

REPORT November 2022



591

Collective protests

744
Migrants

11

Cases of suicide
and attempted suicide

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November 2022 report on social protests



Introduction

According to local and international media, the country will still be going through a political and economic crisis in November 2022. The unclear situation has alarmed observers who have sought to hypothesize about the origin of this crisis and to predict its consequences in the public and private space. Social movements, violence and suicides are - as always - events that sound the alarm about a situation that is getting increasingly worse, both in terms of the public policies implemented (or overlooked) and in terms of their effect on the daily lives of the population.

The effect of fatigue and adaptation to an unmanageable but persistent situation can be seen in the decrease in the number of protests during this month, compared to previous months. The upcoming legislative elections, in December, are accompanied by a perception of expectation and indecision. The movements of professionals that had been going on for some months may have slowed down and then disappeared towards the end of the month, following a political decision. This invokes the reflexive nature and clarity of protests that are often perceived as being driven by conspiracy or unhealthy desires to stir up trouble. These are perceptions formulated and verbalized by decision-makers, which remain out of step with popular discourse, yearning for change and for economic and social rights. They contribute to the lack of communication between the state and the population, which leads to these protest movements. The violence also goes hand in hand with the political and economic malaise. It is mostly linked to the insecurity and impunity that is spreading in the country. As for suicides, the return of suicide by immolation is an indicator of the suffering that has historically been so prevalent in Tunisia¹. These events are of great significance

¹ Lester, David. "Suicidal protests: self-immolation, hunger strikes, or suicide bombing." Behavioral and brain sciences 37.4 (2014): 372.

in this context that keeps evolving according to the same curve that feeds the indicators of protest, violence and suffering.

This report is presented by the Tunisian social observatory created by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) which in the course of its work aims to provide committed political and social actors with a tool for monitoring and analyzing social movements, violence and suicides.

Contextual dynamics

1. Political dynamics:

On the political level, conflicts and repressions marked this month in different parts of the world. Benjamin Netanyahu was forced to form a far-right government with a large maneuvering hand given a majority of 64 deputies, the American mid-term elections allowed Joe Biden to keep a Democratic majority in the Senate despite the fact that the Republicans dominate the Chamber of Deputies, Michel Aoun's presidential term ended in Lebanon at the beginning of November 2022, without the appointment of a successor, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia continued with the intervention of European countries, the conflict between Algeria and Morocco has been reinforced, Iran has strongly repressed the opponents of the regime, Qatar has attracted worldwide attention between support and boycott following the holding of the World Cup, Iraqi Kurdistan was bombed by Iran, Turkey bombed Syrian Kurdistan, China continued to be in the middle of a real estate crisis, the war continued in Ukraine, and the European Union continued to be affected by the energy crisis².

In Tunisia, during the month of November 2022, the state of exception put in place by President Kais Saïed continues to affect the political climate. Political parties are sidelined and the discourse that circulates varies between supporters and antagonists. At the same time, the president is trying to restore his image on the international scene,³ facing concerns about the advent of the process initiated through the establishment of the state of exception. In this sense, the

² Diploweb the geopolitical review. Summary of the international news of November 2022, December 1, 2022, <https://www.diploweb.com/Synthese-de-l-actualite-internationale-de-novembre-2022.html>

³ Le monde Afrique. Tunisia: Kaïs Saïed revives his image on the international scene, despite the hardening of the regime, 25 November 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/11/25/tunisie-kais-saied-redore-son-blason-sur-la-scene-internationale-malgre-le-durcissement-du-regime_6151668_3212.html

summit of the Francophony organized on November 19 and 20, 2022 in Djerba has been announced by the media and the "official" authorities as a spectacular event worthy of long preparations. The National Salvation Front opposed the holding of this event in Tunisia, while the institutions lack legitimacy according to them⁴.

The electoral campaigns began on November 25 and the preparations for the legislative elections scheduled for December 17, 2022 were accompanied by a state of doubt and skepticism on the part of the population. Despite the symbolism of these elections that will seal the categorical break with the constitutional process and the state of democratic transition, a silence and a lack of enthusiasm⁵ has meant that these preparations and campaigns are not taking place like those that preceded them, except for jokes and support for certain candidates at a local level. The programs of these candidates were limited to either local projects at the level of municipalities or town halls or generalities that were not well thought out (such as the liberation of Palestine, the defense of human rights, etc.).

The gap between presidential and popular discourse has also been observed and communication has been limited to decrees or posts on the Facebook page "Presidency Tunisia". These communications have continued to be tinged with the usual rhetoric that does not provide clear answers but continues to lash out and accuse those who publicly and privately oppose the decisions taken.

2. Socio-economic dynamics :

Like other countries affected by the crisis, the situation in Tunisia continues to worsen at an economic level. Shortages in essential products and inflation that increases from month to month affect the lives of Tunisians who suffer the consequences of these crises, without benefiting from social protection or aid directed to mitigate the effects of this crisis. Indeed, consumer prices have increased by 0.6% compared to October, due to the increase in food prices which


⁴ France 24. The Francophony gathered for its fiftieth anniversary in Tunisia in a context of multiple crises, November 19, 2022, <https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20221119-la-francophonie-rassemble-C3%A9-pour-son-cinquante-enaire-en-tunisie-sur-fond-de-cris-multiples>

⁵ Jeune Afrique. Tunisia - Legislative: "Nobody has the mind to elections", November 30, 2022, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1397003/politique/tunisie-legislatives-personne-na-la-tete-a-des-elections/>

was 1.3%, prices of furniture and household items and home maintenance which was 0.8% and that of transport services which was 0.6%.

Regarding food prices, the increase of 1.3% was due to the increase in prices of eggs by 7.5%, that of vegetables by 6.1%, dairy derivatives and cheese by 3.4%, edible oils by 3%. The only decrease recorded was in the price of poultry, which fell by 10.6%. As for the prices of furniture and household goods and routine maintenance of the home, the increase was mainly due to the rise in prices of household goods of 1.2%. Similarly, prices for vehicle expenses increased by 0.9%, which led to an increase in prices for transportation services.

The inflation rate rose to 9.8% in November 2022, after 9.2% in the previous month. In one year, food prices rose 15.1% (eggs rose 43.4%, fresh vegetables rose 32.4%, sheep meat rose 24.3%, edible oils rose 20.4%, and beef rose 17.4%). Manufactured goods increased by 9.8% in one year, due to the increase in prices of building materials by 10%, clothing products by 9.5% and household cleaning products by 9.9%. Prices for restaurants, cafes and hotels also rose by 9.8%.⁶



Shortages have also increased during this month. On the one hand, the Council of the Order of Pharmacists reported on November 4, 2022 several shortages, because of the strike of distributors of wholesale drugs and threats of multinationals to leave Tunisia following the delay of their payment⁷. On the other hand, shortages of milk have been increasingly observable, since the strategic stock of milk has decreased significantly due to the erosion of dairy herds, following the smuggling and random slaughter, according to the president of the National Union of Farmers of Tunisia⁸. Other shortages in food products

⁶ National Institute of Statistics. Consumer Price Index, November 2022, <http://www.ins.tn/publication/indice-des-prix-la-consommation-novembre-2022>

⁷ Réalités.com. Total drug shortage by November 15, November 4, 2022, <https://www.realités.com.tn/fr/article/84187/penurie-totale-de-medicaments-des-le-15-novembre>

⁸ Business news. Milk shortage - Dhaoui: the number of dairy cows has decreased, November 2, 2022, <https://www.businessnews.com.tn/penurie-de-lait-dhaoui--le-nombre-de-vaes-laitieres-a-diminue,534,124111,3>


have been reported, heralding a pattern of precariousness that threatens the population. By the way, in their "Report on food and beverages, and 5-year forecasts to 2026" Fitch solutions predicts that in the current conditions of reformist failures of food subsidies, it will be in the next few years of declining purchasing power of consumers, a risk of malnutrition for vulnerable populations, and a need for recourse to humanitarian aid.⁹

Although systemic, the public has reacted to these political and socio-economic conditions. By organizing or not organizing protests, exercising violence, or committing suicide, the population has expressed indicators of violence and marginalization that will be described below.

Social Movements

1. Geospatial distribution

591 social movements were carried out during the month of November 2022, compared to 889 in October 2022 and 873 in November 2021. This considerable drop in the number of movements recorded could be explained by the exceptional political context that the country is going through, the legislative elections that slow down the organization of protests, and the deterioration of the socio-economic state of the citizens. As in previous months, the same regions, i.e., the northeast, center-west, and center-




⁹ Fitch solutions. Tunisia Food & Drink Report, 2022.

east, recorded the highest number of protests. Unlike the month of October when the northwest recorded a shift in the number of protests remaining in last place, this region resumed the usual reduced numbers.


The governorates that recorded the highest numbers are Tunis with 122 protests, Sidi Bouzid with 55 protests, Sousse with 51 movements, Medenine with 46 protests, and Gafsa with 36. With the exception of Sousse, these governorates are generally the places where most social movements are organized.

Only 10 movements were present in Jendouba which has experienced during the previous month 54 protests.




2. Gendered distribution

About 91.7% of the participants in the social movements that took place during the month of November were mixed, i.e. men and women participated, 7.3% included only men and 1% were exclusively female.




3. « Anarchic" vs. "non-anarchic" movements

Regarding the "anarchic" or "non-anarchic" character of social movements, a percentage of 78.8% was classified as "anarchic", i.e. uncoordinated, while 21.2% were said to be "non-anarchic". This is a decrease in the number of "anarchic" protests compared to October and a sign of the return of trade unions or organizations in the public space.




Regarding the governorates where these movements have gained meaning, the governorates of Tunis, Sousse, Sidi Bouzid and Medenine have recorded the highest number of "anarchic" movements, while Tunis, Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid and Sfax have recorded that of "non-anarchic" movements.




4. Planned vs. instantaneous movements

Among the November movements 81.2% were planned in advance which corresponds to a number of 111 protests, while 18.8% or 489 protests were triggered instantly.



The instantaneous movements were located mainly in the governorates of Medenine with 32 protests, Kairouan with 19 protests, and Tunis with 17. As for the planned movements, they took place in Tunis with 105 protests, Sidi Bouzid where 52 protests took place, and Sousse which recorded 48 protests.




5. The actors

As in the previous two months, teachers formed the majority of the actors of the protests with a percentage of 41%. Students formed 12% of the total while residents formed 10%, unemployed graduates formed 9%, and parents recorded 4%. Drivers took part in the protests with 4% and activists were represented with 4%.

6. The motives of the protests

The motives of the protests are mostly administrative and social. In fact, 48% of the social movements were directed against administrations, 47% were of a social nature, 3% had exclusively economic motives, 2% were related to infrastructure, 1% were related to private institutions, and 1% were related to partisan politics.




Among the reasons for the november protests, 42% were related to the education system, especially the status of teachers, 21% indicated public support for individuals, and 16% were related to the right to work, i.e., improvement of working conditions, non-payment of salaries, demands for regularization, and protests against the non-implementation of past agreements. Other protests took place with the aim of protesting against governmental decisions, as well as demands related to the right of access to water, resources and infrastructure.

7. Targets of the protests

70% of the protests targeted the central authority, i.e. the presidency of the republic with 10% and the government with 60%. The government bodies that were targeted were the presidency of the government with 6%, the ministry of education with 41%, as well as the ministry of labor, the ministry of agriculture, and the ministry of interior. On the other hand, 12% of the protests targeted security authorities, 3% targeted private organizations, and 4% specifically targeted the Gafsa Phosphate Company (CPG).

8. Targeted sectors


The sectors affected by the protests are the education sector by 47%, the public sector by 18%, and the security sector by 12%. Other protests were related to the private sector by 8%, transport by 5%, the environmental sector by 4%, the health sector by 4%, the legal sector 4%, the agricultural sector by 3%, and access to water by 1%.



9. Forms of protest


As in previous months, the majority of protests are sit-ins, that is, more than 400 sit-ins in days and more than 50 sit-ins in total number.

Sit-in days make up 72.6% of total protests, followed by 12.4% of protest rallies. In addition, protests used media appeals, distress calls, social networks, closing workplaces, blocking activities and roads, strikes, congestion, and blocking access to classes to achieve their protest objectives.



10. The spaces of protest

54% of the protests took place in educational institutions, 14% took place on the roads, 9% in front of social seats, 6% in public spaces including the Kasbah with 5%, and 7% took place in targeted workspaces. Government headquarters, media, and social networks were also the preferred spaces for protests.



11. The end of the teachers' movement?

The social movement of teachers, parents and students that began in September 2022 continued through the first part of November. Teachers, parents and students continued to take part in the protests, outraged by the authorities' laissez-faire attitude and the police repression that affected them. The involvement of the UGTT in the teachers' struggles and the negotiations that took place with the Ministry of Education became more and more urgent during this month, while the school year started in September for some (especially in private schools) and remained unpredictable for others who are in state schools, where teachers protest. This discrepancy affecting the right to education of a large segment of the population is a sign of injustice that the various parties are forced to endure, given the non-resolution of the crisis. Thus, the protests continued during the first part of November¹⁰.



However, the signing of an agreement between the basic education union and the Ministry of Education resolved the interruption of classes. After months of stalemate, classes resumed on Wednesday, November 16. The crisis of substitute teachers was resolved on the basis of negotiations that lasted for months. These measures have fanned the wave of protests of the previous months, but at the same time reflect delays and dysfunctions that have caused

¹⁰ Le Monde. In Tunisia, the strike of contractual teachers shakes the elementary school, November 11, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/11/11/en-tunisie-la-greve-des-enseignants-contractuels-secoue-l-ecole-primaire_6149523_3212.html

a large number of students to lose months of classes and have subjected teachers to a number of repressive and violent practices. The failure to seriously and precipitately address the issue of the right to education draws attention to the structural problems that accompany this important sector for the development of this country and any country in the world. The scourge of school dropouts and inequalities in access to education or opportunities for continuing education should continue - beyond this movement - to be a real concern for the State.

12. The continuous movement of the relatives of the missing at sea

This movement that began following the sinking of a boat of migrants to demand the opening of an investigation into the sinking, the search for the victims and the protest of their burial in a cemetery reserved for unidentifiable people. Parents and relatives continued to protest and demand justice for their loved ones. By asking for information about what really happened at sea and about the random burial, they continue to try to find answers to their questions.¹¹



The tragedy that occurred at the end of September continued to fuel the protests in Zarzis, pointing to the state and the smugglers as responsible for the crisis. The demonstrators protested the problems of intercepting the bodies of migrants, the failure to complete the investigation and the non-management of suffering

¹¹ Info Migrants. Tunisia: Families of the disappeared of Zarzis search graves for their loved ones, November 8, 2022, <http://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/44574/tunisie--des-familles-des-disparus-de-zarzis-fouillent-des-tombes-a-la-recherche-de-leurs-proches>

and grief by the government, which has neglected this issue since its inception. With the slogan "Murderers of our children, thieves of our country" the state is designated as guilty and implementing a negligent power.

13. The State's response

Indeed, the response of the State has remained the same, regarding the social movements of November. The negligence, the delay in the reactions, and the confusion have distinguished these reactions, in front of social movements that try to make themselves heard more and more, using the media or approaching the capital.

The period of legislative elections and electoral campaigns have contributed to silence these movements in the eyes of the power. A state of moratorium has thus been established and has contributed to the reproduction of the political crisis, since the reactions of the state reinforce the lack of confidence in its apparatus and its representatives. Despite their importance, some issues have remained unresolved for months, while official declarations have done little to absorb the anger. This state of affairs is also related to the long-awaited draft of the finance law, which already announces political resistance and attempts to keep calm before its publication.

The denial of the crisis has also marked these reactions, whether it is about the crisis in education through the publication of small numbers of demonstrators and closed schools or other movements that have affected the ecology, the transport sector, shortages of medicines, etc. This denial is characteristic of governance in Tunisia since 2019 and its continuity indicates an implemented project that does not seem to back down in the face of any dissenting popular barrier. Denial is used as a mechanism that the regime uses to preserve itself and its image, while the population tries to be heard, without success.

To sum up, the State's responses are either negligent, or of the order of police and security repression through investigations, or technical. Unsatisfactory, these reactions create unmanageable anger that evolves among the vulnerable bangs of the population and that seems unpredictable, therefore capable of breaking out at any moment¹².


¹² Linhart, Daniele. "On Domination and its Denial." *Actuel Marx* 1 (2011): 90-103.

Irregular Migration in November 2022




Comparison In the same period during the years 2019–2020–2021 – 2022


The number of arrivals to Italy



Number of frustrating passes




Number of passersby suspended




2022			2021			2020			2019			the month
Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of passersby suspended	Number of frustrating passes	The number of arrivals to Italy	
1155	124	382	463	17	84	316	22	68	177	8	31	January
1036	95	308	1273	77	660	571	25	26	46	4	21	February
886	58	224	882	72	334	137	4	60	323	20	85	March
1515	87	345	409	42	307	99	6	37	166	11	116	Avril
2658	172	1024	2487	95	601	1243	60	494	249	19	94	water
2086	175	1714	2120	143	977	1611	119	825	254	23	249	june
3226	226	3530	2993	211	4044	2918	245	4145	608	44	262	July
5713	411	4284	5582	317	4035	1621	191	2306	515	28	489	August
3882	270	2958	3199	308	1796	2035	170	1951	500	39	864	september
5584	331	1999	2739	263	1504	1349	157	1300	750	47	381	octobre
2863	595											data
4034	174	744	1969	117	713	849	63	1298	501	22	90	november
34638	2718	16699	22147	1545	14342	11900	999	11212	3588	243	2592	The total

Distribution of arrivals to Italy by months during 2022




Distribution of frustrating passes by authorities during November 2022




*The presence of this sign does not mean that these authorities do not witness crossings, but the official data published in the notifications did not include frustrating crossings in these bodies.


Distribution of passers-by by nationalities During november2022



Distribution of frustrating passes during 2022



The tragedies of irregular migration on the Tunisian coasts during2022



The number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast during 2022

575

The number of dead and missing in the Central Mediterranean Basin during 2022

1340


November Report on Violence



The mapping of violence in the month of November 2022 is distinguished, as in previous months, by its dispersion in the different governorates and by the vulnerability of the people it affects. Taking place in public and private spaces, it affects people who are seriously affected physically.

Geospatial distribution

The governorate of Tunis has recorded 19.4% of cases of violence reported. Kairouan is in second place with a rate of 16.7%, followed by Gafsa and Sousse which have respectively recorded 11.1% of the total cases reported. Bizerte and La Manouba have respectively recorded 8.3%, while the governorates of Ariana, Zaghouan, Le Kef, Mahdia, Tataouine, Medenine, Kebili, Beja, Seliana, Gabes and Tozeur have recorded no cases of violence, unlike previous months. This is a change in the mapping of violence compared to previous months.



Gendered distribution


As for the victims of violence, 76.5% are men, 2.9% are women, 17.6% are a mixed group, and 3% died as a result of the violence suffered.

Regarding the actors of violence, 52.8% are men, 13.9% are women, 16.7% are mixed groups, and 16.7% are dead.



Spheres of violence


55.6% were acts of violence committed individually and 44.4% were committed collectively. This is a change from October 2022, when the majority of cases of violence were collective.



Typology of violence

As in previous months, criminal violence was the majority, accounting for 83.3% of reported cases. 11.1% of the cases were institutional, 2.8% were cases of violence in the public space and 2.8% were of economic nature.

Sector



Spaces of violence


The street remains the space where violence is most prevalent, accounting for 52.8%. In addition, 16.7% of the cases of violence were committed in the victims' homes. 11.1% were committed in economic institutions, 5.6% in schools, 5.6% in health facilities, 2.8% in administrative offices, 2.8% in prisons or detention centers, and 2.8% in the media. Public services were thus taken over by violence, which seems to be an indicator of the population's frustration with these services and the insecurity that prevails there.

Violence continues to follow an upward curve in terms of the number and severity of cases recorded. The street, which is greatly affected by this phenomenon, sees collective and individual aggressions, affecting people and material goods (cars, shops, etc.). The carrying of knives and their use to terrorize and assault victims is commonplace, in broad daylight. The repetition of these acts in the public space contributes to the creation of an urban culture of violence by young people,¹³ where violence becomes a so-called ordinary norm

¹³ Biaya, Tshikala K. "Youth and Street Culture in Urban Africa." *African Policy* 4 (2000): 12-31.

and is part of the daily life of passers-by and residents. The commonplace use of knives is becoming more and more noticeable. The news about the armed people who robbed an administrative headquarters in Nabeul were passed in a simplistic way, without strong reaction from the representatives of the political or administrative power.

Space



The recording and documentation of these acts by the spectators allows the media coverage and the expression of dismay among the population that shares other resources regarding other incidents, warning others of the insecurity that is growing in the country.

Nevertheless, unlike social movements, the security response is lacking. The intervention of the forces of law and order is late, after the act has been committed, preventing the victims from getting help before suffering the violence.

In the family sphere, several cases of violence have been reported: the strangulation of an infant by its mother following the impossibility for the mother to have an abortion according to the law which prohibits abortion after three months of pregnancy; a father who enters a school to physically assault his daughter in Gafsa; a matricide perpetrated by a person suffering from a mental illness in Tunis, etc. This violence indicates conflicts in the private family sphere that are rarely dealt with before the violent act, which increases the possibility

of slipping into hostile environments and acts that come close to or touch death¹⁴

The violence extends to the professional and work spheres. Thus, people have been attacked in their workplaces, as was the case of a nurse who was stabbed following a disagreement with a patient or that of a police officer in a hospital. The approach adopted in hospitals reinforces the insecurity that affects workers in the health sector in the face of patients' frustrations and the lack of understanding of the care environment. The lack of guaranteed security is the result of the lack of denunciation of violence and the non-integration of its prevention in the organization of work¹⁵.

In the education sector, there was a significant amount of violence, both in schools and universities. The violence also affected the protesting teachers, who were attacked by the police. This is an element that could reinforce the crisis in education and encourage possible aggressions resulting from the trivialization of the exercise of violence, since its institutions are easy to penetrate for parents who assault their children or teachers, for students who fight or for students assaulting others in schoolyards¹⁶.

This is a question of flaws in feminist responses and in the institutions defending the rights of women and girls. The fuzziness of the strategy adopted to combat such violence needs to be reconsidered. Campaigns such as "16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence" could benefit from including violence in the public and domestic space in their advocacy.

Indeed, the violence during this month was distinguished by its grandiosity and the impunity that accompanied it. Attempted murders, murders, numerous pedophilic rapes, kidnappings and ransom demands, robberies, and motorcycle hold-ups paint a picture of a state of insecurity that exists in the country, of the delay in the reactions of the police apparatus, and of the growing impunity that contributes to its reinforcement month after month.

¹⁴ Jetté, Mireille, Camil Bouchard, and Marie-Ève Clément. "Family violence in the lives of children." Clément, MÈ, Bouchard, C., Jetté, M. & Laferrière, S. Family violence in the lives of Quebec children (1999).

¹⁵ Jmal-Hammami, K., et al. "Workplace assaults in hospital settings: About 107 cases." Archives of Occupational and Environmental Diseases 67.4 (2006): 626-630.


¹⁶ Vila, Gilbert. "Violence and traumatic events in school settings." Stress and trauma 9.4 (2009): 228-230.

Suicidal behaviors

During this month, 11 suicides were recorded, compared to 10 in October 2022 and 28 in November 2021. The number reported is in line with the months of 2022, where the media coverage of suicides remains reduced, and this social fact continues to be accompanied by unspoken words and silences.


Geospatial distribution

The distribution of suicides follows the same curve as the previous months. Indeed, 3 suicides and attempted suicides were recorded in Bizerte, 2 in Kairouan, one in Sidi Bouzid, one in Tunis, one in Manouba, one in Ariana, one in Nabeul, and one in Monastir. The other governorates have not recorded any cases.




Gendered distribution

Among those who have committed or attempted to commit suicide, 90.9% are men, while 9.1% are women. This percentage could be related to demographic conditions and cultural difficulties in talking about female suicides.



Typology of suicides


Of all suicides recorded, 54.5% were suicides or attempted suicides by immolation, 36.4% were suicides or attempted suicides by jumping or rushing and 9.1% were suicidal behaviors by hanging. The return to the suicidal technique by immolation is observed compared to the past months and indicates a suicidal form of protest that has a particular symbolism in the history of post-revolutionary Tunisia.



Ages of the suicidal individuals

The majority of suicides during this month - seven people - were between 26 and 35 years of age and were adults, generally working or unemployed. Three

people, including one woman, between the ages of 16 and 25 have committed or attempted suicide. No suicides or attempted suicides were recorded for people under 15 or over 60 years of age.



The suicidal behaviors of young people, especially those in their thirties, are related to their socio-economic situation. A suicide attempt in Kairouan where a young person threatened to self-immolate in front of the delegation of his city if he was not allowed to meet with an official is an indicator of the state of despair that accompanies contact with the administrations. Suicide by self-immolation¹⁷ can - in the face of the frustration of young people and the closure of the doors of dialogue with officials - seem a solution for the suicidal to be listened to, through the dramatic nature of death¹⁸. The same incident took place by a young person of approximately the same age, in front of the National Guard station in Tebourba. A suicide was also reported in Monastir under the same circumstances, in front of the delegation.

The repetitive nature of these actions indicates a collective malaise that fuels them. Killing themselves in front of the power structures designated as responsible for the suffering experienced. The traumatic effects of the systemic violence undergone is then revealed to be able to kill individuals who try on the

¹⁷ Andreasen, Nancy C., and Russell Noyes. "Suicide attempted by self-immolation." *The American journal of psychiatry* (1975).

¹⁸ Crosby, Kevin, Joong-Oh Rhee, and Jimmie Holland. "Suicide by fire: a contemporary method of political protest." *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 23.1 (1977): 60-69.

one hand to attract the attention of the symbols of the power and the population and on the other hand to protest its actions.

The other suicides that occurred are indicators of dysfunction in the family and marital sphere, as conflicts with families or partners are described as the reasons for the suicides. The suicide of a young girl in Kairouan after being held captive by her partner for six days illustrates the ways in which violence against others can lead to self-inflicted violence¹⁹.

In the rural environment, there was one suicide by jumping into a well and one by hanging. The tools of suicide are then modulated by the social space in which people live and the means available to them. The socio-economic conditions and the non-observance of mental disorders remain the cause of suicides and indicate a growing but feasible need to implement mental health policies in the country.

¹⁹ Chérif, L., et al. "Psychopathology of suicide attempts in adolescents." *Child and Adolescent Neuropsychiatry* 60.6 (2012): 454-460.

Monitoring methodology for irregular migration:

The totality of the data contained in this report represents what the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to gather from various sources and by the available means. The digital data remains incomplete, not detailed and subject to updating and may not fully reflect reality, but in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian official side (number of passes - number Passengers - their distribution according to age groups and gender - defining where they come from - their social status - the number of missing persons...) These data may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and significant transformations.

- **Frustrating Passes:** Reliance is placed on the Ministry of Interior's communiqués and the statements of the spokesperson of the National Guard in the various media. Most of them do not contain detailed data (sex, age groups, the parties from which the immigrants come...)
- **Arrivals to European coasts:** Many structures that emit digital data about arrivals to Europe, such as UNHCR, IOM, European countries' ministries of the interior and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The figures provided remain approximate and require continuous updating according to figures from official and civil structures that may be issued in subsequent reports but provide a reading of the evolution and change in the dynamics of irregular migration.

Invisible numbers: It's the number of migrants arriving in Europe across different routes without passing through local authorities or international structures does not have any effect on the census, which is important and varies according to the tactics of migrant smuggling networks. It also includes departures from the Tunisian coasts, which succeed in evading strict security controls, or those that are prohibited from passing them without issuing or without being announced.