

REPORT **October** 2022



1999
Migrants

889
Collective protests

10
Cases of suicide
and attempted suicide

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October 2022 report on social protests



Introduction

In terms of social movements, violence and suicides, October was in line with previous months. However, its specific features lie in the contextual factors that contributed to the rise of protest movements and violence in Tunisia. The social movements, violence and suicides were marked by the political context of uncertainty and preparations for a new phase following the legislative elections to be held on 17 December 2022. They are also influenced by a socio-economic context that is expressed by an increasingly pronounced inflation and shortages in basic necessities. The events that took place in October 2022 could lead to further developments in the coming months if the contextual elements persist or intensify.

Due to the current situation of ambiguity in political discourse and the lack of organization of many of the social movements, these events remain unpredictable and poorly organized. The lack of coordination and the disinvestment of political parties as mediators of the movements can be observed. However, social movements and acts of urban violence were observed in all the governorates, which would reflect the desire to report the experienced social prejudice in the public space. The public space continued to be used as a field of protest, but also of violence. As far as suicides are concerned, the unspoken facts that surround them make it difficult to record them in our current context, even if their alarming character lies in the motives, the places, and the ways in which they are carried out.

The Tunisian Social Observatory created by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) presents this report, in order to provide reliable information to the interested social and political actors. The aim of this report, as much as its predecessors, is to quantify and analyze the expressions of social discomfort in Tunisia with a view to reflect on the alternatives and courses of action, that are required in the current context.

Contextual dynamics

1. Political dynamics:

October is marked by the magnitude of social movements against the high cost of living which are multiplying in several countries of the world as well as by other events which indicate the critical situation experienced on the social and economic level. Demagogy and populism, fed by the impoverishment of the various populations, continue to grow in several countries. Migration policies are increasingly coercive and the political deadlock on migration continues to fuel political discourse on the northern shore of the Mediterranean¹. The right-wing shift in the political landscape in various countries (France, Italy, the United States, etc.) reflects a significant discomfort that is spreading throughout the world.

In Tunisia, the political situation depends on the implementation of the political program of Kais Saied. The upcoming legislative elections are being prepared, despite the opposition that has taken place. The Independent High Electoral Body (ISIE) has counted 1058 successful candidates, even though 7 electoral districts have not had any applications accepted. Among these files, 88% of the candidates are male, while 12% are women², which raises the issue of women's representation in decision making.

Additionally, there is the migration drama in Zarzis where about 12 people have been missing for one and half month. The fishermen of Zarzis were able to retrieve eight bodies with no assistance from the police. Demonstrations by the families of the disappeared condemned the state crime committed and demanded justice for their children. These events took place on September 21, and it was not until October 14 that the president hosted the head of government to discuss the incident, ordering to search for the survivors and to open an investigation. This event demonstrated the delays in getting the government to react to such urgent matters. The political speeches seem to be

¹ Le Monde. In the Mediterranean, migrants caught in a "political impasse", 05 November 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2022/11/05/en-mediterranee-les-migrants-pris-dans-une-impasse-politique_6148625_3224.html

² Tunisie numérique: The Higher Independent Electoral Body: Acceptance of 1058 applications for the next legislative elections, 03 November 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/Tunisie.Numerique/videos/493440752823250>

out of step with the reality of the Tunisian people. The silence and the delayed reactions also accompanied the announcement of the agreement approved with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In addition, the increased repression of opponents was pointed out by the "Salvation Front", a coalition of opposition parties. More than a thousand Tunisians demonstrated on October 15 in Tunis against the policies of the President of the Republic. Supporters of Abir Moussi, the Free Destourian Party, Ennahdha, and other members protested shortages and inflation, linking the president's actions to the economic crisis. At the same time, political speeches continued to condemn wholesalers, merchants, trade unionists, and members of political parties and single out these "speculators" as the cause of the economic crisis.

2. Socio-economic Dynamics:

In October, the global economic activity continues to suffer a sharper slowdown than expected, under the effect of the different crises the world is going through (the war in Ukraine, the repercussions of Covid, the strength of the dollar and the increase in the cost of imported products, the energy crisis, the real estate crisis and the economic slowdown in China, etc.). Inflation has reached a level rarely seen in decades. Fuel crises and food shortages are becoming more and more difficult to manage. A recession is looming in the global economy and many countries are forced to calibrate their monetary and fiscal policies to the context. To reduce inflation, some countries are being forced to consider green alternatives, while others are simply being pushed into debt. The marches against the high cost of living are ongoing in several countries of the world and different populations are contesting the economic difficulties that are pushing them to the margins by the day³.

The repercussions of this international crisis are more disastrous for Tunisia, a country already over-indebted and with a critical economic situation. Indeed, Tunisia, whose debt exceeds 100% of its GDP, is unable to borrow on international markets. Speeches about the funds released by the IMF have marked the month of October, as they did in previous months.

³ IMF. Responding to the Cost of Living Crisis, October 2022, <https://www.imf.org/fr/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/10/11/world-economic-outlook-october-2022>

During the month of October, the difficulties experienced by the country due to poor governance, failing monetary policies, and the global context have resulted in shortages of basic foodstuffs (flour, sugar, coffee, milk, etc.) and disruptions in fuel distribution. Long queues in front of gas stations and public anger over the shortages have animated popular discourse⁴. Medication shortages have also been reported, according to the chamber of pharmacists' wholesalers and distributors⁵, whose representatives predict growing shortages in the coming months.

Inflation has certainly taken its toll, in the near absence of effective economic reforms and inaction by policymakers. Consumer prices rose 1% in October, up from 1.1% in September. Clothing prices rose by 6.4%, food prices by 0.8% (eggs 11.3%, dairy products and cheese 3.4%, sheep meat 2.5%, beef 2.2%), and housing prices (water, sanitation, electricity) increased due to the revision of sanitation tariffs by 0.7%. Inflation therefore reached 9.2% during this month⁶.

The IMF funds are being promoted as an economic rescue tool. However, experts estimate that about 80 percent of the allocations will not reach those most in need. The silence accompanying the reforms requested by the IMF is worrying, given the prioritization of the socio-economic issue⁷.

Social Movements

The Tunisian Social Observatory of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights recorded 889 social movements of various types during the month of October 2022. This number stood at 733 social movements in October 2021. This represents an increase compared to last year. Regarding the last month, that is, September 2022 when the observatory recorded 832 protests. The


⁴ Le Monde. Thousands of Tunisians demonstrate against the high cost of living and the president, Kaïs Saïed, October 15, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/10/15/des-milliers-de-tunisiens-manifestent-contre-la-vie-chere-et-le-president-kais-saied_6145965_3212.html#:~:text=Le%20pays%20conna%C3%A9t%20par%20ailleurs,l'Agence%20France%2DPresse.

⁵ Tunisie Numérique. Review of the week from October 28 to November 04, 2022: A shortage of drugs on the horizon, 04 November 2022, <https://www.tunisienumerique.com/revue-de-la-semaine-du-28-octobre-au-04-novembre-2022-une-penurie-de-medicaments-a-lhorizon/>

⁶ National Institute of Statistics (INS). Consumer Price Index, October 2022, <http://www.ins.tn/publication/indice-des-prix-la-consommation-octobre-2022>

⁷ Al Tayar. Tunisia: economic stagnation, shortages and popular discontent, September 30, 2022, <https://atalayar.com/fr/content/tunisie-blocage-economique-penuries-et-mecontentement-populaire>

northeast region recorded the highest number, 238 movements. In second place, the Central East recorded 155. The Southeast had 147 movements and the Southwest had 108, during this month. As in previous months, the Northwest recorded the lowest number of 86 movements, which is however a considerable change compared to recent months.




Geo-spatial distribution

The most affected governorates are Tunis with 96 protests, Gafsa with 80 demonstrations, Medenine which recorded 69, and Sidi Bouzid that experienced 67 protest movements. These governorates are usually dominant in terms of the number of protests that occur. However, during this month, the governorate of Jendouba where usually few social movements are recorded

has registered 54 protests, which is quite an evolution compared to previous months.

The governorates that recorded the lowest number of protests are Seliana, Kef, and Tozeur. This is a continuation of the usual protest functioning of recent years, despite the indicators of underdevelopment and poverty in these regions.




Gendered distribution

As for the gender distribution, 91.1% of the protests involved the participation of all genders, while only 7.2% were male-only and 0.7% were exclusive to women.



" Anarchic " movements vs. " non anarchic " movements


The classification of these protests according to the level of organization and coordination reveals that the majority of these events, i.e. 89.7%, are of an "anarchic" and uncoordinated nature, while only 10.3% are said to be "non-anarchic" and characterized by organization ⁸.



With regard to the so-called "anarchic" movements, the country recorded 797 in October. The governorates of Tunis, Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Sousse and Jendouba have witnessed the highest number of protest days. As for the so-called "non-anarchic" movements, during the month of October there were 92 days of

⁸ We should emphasize that the designation of protest movements as "anarchic" and "non-anarchic" is not intended as a stigmatizing judgment of the nature of the events. It is used to classify them in terms of coordination or lack of coordination. These labels will be rediscussed in future reports.


protests, the highest numbers were recorded in Tunis, Kairouan, Sfax, Gafsa, Kasserine, and Tataouine. The proportion of "anarchic" movements is increasing compared to September 2022, which means a greater tendency to urgently invest the streets without intermediaries and without an organizing entity, due to the rising anger of the population.



Planned vs. instantaneous movements


Planned protests are predominant with a share of 84.5%, i.e. 751 protests, while instantaneous protests amount to 15.5% of the total movements that took place, i.e. 138 protests.

■ Planned ■ Instantaneous




Regarding the instantaneous movements which number is lower than those planned in advance, the governorates that recorded the largest numbers are Kasserine with 28 protests, Jendouba with a number amounting to 27 protests, and Medenine which recorded 24. Several governorates did not record any instantaneous protests including Zaghouan, Mahdia, Manouba and Beja.

As for planned protests, Tunis recorded the highest number of days of protests, that is 89. Then Gafsa recorded 74 and then Sidi Bouzid in third place with 66 days of protests.



Motives for the protests

Among the motives of these movements are struggles for workers' rights, which account for 29%, of which 16% are demands for tenure and improvement of working conditions, 4% are demands for regularization of the status of work, and 5% are protests to the non-implementation of approved agreements. 13% of the total protests are also related to the right to employment, with recruitment as the main reason. In addition, 10% of the protests express support for political figures and 41% are protests against modes of governance. Demands related to transportation, public services, infrastructure, security, and the right to water were also documented. 49% of this month's protests are administrative, while 47% are social, and 4% are exclusively economic. Infrastructure, institutional, and political issues are less important, accounting for 1% of the reasons for the actions.



The reasons for these expressions in the face of silence and conspiracy rhetoric depend on the conditions of the actors and the treatment they receive. On the one hand, concrete demands such as the right to work and education, as well as those that are mainly social, are omnipresent in the field. On the other hand, the people making these demands and belonging to vulnerable groups, more specifically women, children, precarious workers (in this case unpaid teachers), rural inhabitants, and the marginalized in general, have been victims of different types of violence, including police and urban violence, which may have contributed to the emergence of new forms of protest, including hunger strikes.

The actors


The actors who took part in the October events were diverse, with a marked presence of teachers who accounted for 57% of protest participants. Relatives of the disappeared of Zarzis represented 7% of the total number. 6% of the actors present were locals taking part in protests for basic rights, while 3% were youth, 2% were activists, 2% were schoolchildren, 5% were students, 4% were unemployed graduates, and 4% were claiming employment, with the presence of other varied professional groups such as farmers, bus and cab drivers, journalists, and construction workers.

Targets of protests

As in previous months, the majority of protests, that is, 76%, continued to target the central authority, namely the government 71%, the presidency of the government 6%, the Ministry of Education 57%, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Industry. Other protests aimed at regional authorities, and private organizations. Thus employers, educational institutions, and companies such as the Company of phosphates Gafsa have been the focus of claims.


Targeted sectors

According to the data collected, the education sector was a matter of concern for the social actors, since 60% of the events were related to it. The public sector accounted for 23%, while the private sector accounted for 8%. As for the other social movements, 6% related to the transport sector, 2% to agriculture, 1% to the issue of access to water, 1% to the health sector, 1% to security and 1% to the legal sector.



Forms of protest:


The forms of protest adopted comprised a majority of sit-in days, which amounted to 80.3% of the total, and protest rallies, which accounted for 8%. In addition, there were days when access to classes was prohibited, road blockades, congestion days, general or partial strikes, blocking of activities, media appeals, peaceful marches, burning of tires, and "days of anger".



The sit-in continues to be the form of protest most frequently adopted during this month. Thus, 80.3% of the total protests consisted of sit-in days, ie 714 days of sit-in in different places which is equivalent to 65 sit-in.

Spaces of protest

The spaces in which protests took place were different, due to the diversity of the protests that took place and the prevalence of movements focused on the educational and social justice issue. 56% of the protests took place in front of administrative headquarters, 13% in front of educational institutions, 7% in front of the government headquarters, and 5% in front of labor headquarters. Still, 16% took place in public on roads and 3% in front of ministers' headquarters. We also witnessed the disinvestment of the usual locations of protests. Thus, the Avenue Habib Bourguiba - usually invested in mass by demonstrators - was only the place of choice for 1% of the events. This was similarly manifested for spaces such as the municipal theater and the Kasbah having hosted each 1% of protests.



Indeed, this month has revealed many intimate forms of anger among the population. Important and rather unprecedented movements have taken place: the demonstrations of teachers, parents, and students, the protests of the relatives of those who disappeared at sea, and the ongoing movements involving different profiles of demonstrators (farmers, unemployed people, drivers, journalists, and activists) for months.

The impasse of education



The persistence of the "educational impasse" has led to professionals, parents and students taking part in the protests, while confusion and "laissez faire" characterize the political discourse and police repression is increasing and affecting teachers and children. The precarious situation of young "substitute" teachers has pushed them to maintain their strike and the resolution of the issue has not been considered. Between 150,000 and 400,000 students have been deprived of their right to education to date, due to the lack of professionals. 4,000 substitute teachers in elementary school have launched a social movement due to the failure to recruit and the delay in the payment of their salaries⁹. These teachers have chosen this profession and have believed in

⁹ RFI. Tunisia: substitute teachers on strike against their precarious working conditions, October 31, 2022, <https://www.msn.com/fr-fr/actualite/monde/tunisie-les-enseignants-rempla%C3%A7ants-en-gr%C3%A8ve-contre-leurs-conditions-de-travail-pr%C3%A9caires/ar-AA13ziLO>

the promises of their supervisory ministry, which has altered the arrangement, based on the economic crisis experienced by the country. Indeed, the IMF has demanded among other reforms the reduction of salaries in the civil service, which led the Ministry of Education to take measures which, for substitute teachers, mean a break in their professional projects. The title of "teaching agent" was used by the Ministry of Education as a denial of this use, which was an injustice for them and an injunction to sacrifice years of work in order to obtain tenure.

The feeling of having been deceived, as stated by a trade unionist from the Federation of Basic Education, led them to continue their protests. Referring to the agreements signed with previous governments and the economic situation of the country, the Minister of Education called on October 20, 2022 teachers to return to their workplaces and make more sacrifices, promising again the regularization of their professional situation within four years. However, the teachers' protests have not stopped since then and the movement is still going on, despite the growing disagreements.

This has resulted in whole classes being left without teachers, prompting parents to protest and call for a resolution to the conflict¹⁰. The right to education for their children was thus raised, holding the ministerial authority and the teachers responsible. Other issues were raised, such as infrastructure and access to transportation for students which is a barrier to access to schools. These parents' demonstrations took place in different governorates near the educational institutions, which represents an appeal to these institutions and a call for an overhaul of the Tunisian educational system.

Police repression was also documented inside schools. In Ben Arous, students demonstrated against the poor infrastructure of their school (walls, sanitary spaces). Ten students were subsequently arrested by police officers who made an emergency intervention. The principal of the school denied having alerted the police and the head of the education delegation said that the infrastructure is not so poor as to constitute a danger for the students. By the end of October only 6 students were released. This event should alert the authorities to the

¹⁰ Frida Dahmani. Tunisia - Tens of thousands of students without a teacher, Young Africa, October 31, 2022, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1389110/politique/tunisie-des-dizaines-de-milliers-deleves-prives-de-professeur/>

institutional violence of which the victims are children and the loop of violence that could lead to violent reactions, inside structures supposed to play a mission of social justice.

The movement of the relatives of those who are missing at sea

On the other hand, the movement of the families of victims in Zarzis has marked this month. Indeed, this city suffered a shipwreck of a boat of migrants and the burial of its victims. The protesters turned to the streets, demanding the investigation of this shipwreck, the intensification of the search for the victims, and objecting to the hasty burial of some of the victims in the private cemetery "the garden of Africa" reserved for the burial of unidentified sub-Saharan migrants and loaded with symbolic meaning for the latter, the humanitarians, and the inhabitants¹¹.



Les personnes prenant part aux protestations ont participé à des journées de la colère contre les autorités locales et nationale. Des slogans comme « voleurs de notre pays, tueurs de nos enfants » ont été scandés par les proches des disparus, condamnant le silence politique et l'incapacité de l'Etat à gérer proprement les pertes humaines.

¹¹ Zagaria, Valentina. "A Short Story with Strong Symbolic Potential. The Construction of a Cemetery of Unknown Migrants in Southeastern Tunisia," *International Criticism*, vol. 83, no. 2, 2019, pp. 61-85.

Faced with this political silence, the inhabitants have attempted to rescue their relatives. According to the speeches of officials, the Tunisian authorities are struggling to intercept or rescue migrants due to insufficient means. The lack of means did not prevent the solidarity of the inhabitants which was observed following this event ¹². Relatives of the missing, fishermen, and members of local associations tried to recover the bodies of the victims or to find survivors, interrupting their economic activities. Finally, under the pressure of the protest movement, the bodies were dug up and buried in the family cemeteries.

This tragedy of irregular migration has not been unprecedented, since more than 29 thousand migrants have already been intercepted since the beginning of the year. The political silence and the migration policies of the country and its northern neighbors have made the waiting time for a presidential decision to be taken longer. Between September 21 and October 14, the authorities gave no instructions for the searches and burials, making it more difficult to resolve the situation. The failure of the state to intervene thus inspired the Zarzis movement, which spread to other places and gained the sympathy of the population through community solidarity.

Political parties

Social movements are not limited to popular protests. Political parties opposed to the government also took part and organized actions. For example, the "National Salvation Front" organized demonstrations on October 15 to denounce the excesses of the governance of Kais Saied and the police practices that would prevent them from demonstrating. According to a statement from the "National Salvation Front", several supporters were prevented from joining the demonstration in the capital by security means. This coalition of opposition parties, which includes several political parties from different backgrounds, organized demonstrators, pointing to the economic crisis and blaming the policies since 2019 and accusing President Kais Saied of being responsible for the severe economic crisis experienced by the country. At the same time,

¹² Khaled Tabbabi. Floating bodies and drifting souls: the absurdity of burial and the state of contempt (The tragedy of the Zarzis peninsula), FTDES, 10 October 2022, <https://ftdes.net/ar/zarzis-3/>

another demonstration organized by the LDP against the deterioration of living conditions gathered nearly 1000 participants¹³.

Workers' movements

Other protests took place and brought together several trades. Cab drivers continued their protests, in order to obtain licenses.



Hunger strikes have been initiated, denouncing corruption in the allocation of licenses for individual cabs and demanding the increase of fares, which worries the inhabitants. In addition, farmers in several governorates (Kef, Bizerte, Seliana, El Krib, Nabeul) have protested the lack of fertilizer and seeds, which may endanger the planting season. They opposed the unavailability of fertilizer and called for the intervention of the Ministry of Agriculture. The date producers in Kebili also demonstrated to express their surprise at the neglect of the state towards the date sector despite its economic importance. They

¹³ La Croix. Thousands of demonstrators in Tunis against President Saïed and the economic crisis, October 15, 2022, <https://www.la-croix.com/milliers-manifestants-Tunis-contre-president-Saied-crise-economique-2022-10-15-1301237895>

demanding state investment to maintain the quality and harvesting of dates in good conditions, create a date office under the supervision of the state and open the border posts with the Libyan country to promote their products and set an agreed reference price. In addition, the site workers whose ages are over 45 years demonstrated to demand the regularization of their employment situations.

These October protests affirm the failures of government and presidential policies, which hinder social justice and protection. The economic and political developments expected in the coming months due to the budget law and the IMF agreement could make the situation worse. The social movements of October are preliminary elements to predict an accumulation of protests, due to the accumulation of collective anger and the security approach chosen by the government and its agents.

Irregular Migration

in october 2022



The month of October was marked by the expansion of political and social movements, as the protest spread and developed in quantity and quality and attempts to cross the border irregularly increased significantly. The humanitarian crisis in Zarzis during the month of October was a significant event. The indifferent attitude of the state and its institutions and the withholding of information contributed to the rise of social tension in the region, and the population was forced to rely on its own capacities to search for the missing and discover their fate. To this day, the city of Zarzis is still experiencing a continuous movement by residents to find out the fate of their children in the absence of a state spokesperson to inform and communicate the procedures to be followed. The regional authorities quickly buried the bodies of the immigrants without respecting the protocol to be followed during these crises, which exacerbated the suffering of the families and confirmed their doubts that the state only seeks to close this file as soon as possible. The Zarzis crisis revealed the inhumane management by the state of maritime disasters and the failure to respect legal, sanitary, and humanitarian provisions.

While Tunisian authorities were unable to allocate the necessary means to search for missing persons in Zarzis, Mahdia, Kelibia and Bizerte, they succeeded in preventing 5,584 migrants from reaching the Italian coast during the month of October, which represents an increase of 43.8 percent compared to September. They also thwarted 331 crossing operations, compared to 263 operations during the same period last year. The number of migrants thwarted since the beginning of the year until the end of October rose to 30,604, an increase of 38.18% compared to the same period in 2021. The Tunisian authorities have also impeded 2,544 crossing operations, compared to 1,545 crossing operations during the same period last year.

While the number of immigrants of all nationalities arriving in Italy since the beginning of the year has increased by 59.17% to reach 85041 by the end of October, the number of Tunisian immigrants has evolved only 16.43%. The number of Tunisian immigrants arriving in Italy since the beginning of the year


has reached 16699 immigrants against 14342 immigrants during the same period of the previous year.

The number of minors arriving in Italy has reached 3,267, or 19.56% of the total number of Tunisian immigrants. Minors of Tunisian nationality represent 32.9% of the minors who arrived in Italy of all nationalities.


Human tragedies continue on the Tunisian coast, where 23 deaths or missing as a result of irregular migration operations have been observed, bringing the number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast to 567 cases out of a total of 1306 cases in the Mediterranean.

With the extreme right coming to power in Italy, the imposition of visas on Tunisians by Serbia, the unstable political situation and the deterioration of economic and social conditions, the middle Mediterranean route will experience increasing pressure and more tragedies.


Comparison In the same period during the years 2019–2020–2021 – 2022



Number of frustrating passes




Number of passersby suspended




2022			2021			2020			2019			the month
Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	
1155	124	382	463	17	84	316	22	68	177	8	31	January
1036	95	308	1273	77	660	571	25	26	46	4	21	February
886	58	224	882	72	334	137	4	60	323	20	85	March
1515	87	345	409	42	307	99	6	37	166	11	116	Avril
2658	172	1024	2487	95	601	1243	60	494	249	19	94	march
2086	175	1714	2120	143	977	1611	119	825	254	23	249	june
3226	226	3530	2993	211	4044	2918	245	4145	608	44	262	July
5713	411	4284	5582	317	4035	1621	191	2306	515	28	489	August
3882	270	2958	3199	308	1796	2035	170	1951	500	39	864	september
5584	331	1999	2739	263	1504	1349	157	1300	750	47	381	octobre
2863	595											Data*
30604	2544	16699	22147	1545	14342	11900	999	11212	3588	243	2592	The total

*Data contained in the National Guard spokesperson's statements and not monitored by the FTDES in daily communications

Distribution of arrivals to Italy by months during 2022




Distribution of frustrating passes by authorities during october2022




*The presence of this sign does not mean that these authorities do not witness crossings, but the official data published in the notifications did not include frustrating crossings in these bodies.

Distribution of passers-by by nationalities During october2022




Distribution of frustrating passes during 2022



The tragedies of irregular migration on the Tunisian coasts during2022

The number of victims and missing



The number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast during 2022

567

The number of dead and missing in the Central Mediterranean Basin during 2022

1306

October Report on Violence




The mapping of violence in the month of October 2022 is characterized by the dispersion of cases of violence recorded in different regions of the country and their increasingly noticeable magnitude that is specifically affecting vulnerable people. During this month, 48 cases of violence were observed, which is a decrease compared to September. Nevertheless, the so-called "criminal" violence continued to increase during this month.

Geo-spatial distribution

In the governorate of Tunis, 23.4% cases of violence were recorded. Ariana then recorded 12.8% similarly to Kasserine which has also experienced 12.8%, followed by Bizerte which has recorded 10.6%. The governorates mentioned above continue for months to be the place where violence prevails.

Ariana	12.8%	Ben Arous	2.1%
Bizerte	10.6%	Tunis	23.4%
Zaghuan	0%	Manouba	2.1%
Nabeul	2.1%	Beja	2.1%
Jendouba	0%	Siliana	0%
Le Kef	2.1%	Sousse	4.3%
Sfax	2.1%	Monastir	8.5%
Mahdia	4.3%	Sidi Bouzid	0%
Kasserine	12.8%	Kairouan	2.1%
Tataouine	2.1%	Gabes	2.1%
Medenine	4.3%	Tozeur	0%
Kebili	0%	Gafsa	0%




Motives for violence

The causes of this prevalence may differ according to the characteristics of these locations. On the one hand, Tunis and Ariana are governorates with poverty rates below the national average. However, their demographic weight raises questions of inequality between the centers and the margins. Poor neighborhoods are found on the outskirts of the richest delegations, which coincides with a high school dropout rate and feelings of profound inequality in the population's living conditions. Gaps in social justice are observed through the division of these areas into spaces of residence for privileged groups with respectable levels of income, education and better urban infrastructure, and nearby spaces inhabited by populations that are far more marginalized on this level. Urban sociability is established in such a way as to reinforce the perpetration of violent acts, depending on the fragmentation that takes place¹⁴. This fragmentation and the resulting frustration could serve as a clue to help understand the indicators of violence in these specific governorates. Bizerte is also a governorate with an average poverty rate of 17.5, but with a significant standard deviation above the national average. The inequalities observed there result in a relatively high unemployment rate, high literacy and school dropout problems. On the other hand, Kasserine is a governorate that records a poverty rate of 32.8%, which is one of the highest in the country. The marginalization that exists there explains in part the acts that are observed, many of which are material (theft, robbery)¹⁵. Exclusion rather than poverty would then be a common denominator of these places that express the highest rates of violence in the country.

Gendered distribution

Women are represented by 91.3% of the actors of violence, while they represent 59.6% of its victims. Among the victims, 23.4% are women, 6.4% are mixed groups of women and men, and



¹⁴ Bayón, María Cristina, and Gonzalo A. Saraví. "The cultural dimensions of urban fragmentation: Segregation, sociability, and inequality in Mexico City." *Latin American Perspectives* 40.2 (2013): 35-52.

¹⁵ National Institute of Statistics (INS). Poverty map of Tunisia, September 2020, <http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Carte%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20en%20Tunisie%20final%200.pdf>

10.6% of the victims died as a consequence of this violence.


Spheres of violence

In opposition to the month of September, the majority of the cases of violence recorded were collective, that is to say, 53.2% were exercised in a collective manner, while 46.8% of the cases of violence observed were exercised on individuals.




Typology of violence

Regarding the typology of violence and the spheres in which it occurs, 85.1% of the cases were criminal, 6.4% were institutional violence, 4.3% were violence in the public space, 2.1% were economic violence, and 2.1% were related to social protests.



Spaces of violence

The street remained a main location for violence, as 51.1% of cases of violence took place there. Schools (schools, middle schools, high schools) recorded 17% of violent acts, while 12.8% took place in the homes of victims and 4.3% were committed in economic institutions (banks). In addition, administrations, prisons, health facilities, leisure facilities, media and virtual platforms recorded equivocal rates of violence, namely 2.1% in each of these mentioned settings.



The violence during this month was characterized by the rise of violence against women. On the one hand, several cases of domestic violence were recorded and were distinguished by their magnitude. A woman was burned with cigarettes by her husband in Sidi Bachir, another was raped by her husband to such an extent that she fell into a coma, another died after being threatened by her husband who poured fuel on her body in order to burn her, and a femicide was recorded in Kef. On the other hand, several women were victimized in the public space by unknown persons. There was a kidnapping of a teenager in Sfax, attempted rapes of adults and teenagers, and the taking of pornographic videos against the will of the victims.

The educational environment has also recorded a significant amount of violence, which highlights the impact of the educational crisis in Tunisia. The violence took place inside schools and on their margins. The victims were either education professionals or students. For example, the assistant principal of an elementary school was physically assaulted by a relative in Beja, and a teacher was assaulted in her classroom in an elementary school in front of her students. Concerning the students, there was the murder by stabbing in Nabeul, the stabbing of a classmate in Monastir, and the use of tear gas to

suffocate the students in Kasserine, etc. Around the periphery of educational institutions, robberies have been recorded, a case of vandalism and violence against a bus driver in Tataouine by students on board, and cases of regionalist violence have been reported against students boarding buses in Gabes. The "foreigners" were attacked and beaten on this bus and the aggressors even tried to cut their hair. The people attacked belong to a poor neighborhood and have a foreigner status compared to their aggressors, which makes them prey to social exclusion and to this violence. The climate of insecurity in these educational environments is becoming more and more worrying. The unrest and the violence committed are fed by the climate of confusion and disorientation regarding the political discourse on the outcome of the crisis that has been taking place since the beginning of the school year, by the inequalities and exclusions in the educational system, and by the harassment that takes place there without being mediated by third parties. Therefore, in a climate of systemic violence, "rites of liberation" could arise between peers, teachers and parents who are disillusioned with the functions of the school. Preventing violence in the school environment cannot be done without reflecting on the shortcomings of the current educational system and attempting to resolve the conflicts that exist, through dialogue and mediation and by avoiding inconsistency and confusion in the taken positions ¹⁶.

A plethora of other cases of violence were recorded, including robberies, armed assaults (by hunting weapons, knives, sabers), stabbings, murders, swindles, hearing loss, vandalism, tire burning, Molotov throwing, serious parental assaults on children, etc. Police violence was also noted during this month, as well as violence based on religious beliefs, such as in the case of a rental car driver killed by a religious extremist, after defending a woman on board who was attacked by the latter because of her clothing deemed unsuitable to the dogmas followed by the attacker.

This criminal violence, with varying repercussions, is worrying. The question of the right to be different and discrimination based on this difference is a way of reading these phenomena. Indeed, according to the report of the Observatory for the defense of the right to be different in Tunisia between July and

¹⁶ Farrington D.P. Explaining and preventing crime: The globalization of knowledge – The American Society of Criminology 1999 presidential address, in *Criminology*, 2000, 38, 1. 8-26.

September 2022, it is often a question of testimonies on discriminations based on gender identity, the majority of which have been committed within the family sphere, which take on several types of violence (psychological, verbal, physical, economic, sexual), and where witnesses were present at the time of the action of the discriminations even if few would be able to testify¹⁷. Similarly, ethnic and regional discrimination were described in this report. The latest reports from the Tunisian Social Observatory confirm the presence of identity-based foundations for the exercise of violence, the intersectional character of such violence, and the importance of the scale of vulnerabilities, which in part determine the possibilities for individuals or groups to be victimized.

¹⁷ Observatory for the defense of the right to be different in Tunisia. Analysis report of the data collected by the poles, July - September 2022, https://o3dt.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/july-report-French-for-for-web.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0YXrQ3X7qVFKdy3GhKFczNktPf95pE6X50fb4_19HZvZrbZP5Q2jQwYq4

suicide and attempted suicide




During this month, only 10 cases of suicides and attempted suicides have been mediatized, through the formal media and social networks that are the subject of censuses of the Tunisian social observatory. This is a brief decline compared to the month of September, when 15 suicides were recorded.

Geo-spatial distribution

These suicidal behaviors were recorded in the governorates of Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid, Ben Arous, Tunis, Zaghouan, Jendouba, Medenine, and Gafsa.

10 suicides			
Ariana	0	Ben Arous	1
Bizerte	0	Tunis	1
Zaghouan	1	Manouba	0
Nabeul	0	Beja	0
Jendouba	1	Siliana	0
Le Kef	0	Sousse	0
Sfax	0	Monastir	0
Mahdia	0	Sidi Bouzid	2
Kasserine	0	Kairouan	2
Tataouine	0	Gabes	0
Medenine	1	Tozeur	0
Kebili	0	Gafsa	1




Gendered distribution

During this month, gender differences have become more pronounced. 80% of self-inflicted violence is experienced by men, while 20% of cases are experienced by women.




Typologie des suicides

Among the suicidal behaviors, 40% were committed by hanging, 20% by immolation, 20% were by jumping or rushing, and 20% were carried out by ingesting non-prescribed drugs. The techniques used to carry out the self-inflicted violence differed according to the profiles of the actors and the motives of the suicides.



Ages of the suicidal individuals

The ages of the suicidal individuals were variable. One person is over 60 years of age, four are adults between 36 and 45 years of age, two are between 26 and 35 years of age, and three are between 16 and 25 years of age. No suicides were recorded for those under the age of 15 and between the ages of 46 and 60.



Protest suicides have been reported, as well as suicides motivated by interpersonal conflicts (peer harassment and marital conflicts) and by family causes with economic backgrounds (land lot, inherited money, etc.).

This month was distinguished by the suicide of teachers and students, such as the case of suicide of a teenager aged 17 by hanging in Kairouan, because of the harassment of his peers and the self-immolation of a substitute teacher in front of the delegation of education of Kairouan. This suicide "protest" comes as a logical continuation of the conditions experienced for years and the endless wait. The choice of the education delegation as a place of protest reveals the power dynamics that take place between the representatives of the authority and the people who demonstrate in front of these educational structures. The lack of effective public communication, the implicit threats of

the ministry, and the injunction to sacrifice (given the economic situation of the country that makes it not a good time for substitute teachers to demand their rights) pushed this individual to literally sacrifice in the face of injustice. This rhetoric of "sacrifice" as a token of virtue and merit of the teaching profession is then revealed as dangerous, since it does not take into account the conditions of those forced to sacrifice and the impact that this sacrifice could have on their lives, which in this case is death and desperate self-sacrifice.

Other suicides of this type have occurred and have affected other sectors. The attempted suicide of a construction worker in Jendouba that has stirred the anger of his colleagues at the regional hospital of Jendouba. A shopkeeper also threatened to self-immolate in public, following interactions with a customs officer, whom he then tried to burn. During a protest to have licenses to practice as a cab driver, one of the demonstrators also tried to commit suicide in front of the prefecture, with reasons for protest. Indeed, the suicides of protest follow the life trajectories of the perpetrators. They are distinguished by the feelings of injustice that motivate them and the appeal to the emotional sympathy of the public¹⁸.

This type of suicide evokes the inscription of their individual experience in a social and professional area that could legitimize this action and give it a political breath, which would in turn break with the silence and expectation that they experience in their connection to institutional and state structures¹⁹. Protest suicides are then carried out in the public space and draw public attention to the suicide victim and the group they represent or want to represent. They can also take place in private and draw public attention because of the common grievance they represent. In the words of Edward Said, they are enacted as part of a "culture of resistance whose core is energetic insurrection."²⁰

To think of these suicides as acts resulting from a depressive disorder induced by injustice and whose purpose would be to ensure that the individual is "finally seen" in the spectacularity of his public act would be a mark of the

¹⁸ Park, B. C. B., & Lester, D. Protest Suicide among Korean Students and Laborers: A Study of Suicide Notes. *Psychological Reports*, 105(3), 2009, 917–920. doi:10.2466/pr0.105.3.917-920

¹⁹ Jang, S. H. Continuing suicide among laborers. *Labor History*, 45, 2004, 271-297.

²⁰ Abraham, Margaret. "The Intersections of Protest Suicides, Oppression and Social Justice." *Sociologies in Dialogue* 1.1 (2015).

systemic oppression experienced. The militant fatigue that results from taking part in a social movement doomed to defeat and the cumulative factors that add to it (economic, social, and psychological) results in a sense of powerlessness that can lead to self-destruction through suicide. Repression and oppressive power could then go so far as to indirectly kill the people who protest, by inducing suicidal disorders in them or by provoking in them a suicidal impulse channeled to protest through the body²¹.

Conclusion

The events of October 2022 indicate a rise in collective anger and social unease that is generalized to the Tunisian population. All the governorates were affected by social movements and violence with repercussions that herald potential popular reactions of greater magnitude. The events that took place are reactionary to the social, economic and political context of the country. They are above all indicators of future movements, which will only be resolved with the resolution of these crises.

Political discourses characterized by conspiracy, denial of crises, and "laissez faire", unchangeable administrative practices, and the security approach that reinforces anger push Tunisians towards the adoption of tactics employed to manage them. Protests, irregular migration, violence, and suicides are all part of these tactics. In the coming months, the situation will be predicted, in light of contextual events including elections, governance policies, the current and predicted economic situation of inflation, shortages, and the new 2023 finance law that will have heavy consequences on the purchasing power of Tunisians.

²¹ Lester, D. Suicidal protests: Self-immolation, hunger strikes, or suicide bombing. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 2014, 37(04), 372. doi:10.1017/s0140525x13003439

Monitoring methodology for irregular migration:

The totality of the data contained in this report represents what the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to gather from various sources and by the available means. The digital data remains incomplete, not detailed and subject to updating and may not fully reflect reality, but in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian official side (number of passes - number Passengers - their distribution according to age groups and gender - defining where they come from - their social status - the number of missing persons...) These data may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and significant transformations.

- **Frustrating Passes:** Reliance is placed on the Ministry of Interior's communiqués and the statements of the spokesperson of the National Guard in the various media. Most of them do not contain detailed data (sex, age groups, the parties from which the immigrants come...)
- **Arrivals to European coasts:** Many structures that emit digital data about arrivals to Europe, such as UNHCR, IOM, European countries' ministries of the interior and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The figures provided remain approximate and require continuous updating according to figures from official and civil structures that may be issued in subsequent reports but provide a reading of the evolution and change in the dynamics of irregular migration.

Invisible numbers: It's the number of migrants arriving in Europe across different routes without passing through local authorities or international structures does not have any effect on the census, which is important and varies according to the tactics of migrant smuggling networks. It also includes departures from the Tunisian coasts, which succeed in evading strict security controls, or those that are prohibited from passing them without issuing or without being announced.