 88.6% of all observed protests, while organized protests amounted to 87.4%, an important indicator of how much change the social actor is experiencing, organizing his protests but also tending towards indiscriminacy.




In Kairouan, for example, which recorded 74 protest movements over the course of the month of June, organized protests account for 54% of all protests observed, yet indiscriminate protests account for 50% of the total number of protests recorded. The proportion of indiscriminate protests in Tunisia during the month of June reached 96% and in Gafsa reached 88.5%.


100 instantaneous movements			
Ariana	9	Ben Arous	0
Bizerte	0	Tunis	0
Zaghouan	0	Manouba	0
Nabeul	3	Beja	0
Jendouba	1	Siliana	3
Le Kef	0	Sousse	2
Sfax	0	Monastir	0
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	7
Kasserine	2	Kairouan	40
Tataouine	1	Gabes	0
Medenine	6	Tozeur	0
Kebili	0	Gafsa	26



695 planned movements			
Ariana	22	Ben Arous	22
Bizerte	22	Tunis	106
Zaghouan	22	Manouba	22
Nabeul	0	Beja	22
Jendouba	23	Siliana	22
Le Kef	0	Sousse	57
Sfax	26	Monastir	22
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	42
Kasserine	23	Kairouan	34
Tataouine	22	Gabes	22
Medenine	22	Tozeur	24
Kebili	22	Gafsa	96



704 anarchic movements			
Ariana	28	Ben Arous	22
Bizerte	22	Tunis	102
Zaghouan	22	Manouba	22
Nabeul	1	Beja	22
Jendouba	22	Siliana	22
Le Kef	0	Sousse	55
Sfax	23	Monastir	22
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	40
Kasserine	22	Kairouan	37
Tataouine	22	Gabes	22
Medenine	24	Tozeur	22
Kebili	22	Gafsa	108



91 non anarchic movements			
Ariana	3	Ben Arous	0
Bizerte	0	Tunis	4
Zaghouan	0	Manouba	0
Nabeul	2	Beja	0
Jendouba	2	Siliana	3
Le Kef	0	Sousse	4
Sfax	3	Monastir	0
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	9
Kasserine	3	Kairouan	37
Tataouine	1	Gabes	0
Medenine	4	Tozeur	2
Kebili	0	Gafsa	14



Therefore, Indiscriminacy is an option for those protesting against the policy of disregard and non-interaction adopted by the Government of Najla Boden, which is a continuation of the same policy of exhaustion that preceded the social movement and its criminalization.




Mixed gender protests reached 87.5% of the total protests observed, which means that damage is shared and demands are shared, while men's protests are estimated at 11.7%.



Public sector protests fell from 66% in May to 25% in June, further deepening the tension between the social actor and state institutions. 57% of Juan's protests in the legal sector, 4% in the environmental situation, 2% in the agricultural sector and 5% in the right to water.


SECTOR




**Demands and Protest Forms:**

Protests with an economic and social background accounted for 41% of the total protests observed, followed by demands for the administration at 56%, demands for political background at 4% and demands for infrastructure improvement at 2%.


## TYPOLOGIE



More-Over, the reasons for the majority of the protests related to the rejection of a resolution, accounting for 57 per cent, or 450 protest movements, of the total protests observed during the month of Juan. All were protests with a political, legal and human rights background. Protests related to workers' occupational rights are followed by monthly salaries and an end to abuses in employment at rates of up to 21 percent. It also related to the right to drinking water at 8 per cent, the rejection of water outages at 3 per cent, and protests related to deteriorating social conditions, accounting for 48 protest movements out of the total protests observed, and 2 per cent of protests related to health services, infrastructure degradation, environmental degradation and other demands.




Again, Juan also missed any protests demanding development, which means that people's hopes and demands have fallen to the level of the first line of human rights, as we mentioned the right to food, health care and drinkable water.




The strike was the most prominent form of protest adopted by the protesters in their expressions, with 56% followed by a sit-in of 22.9% and 5.4% vigils.

Workers were the most prominent actors in the Juan Month protests, with 57% followed by the population at 13%, 96 protest movements and then 10% disruption. The decline in disrupters' protests means less hope for solutions and prospects for operation. Migrants also accounted for 4% of all actors in the protest movement registered throughout Joan and then for 2% of activists. During the month of Juan, the movement of civilized workers returned by 2% and is a precursor to anticipated movements due to the fact that this file has not been resolved for years and the perpetuation of fragile work and discrimination in employment.




The premises represented the most prominent protest spaces by 57%, followed by the Tunisian company's headquarters for the chemical complex by 11%. The social headquarters of the ministries and sovereign headquarters also

represented a stage for protest movements by 7% and roads by 7%. Among the spaces also used by protesters are the media (5%) and hospitals (2%).



# Non-regulatory migration in the first semester of 2022

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The first semester of 2022 saw an increase in arrivals to Italy, reaching 4,037 migrants, compared to 2,963 in the first semester of 2021, an increase of 36.24%. The male gender accounts for the largest proportion of the total arrivals on the Italian coasts of 81%, while the female gender did not exceed 3.8%. Minors accounted for 15.13%. Tunisians accounted for 15% of all unregulated migrants who arrived in Italy in the first six months, ranking third behind Bengali and Egyptian nationalities.

The most striking figure in the first six months of 2022 is the arrival of 2,354 Tunisians in Europe via the various land routes to the Balkan countries, which is the safest route for many, despite its high cost. This suggests a circumstantial displacement of migratory routes this year to the Balkan countries via Turkey to escape the danger of drowning and deportation on the road to the Central Mediterranean.

The unstable political situation favours the adoption of the migration decision by large groups of Tunisians and fuels growing feelings of frustration, in addition to the effects of the rapidly deteriorating economic and social situation that will be more severe for the most vulnerable groups, in addition to the terrible deterioration of public services that affects the quality of life. Therefore, the danger of straddling the boats of death becomes secondary to the danger of the future.

The second semester of this year will be rich in intensive and collective start operations from the Tunisian coasts, taking advantage of a political, security and social context marked by electoral dates and expected social upheavals.

Tunisian authorities managed to intercept 9,392 passers-by, of different nationalities, in the first six months of 2022, reaching the Italian coasts from Tunisian territory, compared to 7,634 passers-by during the same period in 2021. an increase of 23%, most of which were non-Tunisian nationalities 52.5%,

compared to 47.5% of Tunisian nationalities. Most operations were intercepted at sea, 88%, compared to 12% by land.

Thus, the Tunisian authorities confirm their full involvement in European security initiatives under the headings of “fight against non-regulatory migration” and “border management”, so that the European authorities put in place large technical devices that contribute to the transmission of data to the Maritime Guard in order to facilitate interception operations. Testimonies abound on the seriousness of interceptions at sea, which threaten the lives of migrants.

The Tunisian authorities are mobilizing significant human and logistical capacities to play this role and avoid the European discontent that continues to brandish its threat on aid and financing and on its support of Tunisia in the negotiations with the Monetary Fund international.

Border management programmes are also being strengthened, not only maritime borders through calls for tenders for the purchase of radar equipment and the concentration of surveillance systems but also land borders through programmes in training centres in addition to technical meetings between the different agencies in the field of migration management.

The governorate of Sfax represented the most active areas in the departure of migrant boats with a percentage of 45.85%, followed by the governorate of Nabeul with 16.13%, then Mahdia with 10.48%.

The governorate of Sfax has retained the first place in intercepted transit operations due to many factors, the most important one is the intensive activity of the networks of migrant smugglers who manage an unregulated economy for unregulated migration and the presence a large number of candidates for migration of Tunisian or non-Tunisian nationalities in the region. The governorate of Nabeul moved into second position because it is geographically the closest to Italian territory.



The number of victims and disappeared on Tunisian beaches of all nationalities reached 426 victims and disappeared out of a total of 726 victims and disappeared in the Central Mediterranean. This human tragedy on the Tunisian coasts, neglected by the Tunisian authorities, is the result of solely security approaches that mobilize enormous technical, logistical and human capacities of




surveillance and prevention, but they do not take relief and the rapid and effective management of maritime disasters as seriously as they do.

The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights renews its call to the Tunisian authorities to commit themselves effectively and concretely to save the lives of migrants in Tunisian territorial waters by launching a proactive mechanism of assistance and rescue maritime policy aimed at saving lives and integrating all structures and stakeholders along Tunisian territorial waters and the need to establish a permanent information framework, search for missing persons at sea and information. It also calls on Tunisian municipalities, in particular those located on the coastal strip, to draw up local emergency plans to deal with drowning incidents due to non-migration to ensure that appropriate burial sites exist and that they are conducted under appropriate conditions.

Comparison of the same periods in 2019-20-21-22




## Number of migrants intercepted



Months	2019			2020			2021			2022		
	Number of arrivals in Italy	Number of crossings intercepted	Number of migrants intercepted	Number of arrivals in Italy	Number of crossings intercepted	Number of migrants intercepted	Number of arrivals in Italy	Number of crossings intercepted	Number of migrants intercepted	Number of arrivals in Italy	Number of crossings intercepted	Number of migrants intercepted
January	31	8	177	68	22	316	84	17	463	382	124	1155
February	21	4	46	26	25	571	660	77	1273	308	95	1036
March	85	20	323	60	4	137	334	72	882	224	58	886
April	116	11	166	37	6	99	307	42	409	345	87	1515
May	94	19	249	494	60	1243	601	95	2487	1024	172	2658
June	249	23	254	825	119	1611	977	143	2120	1754	176	2142
Total	596	85	1215	1510	236	3977	2963	446	7634	4037	712	9392

## Arrivals on the Italian coasts in the first half of 2022




## Crossings intercepted by region during the first half of 2022


Months	Medenine	Gabes	Sfax	Mahdia	Monastir	Sousse	Nabeul	Tunis	Bizerte	Jendouba
January	%5.88	*	%31.76	%10.58	%11.76	%5.88	%22.35	%8.23	%3.52	*
February	%6	*	%34	%22	%6	%10	%16	%4	%2	*
March	*	*	%56.4	%10.25	%15.3	%5.1	%12.8	*	*	*
April	%2.5	*	%67.5	%5.1	%5.1	%5.1	%9	%1.2	%3.8	*
May	%3.5	%1.2	%49.7	%5.9	%9.46	%10.05	%13.6	%3.5	%2.9	*
June	6.6%	%0.6	35.75%	9.09%	%10.09	8.48%	%23.03	%1.81	2.42%	%0.6
Total	%4.08	%0.3	%45.85	%10.48	%9.61	%7.43	%16.13	%3.12	%2.44	%0.1

\*The presence of this mark does not mean that these regions do not witness transactions, but the official data published in the notifications did not include transactions intercepted in these regions.

## Arrivals by nationality during the first half of 2022



## Crossing operations intercepted during the first half of 2022



## The dramas of unregulated migration on the Tunisian coasts in 2022



Number of victims and missing persons on Tunisian coasts in the first semester of 2022	Number of victims and missing persons in the Mediterranean Sea in the first semester of 2022
426	726

## The number of arrivals to Europe by various land and sea routes in the first half of 2022

Months	Land	Maritime
Central Mediterranean Basin (Italy and Malta)	%66.66	%33.33
The western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean	%64	%36
by road irregularly (East) Turkey Serbia Romania Balkan countries Albania * (until end of May	%41	%59
By road irregularly (West), Spain	%34.43	%65.56
Total	27.71%	72.71%

## suicide and its attempt:




What must be remembered and emphasized is that suicide is a form of protest, which is self-directed violence, in the sense that the victim places himself in dangerous situations and does not disagree in this matter with those who use smuggling and drugs, as well as those who migrate irregularly. All of them are mechanisms adopted by victims as a product of despair, which are serious individual solutions to which victims have sought refuge after collective solutions have been absent and assistance mechanisms have been lost in the family and the environment.


6 suicides			
Ariana	1	Ben Arous	0
Bizerte	0	Tunis	0
Zaghouan	0	Manouba	0
Nabeul	1	Beja	0
Jendouba	0	Siliana	0
Le Kef	0	Sousse	1
Sfax	0	Monastir	0
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	1
Kasserine	0	Kairouan	1
Tataouine	0	Gabes	0
Medenine	0	Tozeur	0
Kebili	0	Gafsa	1




6 cases and suicide attempts were observed throughout the month of June: one suicide or attempted suicide in Gafsa Ariana, Nabeul, Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid and Sousse. Among the victims were two male children under 15 years old.



The proportion of female victims is estimated at 16.7% of the total victims and 83.3% of males.



Suicide by hanging was the most prominent form of suicide observed, 50% followed by suicide by a 33.3% burn and 16.7% self-esteem from high-rise places.



Also, to recall, these figures do not necessarily reflect the reality of cases and attempts of suicide in society. We have noted the absence of media coverage of many cases and attempts of suicide, which was covered by photo and video documentation and posted on Facebook pages, means through citizenship journalism, and only the state apparatus possesses the real numbers about this negative social phenomenon, for which the state has not yet found any clear strategy of resistance to prevent people from committing suicide.



## June 2022 Violence Report:




Over the first six months of the year, Tunisia's Social Observatory alerted of the worsening and further intensification of the phenomenon of violence in public spaces and within the family, especially in the digital sphere and on social media sites. The observatory considered, through the results of the monthly monitoring that it issues, that it is a shifting violence that tends every time to more escalation, brutality and out of control, nourished by the economic and social crisis that the country is living on and for its long duration. The erosion of the role of State institutions, hostility, mistrust and instability, which for more than a year has dominated the landscape and political action.

The violence during the month of June also arguably maintained the same upward pattern as the first five months. Indeed, violence's behaviour and events have become a tool for communication between different groups and components of society. Violence is rapidly spreading and takes various forms, pedagogical, symbolic, physical, covert, verbal, sexual and transit to State violence. The phenomenon has evolved and transformed into Tunisia's character and behaviour, transforming violence into the basic instrument of dealing with the other individually or collectively.


It is mostly related to violent incidents in their escalating pattern since the beginning of the year, to social crises, the month of Ramadan and its high prices and cost of living and its repercussions on the requirements of the Tunisian family during the season of joy and glory, and the shortage of a number of consumables. the political transformations and the direction of the country to an electoral entitlement, political actors were divided into opponents and supporters of President Kais Saied... All of these are activating and motivating factors for the spread of violent behavior.

The month of June 2022 was virtually a political framework and a month in which conflict and disagreement intensified between political parties and civil society organizations. The conflict between the Tunisian General Labour Union and the Office of the President of the Republic has culminated in the general strike in public institutions and institutions. The positions of various political groups have


been further clarified by the draft new constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, which is expected to be voted on 25 July. It was generally a month in which the details of the dialogue were absent and made up for divergence, disagreement, defamation of charges, attempts at dwarfism and treason.



And like every time criminal violence came to the forefront, it was observed during the month of Juan in the sample operated by the Tunisian Social Observatory team, where about 84% of the general total of violence also represented the public space, especially the street.



The family and the housing space in the second framework are considered the incubators of violence, followed by educational and school spaces, and then the administrative and health institutions are in a pro-rank. The deterioration of the services provided within them is an essential catalyst for the escalation of the pattern of violence.




More-over, Incidents of violence in their individual form overcome those recorded in collective directions Men are responsible for more than 80% of the violence observed in the sample of daily and weekly newspapers, websites, television and radio broadcasts. Women who have recently engaged in violent behaviour are responsible for about 6% of it and the remaining 12% are recorded in the form of collective and mixed violence.



So, we can say that violence is based on a particular social type, and it varies from month to month. And while previously the first target was women, the proportion of men targeted by violence increased during Juan, they accounted

for about 54% of those subjected to violence, while women accounted for 25% of all violent persons and the moral violence rate rose to 12% during Juan.

However, Violence is widespread in various forms to be distributed in different states of the Republic in close proportions, with kairouan at the top of the ranking, followed by Sousse Nabel, Sidi Bouzid and Monastir.



The widespread level of violence in Tunisian society is likely to take more severe forms in the coming period, which will coincide with the period of the new Constitution's interpretative campaign and the referendum date. Cyberspace will most likely be the broader framework for it to be taken by the electronic "armies" of political groups and different, as a framework for its feuding and the unattended backcountry of hate speech, violence and incitement.

Furthermore, Tunisia's social observatory stresses the seriousness of this situation, the persistence of the situation of dissent, the State's evasion of its responsibilities and its failure to engage in a balanced societal project based on the principle of right, equality, freedom and difference. The continuing chaos, instability and uncertainty experienced by Tunisians and Tunisians for more than a year would be the instrument that would destroy the entire societal structure and undermine the remainder of Tunisia's social contract and peaceful coexistence.

## **conclusion:**

The protest scene observed in the course of the month of June did not distort what we expected in advance about the state of anticipation and the wait and patience of Tunisia's street in front of all the developments in the political situation. And if the diagnosis is correct, we can say that the observed curve of protest movements will witness a reverse movement after July 25, as protests with a political, legal and human rights background will decrease, while the protests with an economic and social background are expected to witness a rapid escalation that may end in a possible social shake-up by next September. If there is no authority capable of containing this social anger, then violence will be a substitute for the absence of the state and the absence of a solution, and parallel solutions will be implemented and the networks of influence and lobbies will grow. This situation threatens the safety and security of the community.

### **Monitoring Methodology of Irregular Migration:**

The data registered in this report represent the extent to which the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to collect information from various sources, through available means. The statistics remain incomplete and non-detailed and may not fully reflect reality. However, in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian authorities (Number of crossings — number of crossers — distribution by age group and gender — identification of their origins — social status — number of missing persons...) the following report may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and its highlighting shifts.

**Aborted Crossings:** The press releases of the Ministry of Interior, as well as the statements of the spokesman of the National Guard on different platforms, do not usually contain thorough data (gender, age, origin of irregular migrants).

**Irregular migrants who made it to the European coasts:** Numerous structures produce statistics about irregular arrivals to Europe such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Migration Organization, the Ministries of Interior of the European States, and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The given figures remain approximate and in need of continuous update based on the statistics delivered by official authorities and civic structures, which may publish subsequent reports. The figures present studies about the evolution and the changes in the dynamics of irregular migration.

#### **The invisible numbers:**

The invisible numbers reflect the number of migrants arriving in Europe irregularly in undetected ways without being detected by local authorities and global organizations. No track is found of these numbers in the statistics despite their seriousness. These numbers vary as they depend on various migration trafficking networks, following diverse strategies. The figures also include the departures from the Tunisian coast that managed to evade strict border controls. Unreported failed operations are also included.