

REPORT

September 2022



Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux

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September 2022 report on social protests



Introduction

The month of September 2022 has resonated with a set of significant events, which are in continuity with the political processes set in motion. The period of political and socio-economic uncertainty that persists in the country has given rise to a set of expressions of Tunisian collective unease. Being dependent on the particularity of the current situation, the expressions in question are part of the modalities of the management of the crisis, that are at the same time political, social, and economic. The protests, interpersonal violence and suicides that have been reported during this month illustrate the discontent of the population with the current circumstances. These expressions come two months before the legislative elections and remind us of the endless confrontation between the social and the political.

The multiplicity of actors and the diverse profiles that took part in the protests testify of a rise in the generality of demands¹ that affect several levels of common life. The flows and episodes of the events followed an episodic and interactive "protest politics"², that are mediated by the government³. As in previous months, the sporadic and unpredictable character persists, despite the high number of protests and interpersonal violence. The decline in uncoordinated, "anarchic" protests in August 2022, which had been evolving since April 2020, is evidence of emerging dynamics in the country and of the dynamic nature of the political actors involved. Interpersonal violence followed the same pattern as in previous months, with an increase in the intensity of violent acts. As for suicides reported by social networks and media of all types, socio-economic insecurity has emerged as a reason for the reported suicidal behaviors.

¹ Moving from singularity to generality

² Mathieu, Lilian. « Politique contestataire », Olivier Fillieule éd., Dictionnaire des mouvements sociaux. Presses de Sciences Po, 2009, pp. 422-429.

³ Tilly, Charles, et Sidney Tarrow. Politique(s) du conflit. De la grève à la révolution, traduit de l'anglais (États-Unis) par Bouyssou Rachel. Presses de Sciences Po, 2015

This report by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights aims to describe and analyze the protests, acts of violence and suicides that took place in September 2022. The descriptive and analytical reading of these events will take into account the emerging political and socio-economic dynamics below.

The emerging dynamics

1. Political dynamics:

International politics are still affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war, the long-term repercussions of the covid pandemic, and the elections in the different countries of the northern and southern hemispheres⁴. These political events have resulted in a multitude of displaced people and disastrous economic consequences around the world⁵. While a return to post-covid normality was anticipated in 2022, the Ukrainian war has resulted in a negative shock whose magnitude and duration are unpredictable. Global monetary policies now follow an "emergency" operation, where some countries including Tunisia are the most affected.

In Tunisia, the process begun on July 25, 2021 can be uncertain and breathless. An administrative slowness is reported, as well as an ambiguity in the mode of governance adopted⁶. Conspiracy and treason discourses has persisted since 2019⁷ and continue to fuel the majority of political statements issued. Loyalties and foreign plots are continually evoked. In terms of practice, on September 15, 2022, President Kais Saïed introduced his new election law⁸. According to this law, the role of political parties is fading. Tunisians will now be able to elect their deputies to the Assembly of People's Representatives directly, on a majority vote basis, without going through the intermediary of electoral lists. The legislative elections scheduled for December 17, 2022, are therefore being prepared in a climate that favors the personification of power and a hybrid form of democracy.

⁴ For example, the victory of Giorgia Meloni in the Italian legislative elections on September 25, 2022

⁵ « Guerre en Ukraine: conséquences économiques et sociales et implications pour les politiques publiques », Perspectives économiques de l'OCDE, vol. 2, no. Supplément 2, 2022, pp. 3-16.

⁶ Seif Soudani. Tunisie. Diplomatie: la politique de la chaise vides, le courrier de l'Atlas, 4 octobre 2022, <https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/tunisie-diplomatie-la-politique-de-la-chaise-vide/>

⁷ Tebini, Maram. Lorsque plebs deviennent populus: intersubjectivité politique du populisme. Cahiers de Psychologie Politique, 38, 2021, https://doi.org/10.34745/numerev_1406

⁸ Frédéric Bobin. En Tunisie, le président Kaïs Saïed instaure une nouvelle loi électorale marginalisant les partis politiques, Le monde, 16 septembre 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/09/16/en-tunisie-le-president-kais-saied-instaure-une-nouvelle-loi-electorale-marginalisant-les-partis-politiques_6141947_3212.html

In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is demanding that the already over-indebted Tunisian state carry out structural reforms that would pave the way for the impoverishment of the Tunisian people, including the lifting of state compensation on basic products (food, fuel), the freezing of civil service payments and the privatization of so-called bankrupt public enterprises. The UGTT has continually opposed these measures, trying to block these reforms. However, September 15, 2022 was the date when an agreement was reached, obtaining in return an annual increase in public sector salaries of 3.5% over three years starting in 2023⁹. According to a statement by the Presidency of the Republic about the meeting with the UGTT and UTICA on September 12, 2022, which was the origin of this agreement, "many basic materials for the citizen are abnormally absent, although these materials are available, but they are monopolized to aggravate the social situation. The Tunisian people know very well those who pay money to achieve these goals, and their current and futures actions »¹⁰. On rhythms of denial, ambiguity and conspiracy, the set of expressions observed during this month is orchestrated. In parallel, social and economic dynamics are affected by the crisis.

2. Socio-economic dynamics:

During September 2022, the inflation was considerable. Indeed, consumer prices grew by 1.1%, after 0.4% in August. The 2.2% increase in food prices in September (poultry by 27.4%, eggs by 25%, edible oils by 21.8% and fruits by 18.2% year-on-year) was painfully felt by the most vulnerable segments of the population.

The specificity of the month of September lies, among other things, in the school year beginning. It is in this context of high demand that educational services and products have seen an increase of 4%. School supplies have increased by 4.4%, leaving parents and students facing an impasse that could have tragic turns, such as dropping out of school and mental disorders related to the lack and denial of one of the most basic rights¹¹. The malaise of the educational system was

⁹ Frida Dahmani. Tunisie: Kaïs Saïed, entre le marteau du FMI et l'enclume de l'UGTT, Jeune Afrique, 14 septembre 2022, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1376909/politique/tunisie-kaïs-saïed-entre-le-marteau-du-fmi-et-lenclume-de-lugtt/>

¹⁰ كما تم التطرق، أيضاً، إلى الأوضاع الاقتصادية والاجتماعية في تونس، وإلى الغياب غير الطبيعي للعديد من المواد الأساسية بالنسبة إلى المواطن بالرغم من أن هذه المواد متوفرة ولكن يتم احتكارها لتأجيج الوضع الاجتماعي، وهؤلاء الذين يدفعون الأموال لتحقيق مآربهم يعلم الشعب التونسي جيداً من هم وما هي ترتيباتهم الحالية واللاحقة


¹¹ INS. Indice des prix à la consommation, Septembre 2022, <http://www.ins.tn/publication/indice-des-prix-la-consommation-septembre-2022>

discussed in September, in terms of the shortcomings observed during the start of the school year and the reactions of parents and teachers.

In addition, this month was characterized by the lack of alimentation products. There was talk of the reinforcement of the interminable crisis in the dairy sector, shortages of sugar, coffee, gasoline, rice, butter, etc. The deterioration of the purchasing power of the Tunisians and the unavailability of products reinforces on their side the discontent and the collective frustration which grows. The ambiguity of government communications and the insistence on conspiracy plays a role in diverting public opinion from concrete and quantifiable problems, while creating "scapegoats"¹² that are difficult to capture. The protests come in this case as a stance characterized by refusal and opposition to the current functioning.

Social movements


The Tunisian forum for economic and social rights recorded 832 protests of different types. The number of protests has decreased, compared to September 2021 when 1006 social movements were recorded. This year, the north-east, having recorded 251 protests, was the region most affected by protests, followed by the center-west which recorded 163 protests, then the south-west with a number of 158 protests.




¹² Girard, René. Le bouc émissaire. Grasset, 2014.

The central-east recorded 125 protests and the south-east recorded 70. The region with the lowest number of protests, 65, was the north-west, which is paradoxically a region with significant regional disparities.

A majority of 90.6% of the protests were mixed and only 9.1% of the protests were male-only.




The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights classifies these protests into two categories that include "anarchic" and "non-anarchic" movements, in terms of coordination and lack of prior coordination. Of the movements reported in September 2022, 695 are anarchic (i.e., 83.5%) and 137 are non-anarchic (i.e., 16.5%). Compared to 2021, the number of anarchic protests increases in 2022 even though the total number is less.




Regarding the anarchic movements, the governorate of Gafsa is in first place with a number of 106 protests, followed by Tunis with 98 protests and Sidi Bouzid with 79. Manouba has experienced only three such protests, while El Kef and Seliana have not experienced any anarchic protests. In the regions usually recognized as a figure of social movements, the anarchic movements increase during this month of September, while this is not the case for other regions. This

relates to contextual reasons (such as the continued interruption of drinking water and problems with the CPG in Gafsa), systemic (spatial inequalities in some regions compared to others), and established habits of uncoordinated protests in some regions.

As for non-anarchic movements, Tunis experienced 20 protests, while Manouba and Kairouan recorded 14 protests respectively. Sidi Bouzid saw 7 non-anarchic protests and Gafsa has only known 7.




The protests that took place are also classified into planned and instantaneous protests. Planned protests amount to 77% (i.e., 641 protests,) while instantaneous protests form 23% of the total body of social movements in September (i.e., 191 protests).




Regarding planned movements, Tunis is at the top of the list with 108 protests reported. Gafsa is in second place with 104 planned movements, followed by Sidi


Bouazid where 77 protests took place. As for movements triggered instantly, Kasserine recorded 31 movements, Nabeul recorded 24, and Jendouba reported of 22 instantaneous protests.



The reasons for these protests are diverse. Among the protests reported, 33% were protests against government decisions, 27% were related to employment, 22% were related to labor rights, 10% held recruitment demands, 9% were aimed at improving socio-economic conditions, 8% were expressions of support for public figures, 7% were related to protests to the education system by different actors. Other reasons include demands related to infrastructure, the right to water, security and protection, transportation, environment, lack of basic products and price increases, etc. The reasons for these protests are then 53% social, 35% administrative, 4% economic, 4% political, and 4% related to the functioning of private institutions.




Typologie



The actors who participated in these protests were also multiple. School teachers took part in 42% of these actions. Residents of different regions participated in 10% and young people contributed by 9%. Parents were among 7% of protesters, employees formed 5% of protesters and unemployed graduates were 9%. Migrants formed 4% of the protests, cab drivers were represented by 3% and various activists formed 3%.


Actors



The profiles of the social actors of the protests, varying between parents, teachers, students, residents, farmers, workers, attest to a convergence of demands, in the face of the non-adaptation of the State's responses to the

demands of citizenship. These protests are not only an expression of anger, but also a demand for recognition and legitimacy of citizenship¹³.


The majority of the protests targeted the central authority (56%) and specifically the government (48%) (the Ministry of Education (35%), the Presidency of the Government (8%), the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Tourism, etc.). Other targets include regional authorities, town halls, SONEDE, judicial authorities, regional police stations, etc. The majority of the sectors targeted are the education sector (46%) and the public sector in general (36%). Other sectors included in the list of protest targets are the agricultural sector with 5%, the environmental sector, the legal sector, and the transport sector with 4%, etc.




The spaces where the protests took place were mostly administrative headquarters by 44% or 364 protests. In the case of 16% or 129 protests, roads were blocked. 8% namely 66 took place at the premises of the Company of

¹³ Hatzfeld, Hélène. « Au nom de quoi? Les revendications de légitimité, expressions de mutations sociales et politiques », Vie sociale, vol. 8, no. 4, 2014, pp. 25-36.

phosphates of Gafsa (CPG). 6% took place in educational institutions and 6% in the headquarters of ministries. Other protests took place in workplaces, public buildings, the seat of government, the media, the seats of municipalities, the presidential palace, hospitals, etc.



72.5% of the protests (in days) were sit-ins. Protest rallies follow with 12.1% of the total movements, followed by the prohibition of access to courses, road blockades, expressions of indignation, blocking of activities, media appeals, distress calls, hunger strikes, peaceful marches, congestion days, demonstration, etc.



Sit-ins were the highest in number and in days. 30 sit-ins were observed, which is equivalent to 603 sit-ins in days in the whole country.

During this month, the movements adopted their usual cyclical march, multiplying, with the social and political at the heart of the demands made by various actors. The demonstrators appealed to the political authorities (the presidency of the republic, the government, local authorities, administrations) in the hope of a public intervention that would be a concrete solution. The demands during this month were clear and proposals for possible solutions were documented. The demands included social protection and the demand to respect the "social contract" between governor and governed. The unfulfilled promises of the state apparatus, as in the case of the teachers' crisis, now called "teaching agents", and the intervention of local and governmental authorities that reinforce - instead of stirring up - the conflicts. In addition, the strategies of confusion employed by the government to make certain movements invisible are attempting to make them disappear.

September heralds the beginning of a new school and university year and the change of season after the summer. Problems have accompanied the start of the school year, such as the transport crisis in some regions, the lack of educational personnel, and conflicts with a fringe group of teachers.



The "substitute" teachers who are appointed by the ministry to fill vacancies in the ranks of secondary school teachers have demonstrated and gone on strike in many Tunisian governorates. These substitute teachers are teachers working in public institutions with little or no salary. Their interminable wait to receive a salary or to have a tenure motivated their protests. However, following pressure from the IMF, "The Ministry of Education has decided, unilaterally, to change the

status of substitute teachers in charge of teaching, and this in order not to respect its commitments”¹⁴. This new name has put into question the socio-professional future of more than 25 thousand teachers who took part in the protests. Their academic qualifications, the experience they have acquired while practicing and the undeniable need for their presence is a societal issue. The cancellation of the law No. 2020-38 of August 13, 2020, already criticized by Kais Saïed has created tension for people recruited without guarantees¹⁵. This is reminiscent of the discomfort and protests of teachers holding an applied license in education and teaching, marketed - from its inception - because of its alleged high employability. The unfulfilled promises of the state and the interminable wait to acquire deserved rights has pushed teachers and unions to mobilize.

In addition, barriers to access to school have been imposed on students by lack of transportation, poor infrastructure, and lack of personnel. Indeed, the situation of educational institutions is often deplorable and inadequate. The difficulties of access to schools and the insalubrity of these establishments in several regions of the country has prompted parents to protest directly and has caused a considerable number of students to drop out of school¹⁶. The reasons for the protests include difficulties in obtaining drinking water, the deterioration of walls and roofs, overcrowded classrooms, the division of classes into groups which makes it difficult for parents and children to organize their daily lives, the insalubrity of classrooms which causes health problems for the children, etc.

The sit-ins and the closure of roads in several regions including Hassi Farid in Kasserine, Tebourba in Manouba, Fouchana 2 Ben Arous, Redeyef in Gafsa, Souk al Ahad in Kébili, etc. Similarly, a number of parents occupied on September 27, 2022 an elementary school in Kairouan to denounce the lack of educational staff and the non-assignment of a director, in a chaotic context in which students are caught inside an educational institution.

On the other hand, in Sidi Bouzid, parents closed the roads between Menzel BouZayen and El Khorchof to demand the paving of roads linking two villages passing through a school. On September 29, 2022, the inhabitants of the

¹⁴ 17 mille enseignants suppléants en grève depuis le 26 septembre, <https://www.webdo.tn/2022/09/29/17-mille-enseignants-suppléants-en-greve-depuis-le-26-septembre/>

¹⁵ L'Économiste maghrébin. Kais Saïed: " la loi n° 2020-38 n'est pas faite pour être appliquée, 19 novembre 2021, <https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2021/11/19/kais-saied-loi-n-2020-38-faite-etre-appliquee/>

¹⁶ In 2021 in Sbeitla, dropping out of school was a form of political protest where parents refused to take their children to school because of the poor conditions of the schools that accompany the socio-academic insecurity.

"Karma" of Meknassi in Sidi Bouzid also blocked the roads linking the governorate of Gafsa and Sfax to demand buses to transport their children from the high school to the village, following the eviction of the latter from the boarding school of the secondary school of Meknassi because of its degradation and its non-adaptability to housing. The techniques of protests by occupying the educational space indicate in addition to the desire to appropriate it, in order to denounce the spatial segregation and the chaotic situation¹⁷, while the blocking of traffic routes indicates the need to be heard. While their children are prevented from moving to study, parents block the movement of those they consider more privileged. Power relations are then used to make themselves heard, since the complaints about the inaccessibility of roads would be more important in the eyes of the state than the right to education of hundreds of children.



Outside the educational spheres, the issue of infrastructure and roads in poor condition has motivated other protests in different places, such as Haouaria, Seliana, Beja, and Bouarada. The isolation of some regions because of infrastructure problems that block their daily travel, agricultural work and urgent return trips. The feeling of being prevented from having access to basic rights

¹⁷ Dutercq, Yves, et Claudette Lafaye. « Se mobiliser pour soi et pour les autres. La politique d'éducation interrogée par l'action de proximité », *Éducation et sociétés*, vol. 19, no. 1, 2007, pp. 53-66.

because of the shortcomings of the state has therefore prompted the inhabitants to protest by completely blocking the movement.



Other failures in available public services motivated the September protests. The problems of sanitation at the Saheb Jbel in Haouaria has caused anger among residents, because of the odors and fluids in the neighborhoods and the risk of disease that this causes. The breakdowns of the sanitation pump and the inability of the municipality to implement the developmental programs, one of which is due since 2012. The protests are then not a simple expression of discontent¹⁸. It is in many cases, including this one, an attempt to fight against a system that indirectly kills groups of individuals, through health problems caused by the power as the criteria of hygiene not met, the nonchalance of the authority to the complaints of the population, the psychological disorders induced by a socially miserable life, etc.¹⁹

Like substitute teachers, workers agents of the company of the Environment, planting and gardening have organized protests to demand the fulfillment of promises of hiring in Tataouine and Kebili. Demanding the implementation of the convention of November 5, 2022 which brought together the stakeholders, the protesters demanded a salary and professional recognition, emphasizing their daily needs that make waiting impossible (bills, rent, school and university returns of their children, and urgent health needs). The failure to respect the

¹⁸ Pierru, Emmanuel. « Les pauvres, des acteurs de la lutte contre la pauvreté? », Regards croisés sur l'économie, vol. 4, no. 2, 2008, pp. 215-222.

¹⁹ Fassin, Didier. De l'inégalité des vies. Fayard, 2020

agreements and promises that the workers have believed can break social bonds²⁰. Since there is no ethics without promises, politicians condemn society and democratic hope. The growing skepticism is even more dangerous, because it calls into question the possibilities of building political alternatives. The result is a crisis of confidence in the population directly and indirectly affected, based on the feeling of learned helplessness. “Anarchic” movements multiply, while the possibilities of concrete and lasting political organization shrink²¹. The executive branch employs strategies of blame avoidance, referring to the economic crisis and other conspiratorial discourses, which are commonplace. Following Machiavelli's formula, by choosing not to appear responsible for decisions and minimizing their political credit, the presidency and the government make reforms even more difficult and reinforce political inertia, which in turn reinforces the economic crisis²².

Other specific groups also demonstrated in response to governance issues: farmers in Seliana protested the unavailability of seeds, organic fertilizers, and inefficient mineral fertilizers. Demonstrators expressed concern that these difficulties could jeopardize the outcome of the agricultural season. The unemployed graduates have also resumed their demonstrations, in the regions and in front of the palace of Carthage, demanding a recruitment that a good part of them has long awaited. Cab owners have also demonstrated with sectoral claims against the increase in fuel prices and for the facilitation of the granting of licenses.



²⁰ Alain Boyer, *Chose promise. Étude sur la promesse, à partir de Hobbes et de quelques autres*, Paris, PUF, 2014.

²¹ R. Kent Weaver, « The Politics of Blame Avoidance », *Journal of Public Policy*, 6 (4), 1986, p. 371-398.

²² Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity, 2004; Colin Hay, *Why We Hate Politics*, Cambridge, Polity, 2007.

In addition, the proclaimed "Mafrouzin ejtimaeyan" or "socially left behind" demonstrated in Douar Hicher against inflation and shortages. Three-night movements (due to the late end of the organizational meeting) were organized by this group. Unlike the claims that were clear, the reactions were not. On September 26, 2022, however, the presence of the Minister of Social Affairs was able to instantly calm these protests. Other protests took place in reaction to the economic situation and shortages. The crisis of the bakeries between Sfax and Kebili and the crisis of the litter industry have also been documented. As for the political parties, the Free Destourian Party (PDL) organized demonstrations to denounce the deterioration of the purchasing power of Tunisians and the shortage of basic foods.

Demands related to ecology were reported, like those related to the definitive opening of the waste disposal site in Sfax. The protests of refusal of the inhabitants were provoked by a declaration in favor of the reopening of the waste disposal center on behalf of the mayor of Sfax that he issued by reviving tensions between the inhabitants and by arguing by paralogisms (by evoking the case of the doctors who would work in regions that they do not choose, contrary to the inhabitants of Agareb who refuse that a waste disposal center harmful to their health is installed in their city). The inhabitants then demonstrated by blocking the roads and burning tires to denounce the project of what they call the "waste dump of death" and by signing a petition refusing the project of the waste dump. The protests of the inhabitants were related to the repercussions of the opening of the dump on their health, but also to the absence of public policies of development. The slogan "we want development, not a garbage cans" testifies to the disappointment with what the state is offering: a garbage can instead of development opportunities.

In Kairouan, the inhabitants of the village Sidi Ibrahim Zahhar in Kairouan have protested during this month the cut of water having affected more than 133 families for 10 days. The inability to have soup water has similarly affected the inhabitants of Jendouba and Tataouine who protested for this right.

Police repression motivated demonstrations in support of its victims. On September 4, the suspicious death of a young detained man in Tataouine led to a demonstration to denounce the conditions of arrest and the inhumanity of justice and its agents. On September 7, the death of a "smuggler" in Tunis

prompted a demonstration to demand justice. The suicide of street vendors in Manouba and Mornag provoked protests related to a sense of social injustice and authoritarian abuse²³. These diverse reasons and forms of protest attest to the general climate in the country characterized by negativity in political action. The fallout from these protests will depend on the political treatment and the achievable cohesion or not between the interests of the governors and the governed.

²³ Deffontaines, Nicolas. « Les suicides des agriculteurs: le déni de la dimension sociale », *Raison présente*, vol. 218, no. 2, 2021, pp. 35-43.

Irregular Migration in september 2022




Comparison In the same period during the years 2019–2020–2021 – 2022


The dynamics of irregular migration continued to intensify despite the climatic changes that the month of September has experienced. 2,958 Tunisian immigrants have managed to reach the Italian coasts, compared to 1,796 during the same period in 2021, representing an increase of 39.28%, while 270 crossings were intercepted and 3883 migrants were arrested before reaching the Italian coast. The majority of these interceptions took place by sea, with a percentage of 74.81%. 52.43% of the migrants arrested were of foreign nationalities and the rest were Tunisians. The map of interceptions has not changed; as the majority of these interception operations %27.40 took place in Sfax and 15.55% in Monastir.

The death rate has increased on the Tunisian coast, since the month of September witnessed the death and disappearance of 69 migrants in disasters that occurred in Zarzis, Monastir and Bizerte, bringing the number of victims and missing people to 544 since the beginning of the year 2022.


Number of passersby suspended



Number of frustrating passes




The number of arrivals to Italy




2022			2021			2020			2019			the month
Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	
1155	124	382	463	17	84	316	22	68	177	8	31	January
1036	95	308	1273	77	660	571	25	26	46	4	21	February
886	58	224	882	72	334	137	4	60	323	20	85	March
1515	87	345	409	42	307	99	6	37	166	11	116	Avril
2658	172	1024	2487	95	601	1243	60	494	249	19	94	water
2086	175	1714	2120	143	977	1611	119	825	254	23	249	june
3226	226	3530	2993	211	4044	2918	245	4145	608	44	262	July
5713	411	4284	5582	317	4035	1621	191	2306	515	28	489	August
3882	270	2958	3199	308	1796	2035	170	1951	500	39	864	september
2863	387											data
25020	2005	14700	19408	1282	12838	10551	842	9912	3838	196	2211	The total

* Data provided in the National Guard spokesperson's statements and not monitored by the Forum in daily communications

Distribution of arrivals to Italy by months during 2022




Distribution of frustrating passes by authorities during septmeber2022




*The presence of this sign does not mean that these authorities do not witness crossings, but the official data published in the notifications did not include frustrating crossings in these bodies.


Distribution of passers-by by nationalities During september 2022



Distribution of frustrating passes during 2022



The tragedies of irregular migration on the Tunisian coasts during 2022



The number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast during 2022	The number of dead and missing in the Central Mediterranean Basin during 2022
544	1017


September Report on Violence




Occurring in contexts of symbolic violence, the violence exercised continued its ascent during the month of September 2022. Compared to previous months, violence is increasing in scope and scale. September was particularly notable for the greater intensity of reported acts. These acts of violence varied between murders, feminicides, conjugal aggressions, matricides, stabbings, defenestration, murder of a customs officer during the exercise of his work, etc. The number of reported violence has tripled during this month, reaching 63 cases of violence that have gained momentum on the media and social networks.

The geographical distribution of violence is not balanced between the different regions. Tunis recorded 46.8% of reported cases of violence. Then Kairouan recorded 11.3%, followed by Bizerte which recorded 6.5% cases, and Mahdia, Kasserine and Sousse which recorded the same rate of reported violence, namely 4.8%. This spatial distribution of violence depends on several demographic and social factors, including the number of inhabitants, socio-economic marginalization, social representation, and inequalities that may exist, etc.

The gendered distribution of violence has also varied. Men continue to dominate among the actors of




violence. They represent 81% of all reported acts. The exclusive representation of the female gender is less, as the violent acts in which women participated as actors amount to 13.8%. The violent acts that involved actors of different genders as aggressors are in the minority and amount to 5.2%.




As for the people assaulted, men remain in the majority with 56.9%. The number of assaulted women increases with 29.3% of all assaulted persons. The victims of mixed gender are represented with a percentage of 10.3% and the 3.4% of the assaulted persons died.

The Tunisian Social Observatory reports that violence between individuals is in the majority with a percentage of 69.4%, while collective violence is at 30.6%.




The reported violence occurred across different sectors. The majority of the violence, 83.9%, was criminal, while institutional violence amounted to 3.2%.

Economic violence was at 6.5% and violence aimed at protest was represented at 6.5%.



The spaces where the violence occurred were diverse. The street is the most common place of violence, where 46.8% of violent acts were observed. The second most common place of violence was in the home, with 19.4% of violent acts. Schools (primary, secondary and high schools) are home to 17.7% of violent acts. Other spaces where violence is practiced are public transport, prisons and detention centers, virtual spaces, administrations, economic institutions, and health spaces.



The trivialization of violence contributes to the increase of its manifestations and to the diversification of the spaces where it is exercised. Indignation in the face of violence can be observed but in an increasingly reduced manner. The process of habituation to its manifestations no longer generates a strong and assumed reaction from the State and its control apparatus. The absence and the lack of this indignation which is at the base of the ethics in society strengthens the violent expressions, in different profiles of the population²⁴.

The horror that affects children is equally alarming. A 14-year-old boy stabbed his classmate over a dispute and caused his death. This murder is symptomatic of family, school, and psychological²⁵ problems and of the climate of insecurity and lack of control in schools²⁶.

The other forms of violence that occurred during this month are also significant, in the context of an ambient violence in society. The diversity of the places where violence is exercised testifies to its repetitiveness in society, in the face of the negativity of the State's reactions to the question of the security of its citizens. The increasing importance of violent acts in society describes the dynamics of frustration experienced and not reflected upon by citizens, as well as social relations that are undermined. The difficulty of establishing links that are not based on violence or confrontation is increasingly observed.

²⁴ De Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie. « Le recours à la violence », La mort donnée. Essai de psychanalyse sur le meurtre et la guerre, sous la direction de murre Mijolla-Mellor Sophie. Presses Universitaires de France, 2011, pp. 257-268.


²⁵ Cohen, David. « Vers un modèle développemental d'épigenèse probabiliste du trouble des conduites et des troubles externalisés de l'enfant et de l'adolescent », Neuropsychiatrie de l'enfance et de l'adolescence, n° 56, 2003.

²⁶ Sirota, André. « De la violence vécue à la violence agie à l'école », Revue de psychothérapie psychanalytique de groupe, vol. 55, no. 2, 2010, pp. 129-145.

suicide and attempted suicide



Suicidal behavior evolved in September, with 15 suicides and attempted suicides recorded through observation of formal and informal media. This number is higher in comparison with previous months and indicates the expression of self-inflicted violence. The cities of Kairouan, Tunis and Ben Arous recorded the highest number of suicidal behaviors. La Manouba, Sfax, Mahdia, and Kasserine also saw suicidal behaviors.




The suicide by hanging of a worker in his workplace in Kasserine, the suicide by defenestration from the fourth floor of a building, the precipitation under the rails of a train of a man in Mahdia, the suicide by hanging of a young person in Oued Ellil in a farm, the suicide by defenestration of a young woman following a couple conflict, suicide by immolation of adults in a public and visible place, the attempted suicide of a young Tunisian in an Italian prison, the self-mutilation of Tunisians in several Italian prisons, suicide by hanging in a domestic space, the suicide of two street vendors following interactions with police.

The suicidal act oscillated between the private and public space. Eight suicides and suicide attempts took place in the private domestic space, while the remaining number took place in private institutions, on the street, and in detention centers or Italian prisons.

The reasons transcended several aspects of life together: personal, relational, family, social. They are indeed variable according to the profiles. They were family conflicts, marital problems, untreated psychological disorders, socio-economic precariousness that had become unbearable, intimidation, and abuse.


Among the suicidal behaviors reported, 53.3% were by hanging, 20% attempted or were able to commit suicide by immolation, 20% were through precipitation or defenestration, and 6.7% were through ingestion of drugs. These forms - with the exception of the ingestion of drugs - are sometimes practiced publicly and are distinguished by the horror that can accompany them.



Gender differences are observable. Men commit more suicides and suicide attempts with a percentage of 93.3% of all reported cases. Women commit suicide at 6.7%. This difference is related to psychological, social and cultural factors, but also to the invisibilization of female suicides in public discourses, subject to observations.



Young people between the ages of 16 and 25 are over-represented for all genders. Adults between the ages of 36 and 45 are the second most likely to commit suicide, followed by young adults between the ages of 26 and 35.



Self-inflicted violence in its suicidal form with explicit or implicit evidence that the person wanted to die is a self-aggrandizing behavior that reflects a multifactorial malaise. The act consists in the revelation of the insufficiency of the internal or external means of defense and vulnerability which breaks the psychic, relational, and environmental balance. The incapacity to fight against this malaise by other reflected or not intermediaries as for example interpersonal violence, political protest, artistic creation, and psychotherapy results in this suicidal act.

Suicides are a failure of public policies that disinvest the psychotherapeutic field and marginalize the population's access to a type of care that is increasingly necessary in a context of economic and political crisis. As the budget dedicated to mental health is reduced, therapeutic practices remain lacking and inaccessible. Barriers to access are also observable at many levels, preventing socio-economically marginalized groups from benefiting from it²⁷. The "left behind" are therefore unable to access treatment because of misinformation, flaws in psychological care policies, and symbolic violence that stigmatizes and culturalizes mental disorders by directly or indirectly preventing marginalized individuals from accessing it.

The hanging of a street vendor in Mornag following altercations with municipal officials was later blamed on the family conflicts he was experiencing²⁸. However, it is clear that the suffering of an individual can indeed be multiple. Family and societal conflicts can coexist and neither is to be condoned. Seeing in the history of Tunisia and the world the high number of political suicides that have occurred as a result of conflicts with authority and its agents indicates how psychically and socially destructive these conflicts can be²⁹. Self-sacrifice in the face of a sense of political exclusion is a dissident bodily critique of social distinction that responds to the impossibility of acting otherwise.

The European policies also by the repressive acts used against Tunisian migrants in detention centers create suicidal subjects. The high number of Tunisians in Italian prisons amounts to 1745 prisoners including 12 Tunisian women. Being in these places of detention reinforces in these Tunisian prisoners the feeling of facing an unexpected impasse before departure and to face an oppressive institution, which pushes them to suicide, suicide attempts and acts of scarification.

Suicidal behaviors are then revealed as a way to destructively deal with an oppressing social life and as a consequence of the symbolic violence that is

²⁷ Tebini, Maram. Précarisation et précarité des soins psychologiques en Tunisie: une priorité délaissée, 30 novembre 2021, Houloul, <https://houloul.org/fr/2021/11/30/precarisation-et-precarite-des-soins-psychologiques-en-tunisie-une-priorite-delaissée/>

²⁸ Le ministère de l'intérieur. Déclaration explicative, 24 septembre 2022, <http://www.interieur.gov.tn/actualite/28849/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%8A?fbclid=IwAR1e0W4w0FLejNLJXYkC4dEqITVXWH9nVklidAWY0idzdYexIvEfADMRBCQ>

²⁹ Cormann, Grégory. « La radicalité politique au bout du travail: du suicide des ouvriers aux suicides en série des employés », Quaderni, vol. 84, no. 2, 2014, pp. 73-83.

exerted on Tunisians, as much as protests and forms of interpersonal violence. Reducing suicidal behaviors would require a questioning of the factors of these passages to the act: poverty, mental disorders in non-observance, humiliation experienced, violence of the agents of order, marital conflicts, and the absence of adequate social assistance to navigate them, etc. Political actions could contribute to fight firmly against suicides and the underlying evolution of fatal depressions in the society.

Conclusion

During this month, protests continued to evolve, in comparison to previous months. Violence and suicides have also increased. These numbers attest to a growing social malaise in a context that heralds a political and socio-economic crisis. The repercussions of which are already observable. The difficulties in organizing and the scattering of protests contribute to the fact that social movements remain fragmented. However, given the particularity of the current political and socio-economic context, these movements may continue to evolve over the next few months in an increasing manner.

The reasons behind protests, violence and suicides are similar and all three types of actions distinguish a way for individuals to fight the condition in which they find themselves. The types of these protests and the places invested testify to a desire to penetrate the public and the political, which remains an exclusive space for people in marginality.

Monitoring methodology for irregular migration:

The totality of the data contained in this report represents what the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to gather from various sources and by the available means. The digital data remains incomplete, not detailed and subject to updating and may not fully reflect reality, but in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian official side (number of passes - number Passengers - their distribution according to age groups and gender - defining where they come from - their social status - the number of missing persons...) These data may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and significant transformations.

- **Frustrating Passes:** Reliance is placed on the Ministry of Interior's communiqués and the statements of the spokesperson of the National Guard in the various media. Most of them do not contain detailed data (sex, age groups, the parties from which the immigrants come...)
- **Arrivals to European coasts:** Many structures that emit digital data about arrivals to Europe, such as UNHCR, IOM, European countries' ministries of the interior and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The figures provided remain approximate and require continuous updating according to figures from official and civil structures that may be issued in subsequent reports but provide a reading of the evolution and change in the dynamics of irregular migration.

Invisible numbers: It's the number of migrants arriving in Europe across different routes without passing through local authorities or international structures does not have any effect on the census, which is important and varies according to the tactics of migrant smuggling networks. It also includes departures from the Tunisian coasts, which succeed in evading strict security controls, or those that are prohibited from passing them without issuing or without being announced.