

OST
Tunisian Social Observatory
Departement

QUARTERLY
REPORT **JULY**
SEPTEMBER
2023

TRIMESTRIEL

**SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS**

680 protest movements
recorded during this quarter 2023

**IRREGULAR
MIGRANTION**

4814 Migrants in September 2023
9779 Migrants between July and September 2023

32 cases

Suicide and Suicide attempts
July - September 2023

Quarterly report

JULY - SEPTEMBER **2023**

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INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty and resentment continued to punctuate Tunisian politics. The ways in which the population expresses itself have taken the form of the political formulations of political and media decision-makers: uncertain and disorganized. This quarter saw the continuation of populism and its repercussions on the population. The inadequate or inappropriate responses of those in power are there to provoke a feeling of weariness or even powerlessness, but the concrete data of deprivation and precariousness are also there to breathe life into popular expressions. The loss of momentum predicted in recent reports is becoming increasingly evident, ahead of an ever-decreasing curve in the number of protests. However, the protests are becoming increasingly organized, and are touching more and more on concrete elements of daily life, such as work, education, and health. The year 2023 is indeed a difficult one for Tunisia, both economically and politically. A form of eco-anxiety is permeating the population's discourse and contributing to a malaise linked to insecurity. Daily life remains uncertain, and inflation continues to affect the population, particularly vulnerable groups. Signs of inequality are there to remind us of the defeats. However, the population's hopes remain high. Concrete and elaborate demands are

being made to the authorities, in an organized fashion. Without adequate answers, the population's rage will resurface, either through the struggle to organize protests, or by fleeing through clandestine immigration or interpersonal violence, or the stupefaction we are currently observing. As with political formulations, the current context brings with it a host of social reactions, including violence and suicide: violence directed at the Other and self-inflicted violence. On the rise since the beginning of the year, these expressions are sometimes a sign of despair and sometimes a way of protest. Violence proliferating in both intimate and public spaces indicates frustration, a desire to dominate others and blatant impunity. Unable to contain or transform their rage, victims multiply, bringing with them societal after-effects that will be difficult to manage. As for suicides, they indicate the suffering of the population, but also the failings of the Tunisian mental health system. This report by the FTDES Tunisian Social Observatory is intended for readers interested in the context, social movements, violence, and suicides in Tunisia. It provides an overview of the main events that took place during the quarter, while also offering avenues for analysis.

CONTEXTUELLE ANALYSIS

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Politically, Tunisia is going through a phase of populist structuring that has lasted since July 25, 2021¹. Phases of governmental instability and political procrastination have led to uncertain power in the face of oppositions with whom power is unequal. The ultra-presidentialist regime that has taken hold, as well as a *modus operandi* peculiar to this regime.

Nevertheless, the use of the word "crisis" can be considered old-fashioned. This word - widely appropriated by the local and foreign media - is used to describe the political situation in Tunisia and hinders sociological analysis beyond the assignment of this term and the use of "crisis" paradigms. Indeed,

by definition, a crisis is an unpredictable, spectacular and theatrical rupture. A political crisis is defined as an episode in which reference points are lost and a loss of meaning is observed. It is characterized by the blurring of organizational boundaries and the fluidity of the situation. At present, the political situation is characterized by the installation of one political system, erasing another. The ultra-presidential regime and the disappearance of the safeguards of democratic transition are a reaction to the consensus² policies that lasted a decade. Henceforth, the political situation may be mono-decisional, but it is stabilized. The crisis paradigm is now obsolete and useless³.

¹ Nafti, Hatem. "Kaïs Saïed's system: an authoritarian populist project supported by the elites", *Mediterranean Confluences*, vol. 125, no. 2, 2023, pp. 27-40.

² Mouffe, Chantal. *The illusion of consensus*. Albin Michel, 2016.

³ Ordioni, Natacha. "The concept of crisis: an obsolete explanatory paradigm? A gender-specific approach", *Journal of Gender Studies*, vol. 202, no. 1, 2023, pp. 1-15.

In this context, we observe the oppression of freedom of expression. According to Reporters Without Borders, Tunisia has fallen 49 places in the world rankings in the space of two years. It is now ranked 121 out of 180 countries. This is due to the harassment of journalists by the legal framework, the law against false information, the detention of the managing director of Mosaïque FM, the failure to receive journalists at Carthage Palace, the use of social networks for the purposes of defamation and discrediting the press, and so on¹. In addition, the President continued to repeatedly accuse civil society of serving foreign interests, and declared his intention to ban "foreign funding". These accusations have served to limit the credibility of citizen checks and balances in the eyes of the population², given the climate of mistrust that has prevailed for years in Tunisia.

As for the case of the incriminated political opponents, the repression continued during the third quarter. This was reflected in the opening of criminal investigations against at least 21 activists, lawyers and businessmen accused of "plotting against state security". Among

those still arbitrarily detained, seven people are still in prison. They are political leader Khayam Turki, dissident and political leader Abdelhamid Jlassi, opposition activists Issam Chebbi and Jaouhar Ben Mbarek, and lawyers and opposition activists Ghazi Chaouachi and Ridha Bel Hadj³. These detentions involved the children of political prisoners asking the International Criminal Court to investigate the Tunisian government⁴.

In terms of its relations with foreign countries, Tunisia is adopting a new sovereignist stance. The Tunisian government returned 60 million euros of European budgetary aid funds, which was supposed to be a first installment of the 127 million euros provided for in the protocol signed in July between the EU and Tunisia. This agreement, which was supposed to reinforce border outsourcing in Tunisia, was questioned by the President, and the payment was described as "an affront to our dignity."

¹ <https://rsf.org/fr/pays/tunisie>

² Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/campaigns/2023/07/human-rights-under-assault-two-years-after-president-saieds-power-grab/>

³ Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2023/10/tunisia-drop-trumped-up-charges-against-arbitrarily-detained-political-dissidents/>

⁴ Euronews. The children of political prisoners ask the ICC to investigate the Tunisian government, <https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/10/05/les-enfants-de-prisonniers-politiques-demandent-a-la-cpi-denqueter-sur-le-gouvernement-tun>

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS

The year 2023 was a difficult one for Tunisians on the economic front. The slowdown in consumption, inflation, restrictive currency policies and the reduction in IMF subsidies have created daily difficulties for Tunisians. At agrarian level, local agriculture is in difficulty due to water shortages and investment failures and delays. Inequalities are also proliferating, whether with regard to disparities between the country's coastal and inland areas, difficulties in accessing healthcare and education, etc. The brain drain and clandestine emigration are also factors that will have ambivalent effects on the Tunisian economy, both negative through the loss of human capital and positive due to the remittances of the diaspora. Similarly, the public sector remains weak and difficult for the State to reform, the tourism sector is still weak, and institutions are not yet fully stabilized. Unemployment continues to rise. In the 2nd quarter of 2023, it reached 15.6%, with more

women (21.1%) than men (13.2%). During the third quarter, inflation reached a rate of 9%, with an increase in August, followed by a decrease in September. In July, consumer prices rose by 0.7% on average, following a 0.4% increase the previous month. This increase was due to a 1.1% rise in food prices, and a 2.3% rise in restaurant and hotel services. Inflation was 9.1%, compared with 9.3% in June. In August, consumer prices rose by 0.6% on average. This increase was due to food prices, which rose by 2.3%, and tobacco prices, which rose by 3.2%. During the month, inflation rose to 9.3% after 5 consecutive months of falling rates. In September, consumer prices rose by a further 0.8%, due to a 4.3% increase in the price of education products and services, a 5.8% rise in tobacco prices and a 0.9% increase in food prices. Inflation reached 9% this month, following a one-off rise in August¹.

¹ INS. 2023 statistics, <https://www.ins.tn/>

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

680
protest movements
recorded during this quarter

During this quarter, we continued to observe a drop in the number of protests, in comparison with the second quarter when 894 protests took place, and the first quarter when 1,262 protests were recorded. The hypothesis of a downward curve is therefore confirmed, and with it that of the population's running out of steam and disinvestment in demonstrations as a means of popular response to political and socio-economic conditions.


It is complicated to analyze social movements in Tunisia exclusively through the 680 protest movements recorded during this quarter. While these movements are declining in number, they are becoming clearer in content. Disillusionment with the ideals of "justice" and "freedom", for example, is a noticeable feature, with the disappearance of these demands and the emergence of more concrete and urgent ones.

Regional disparity is also a noticeable feature of this quarters and previous protests. Regional inequalities have always been present. The public policies implemented in the country's various governorates have contributed to reinforcing these inequalities, and consequently popular reactions to them. Tunisia's new territorial division into five districts – to which numbers have been assigned – has brought a new complexity to the analysis of how the regions function.

1.1 Geospatial Distribution

A total of 680 protest movements were recorded, 234 in July, 223 in August and 223 in September. Of these, 200 were recorded in Gafsa, 60 in Sfax, 59 in Sidi Bouzid, and 51 in Kairouan. The governorates with the lowest rates were Mahdia, Zaghouan and Monastir.

This composition of geographical protest areas differs from that of previous quarters, although Gafsa has already begun to dominate June's renunciation of social movements in terms of numbers.



Demonstrations in Gafsa: what does it mean?

200 protests were recorded in Gafsa during the quarter. This significant number among the protests recorded is an indicator of the inequalities in this governorate. The voices of Gafsa's inhabitants remain audible and carry a long history of struggle.

Protests have been linked to and carried out in front of the headquarters of the Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa (CPG). Economic difficulties, and in particular the fall in annual phosphate production, have provoked a wave of protests. Some of these protests are linked to the non-payment of back-to-school bonuses and other bonuses linked to long-standing increases.

In July, protests were triggered by problems with water distribution that lasted for almost a month. Residents expressed their anger by demonstrating and burning tires in front of the Redeyef delegation headquarters. Depriving residents of their fundamental right of access to water means putting their health and lives at risk.

However, the anger is not just a response to deprivation. In this governorate, unemployment and poverty rates are among the highest in the country, reaching 30% in the mining basin regions. Among the unemployed, 52.91% have higher education qualifications. Inequality and deprivation are therefore factors of discontent in the Gafsa governorate. The mobilizations are a response to daily frustration. Gafsa has long been forgotten and marginalized by the authorities. In 2023, it continues to resist.


1.2 Gendered Distribution



11.76%



86.32%



1.91%



As in previous months, protests were not gender segregated. Thus, 86.32% of protests were led by women and men, 11.76% were led by men exclusively, and 1.91% were led by women exclusively. Despite this apparent shared presence, protests led by women were limited to denunciatory media appeals on radio and social networks, while those led exclusively by men included demonstrations by drivers, farmers, fishermen and shopkeepers in stereotypically male occupations.

1.3 Emergence et Nature des Mouvements Sociaux

As usual, the majority of movements are collective, and only a small proportion of protests are individual. Thus, 5.44% of movements recorded are individual, while 94.56% are collective. This relates to the very definition of social movements as imminently collective action. Individual initiatives are thus cries of anger that inspire collective movements¹. In the third quarter of 2023, individual protests included 25 media calls, 4 hunger strikes, two distress calls, and one suicide threat.

In the third quarter of 2023, individual protests included 25 media calls, 4 hunger strikes, two distress calls, and one suicidal threat. 56.18% of protests were organized in advance, while 43.82% were not organized in advance and were triggered instantly.

¹ Sandrine Rui, « Social movements », in Paugam Serge (dir.), Les 100 mots de la sociologie, Paris, University Press of France, coll. « Que Sais-Je ? », pp. 82-83.



The role of political organization


For months now, protest movements have been rather organized. The "anarchic" aspect is in the process of regressing to the profile of a more sustained organization of mobilizations. Protests are now planned, discussed and scheduled in advance. They are no longer limited to expressions of anger that spread emotionally between people sharing a common space and turn into a demonstration.

382 protests were organized. They mainly concerned workers demanding payment of their financial entitlements, improved working conditions, a solution to the situation of supply teachers, or protests against the lack of medical equipment and deteriorating working conditions. They often take the form of sit-ins and protest rallies. The 298 instantaneous protests concern demonstrations of revolt against administrative infractions and violations, water and electricity cuts, shortages of basic commodities, etc. They are carried out in the form of blockades of buildings, or in the form of protests against the lack of medical supplies and deteriorating working conditions. They take the form of road and business blockades, tire burnings and media appeals.


The urgency of the demands is obvious and explains the nature of the movements involved. It is not the sign of a lack of reflexivity or of popular powerlessness to organize politically. Rather, it is a sign of explicable anger and popular legitimacy.

1.4 Actors & Demands

The actors involved in protests in the third quarter of 2023 were diverse. In general, 35.88% of protests were carried out by residents, 32.25% by workers, 10.44% by teachers, 8.38% by activists, 2.06% by farmers, 1.91% by parents, and so on. Cab drivers, other employees and shopkeepers, and families took part in the mobilizations recorded.



The reasons behind these mobilizations are as diverse as the profiles of the social actors taking part. Many of them focused on working conditions, while others concerned the environment and access to public services. 112 protests – the majority in Gafsa – were motivated by the non-payment of workers' financial entitlements, 87 by water cuts, 47 by the situation of supply teachers, and so on.



WORK: THE VECTOR OF DEMANDS

We are currently witnessing the emergence of many forms of precariousness due to the difficulties encountered by Tunisians in benefiting from a certain degree of protection and justice in their work. It is in this context that the theme of work was omnipresent in the demands made by Tunisians during this quarter.

During this quarter, work became the vector around which protests revolved. In a deplorable economic context, access to income for a large proportion of Tunisians depends on salaried work. As a result, people affected by this economic situation are investing in the world of work as a means of getting by, and this aspect of their lives is in turn affected by the situation. The non-payment of financial entitlements, the regularization of the situation of substitute teachers, the working situation of farmers, and the difficulties of cab drivers are examples of these effects.

The aim of the protests was to regularize the situation and demand the fundamental rights guaranteed by the very nature of work. Thus, faced with current individual working conditions affected by increasing personal uncertainty in the face of a risk-based society and a lack of state protection, the social actors involved in the protests mobilized.


1.5 Forms & Spaces of Protest

To put forward these demands, the social actors of the movements took over protest spaces related to their mobilization. Thus, 26.91% were in workplaces, 16.62% in the media, 16.47% in public spaces, 11.62% on roads, 10.74% on CPG premises, 3.68% in administrative headquarters, 2.65% in front of government headquarters, 0.74% in front of ministry headquarters, etc.

32.5% of protests took the form of sit-ins, 29.71% protest rallies, 12.35% media calls, 7.5% distress calls, 6.62% congestion, 1.18% road blockades, etc.

The protest events that took place during this quarter are both a sign of distress and clear demands in an economic and social situation that is increasingly difficult for the population to manage. Their formulation is aimed at the State and its apparatuses, with clear demands that are faithful to the ideals pre-established in the social pact linking the governed and those who govern them. The drop in protest numbers is certainly a sign of exhaustion, but it is also a marker of injustice and signals the population's orientation towards other avenues of mobilization, which may include interpersonal violence, illegal immigration and suicidal acts.

Espace	Total
Work spaces	183
Medias	113
Public spaces	112
Roads	79
CPG	73
Administrative headquarters	25
Governorate headquarters	23
Ministry headquarters	18
Social media	14
Educational institutions	10
Hospitals	6
Public building	5
SONED	5
Prison	4
	2
Headquarters of the municipalities	2
Habib Bourguiba avenue	1
Sièges des municipalités	1
Judicial institutions	1
kasba Square	1
Public Services	1
Railways	1
Municipal Theater of Tunis	1
Total	680



- Manner
- Sit-in
- Protest rally
- Protest gatherings
- Appel médiatique
- Appel de détresse
- Congestion
- Road blocking
- Indignation
- Blocking activities
- statement
- Hunger-strike
- Burn tires
- Stoppage
- Prohibition of access to courses
- Social media
- Day of anger
- Detention of a person / means of transport
- Peaceful march
- Petition
- Threat of suicide

IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Septembre 2023

4814 migrants arrived on Italian coasts during the month of September 2023

September was marked by a series of significant figures. The dynamics of movement towards the north shore increased, both for those arriving and those who were prevented from reaching their destination.

The number of arrivals on Italian shores during September reached 4814 migrants (the highest figure in terms of arrivals since April 2011) bringing the total number of arrivals in Italy of Tunisian nationality since the start of 2023 to 14097 migrants.

Tunisian nationals ranked third among arrivals in Italy, with a rate of 11%, although this figure was slightly down compared with the same period last year.

This month saw a significant increase in the number of operations thwarted, with 479 land and sea crossings prevented,

representing an increase of 77.40% on the same period in 2022.

A total of 8781 migrants were prevented from reaching the Italian coast, representing an increase of 126.19%. These high figures reflect the security vigilance and logistical and technical resources allocated to the Tunisian Naval Guard, which demonstrates the strong pressure that European countries are exerting on Tunisia in terms of border control.

Among the data announced by the Ministry of the Interior, and which have not been observed in detail, it appears that since the beginning of 2023, 5,609 attempted crossings have been thwarted. The total number of people who have attempted to cross the Mediterranean has reached 72,516, and 1,290 bodies of irregular migrants have been found.

2.1 Comparison In the same period during the years 2020-2021-2022-2023

The month	2020				2021				2022				2023			
	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of frustrating passes	Number of passersby suspended	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of frustrating passes	Number of passersby suspended	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of frustrating passes	Number of passersby suspended	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of frustrating passes	Number of passersby suspended	The number of arrivals to Italy	Number of frustrating passes	Number of passersby suspended	
January	68	22	316	84	17	463	382	124	1155	341	85	2322				
February	26	25	571	660	17	1273	308	95	1036	770	177	5147				
March	60	4	137	334	72	882	224	58	886	774	241	7494				
April	37	6	99	307	42	409	315	87	1515	1047	170	4081				
May	494	60	1243	601	95	2487	1024	172	2658	497	180	4057				
June	825	119	1611	977	143	2120	1714	175	2086	770	123	3528				
July	4145	245	2918	4044	211	2993	3461	226	3226	1769	37	848				
August	2306	191	1621	4035	317	5582	4284	411	5713	3196	127	4427				
September	1951	170	2035	1796	308	3199	2958	270	3882	4814	479	8781				
Total	58261	842	11855	20290	1282	19408	14700	1618	22157	14097	1952	48349				
Total MI*													5609	72516		

* Les données ont été fournies dans les déclarations du ministère de l'intérieur et n'ont pas été détaillées.

2.2 Distribution of arrivals to Italy by months during September 2023

The month	Number of arrivals	Men	Women	Accompanied children	Unaccompanied and separated children
January	341	295	8	10	28
february	770	576	51	37	106
March	777	492	52	53	180
Avril	1027	734	62	70	181
May	497	390	25	27	55
June	770	366	52	51	91
July	1769	1160	121	140	342
August	3196	2190	232	282	492
September	4814	3088	412	382	932
Total	14097	9226	1090	1159	2622

2.3 Distribution of Passers-by by nationalities During September 2023

The month	Tunisian	Non-Tunisian
January	19.18%	80.82%
february	15.58%	84.41%
March	5.5%	94.5%
April	19.79%	80.2%
May	22.18%	77.82%
June	16.89%	83.11%
July	20.92%	79.07%
August	20.51%	79.48%
September	14.89%	85.10%
Total	17.27%	82.24%

2.4 Distribution of frustrating passes by authorities during Septembre 2023

Mois	Médenine	Gabès	Sfax	Mahdia	Monastir	Sousse	Nabeul	Tunis	Bizerte
September	*	0.20%	83.50%	15.24%	*	*	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%

* La présence de cette marque ne signifie pas que ces régions ne sont pas témoins de opérations, mais les données officielles publiées dans les notifications n'incluaient pas les opérations interceptées dans ces régions.

2.5 Distribution of frustrating passes during Septembre 2023

The month	Land	The Sea
January	11.76%	88.24%
february	21.46%	78.53%
March	13.64%	86.36%
April	11.18%	88.83%
May	37.73%	62.27%
June	11.72%	88.28%
July	40.55%	59.45%
August	8.66%	91.33%
September	13.98%	86.01%
Total	20.95%	79.04%

2.6 The tragedies of irregular migration on the Tunisian coasts during 2023

The month	The number of victims and missing
January	28
february	7
March	92
April	373
May	34
June	114
July	22
August	55
September	44
Données*	523
Total	1290

* Les données ont été fournies dans les déclarations du ministère de l'Intérieur et n'ont pas été détaillées.

The number of dead and missing on the Tunisian coast during 2023	The number of dead and missing in the Central Mediterranean Basin during 2023
958	1500

MONITORING METHODOLOGY

FOR IRREGULAR MIGRATION

The totality of the data contained in this report represents what the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has been able to gather from various sources and by the available means. The digital data remains incomplete, not detailed and subject to updating and may not fully reflect reality, but in the absence of detailed and updated information from the Tunisian official side (number of passes - number Passengers - their distribution according to age groups and gender - defining where they come from - their social status - the number of missing persons...) These data may contribute to a clearer understanding of migration dynamics and significant transformations.

FRUSTRATED PASSES

Reliance is placed on the Ministry of Interior's communiqués and the statements of the spokesperson of the National Guard in the various media. Most of them do not contain detailed data (sex, age groups, the parties from which the immigrants come...)

RRIVALS TO EUROPEAN COASTS


Many structures that emit digital data about arrivals to Europe, such as UNHCR, IOM, European countries' ministries of the interior and the European Coastal Control Agency.

The figures provided remain approximate and require continuous updating according to figures from official and civil structures that may be issued in subsequent reports but provide a reading of the evolution and change in the dynamics of irregular migration.

AINVISIBLE NUMBERS

It's the number of migrants arriving in Europe across different routes without passing through local authorities or international structures does not have any effect on the census, which is important and varies according to the tactics of migrant smuggling networks. It also includes departures from the Tunisian coasts, which succeed in evading strict security controls, or those that are prohibited from passing them without issuing or without being announced.

VIOLENCE



In addition, the reasons for violence can be political, given the lack of opportunities to shape debate and influence political change, or to promote measures to combat violence and support equality between citizens. The economic situation is also a factor in violence, as patterns of precariousness and impoverishment – which are more or less stable – greatly reduce victims' chances of escaping, and drive aggressors who are affected by unemployment and poverty to assert their masculinity and strength through acts of violence.


Revealing the facts of domestic violence is as complicated as ever. This complicates recording in the media and social networks, and modulates the sample presented. The acts of violence recorded are those that are spectacular and that are highlighted by victims or witnesses. Silent victims may not be heard in this context. What's more, the use of specialized listening and support services is not yet widespread, given the lack of resources and action. Testimonials from people who have survived or not survived the dynamics of violence are rare. That's why it's important to seek out these voices, in addition to the interest in news stories.

3-1 Geospatial Distribution


During the third quarter of 2023, violence continued to be – as it has been for the past year – scattered across the various governorates. It targets sections of the population distinguished by their vulnerability, namely women, children, and migrants.

The cartography of violence has changed since the last quarter. The governorates affected are not the same as in previous months.

Mostly concentrated in Tunis, Nabeul, Sousse and Kasserine, violence is on the increase in regions where inequality proliferates. This factor seems more influential than poverty and precariousness. What's more, in Gafsa – the governorate with the highest rate of social unrest – few acts of violence were recorded. Thus, collective mobilization seems to be an outlet for frustrations, reducing the impetus for violence among the population.



3-2 Gendered Distribution




Of the perpetrators, 70.49% are men, 14.75% are women and 14.75% are mixed groups. The male trend in violence has remained unchanged over the past week, despite a decline in the number of men perpetrating acts of violence. This could signify the generalization of violence in society and its non-exclusivity to the male gender.

In terms of the number of assailants, the proportion of women rose during the quarter to 21.31% of the total. 50.82% of victims of violence were men, and 2.87% were mixed groups. This points to the generalization of the phenomenon of violence, despite gender vulnerability remaining a determining factor.



3-3 Types of Violence

As in previous months, criminal violence was in the majority, accounting for 36.59% of reported cases. 29.27% of cases were terror-related, 10.98% involved violence in the public space, 8.54% protest-related, 7.32% economic, 6.1% institutional and 1.22% politically motivated.





3-4 Spaces of Violence

These events took place in a variety of settings, ranging from the public to the private. 36.59% were recorded in the street, 34.15% in the victims' homes, 6.1% in the media, 4.88% in virtual spaces, 4.88% in tourist and leisure areas, 4.88% in schools, 4.88% in economic institutions, and 2.44% in health-care facilities.



3-5 The Goals of Violence

In general, the aim of violence is to subjugate and dominate victims. Despite this general aim, the violence that took place during this quarter had a variety of purposes. 40.98% were aimed at aggression, 22.95% at theft, 11.48% at revenge, 9.84% at intimidation, 4.92% at sexual assault, 3.28% at devaluation, 1.64% at harassment, as well as sexual harassment and protest against a given situation.



3-6 Summary of the most significant violent events during the 3rd quarter of 2023

CATEGORY

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

EXAMPLES

Rape of a young girl
Sexual assault of women and girls

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Sequestration of a young girl by her parents and physical violence
Young man stabbed by his cousin.
Threats of revenge and publication of pornographic material

SCAM

Property rental scam
Sale of expired food products

URBAN VIOLENCE

Assault by a group of men in a working-class neighborhood
Vandalism of a house following a disagreement between people

VIOLENCE IN THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Knife attack on a student in the schoolyard
Harassment in a middle school

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING

Discovery of a smuggling ring
Discovery of a network of alcohol factories not complying with legal standards,

MIGRATION-RELATED VIOLENCE

Violence between Tunisians and sub-Saharan migrants
Young sub-Saharan man tried to infiltrate elderly woman's home.
Murder of a sub-Saharan migrant by three Tunisians

SUICIDE & SUICIDE ATTEMPTS

32 suicides and suicide attempts
were recorded during the third
quarter of 2023


By definition, suicidal behavior involves intentionally killing oneself, or attempting to do so. These behaviors are often linked to stress factors and complex health problems, leading to feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. They are also markers of a social and economic situation that reinforces psychic vulnerabilities, as well as of a mental health care system that does not respond, or responds poorly, to the specific needs of the population.

32 suicides and attempted suicides were recorded in the third quarter of 2023: 10 in July 17 in August and 5 in September. Compared with previous months, the figures are down on the second quarter, when 45 cases were recorded. This drop is to be expected, given the alarm caused by the latest figures. Nevertheless, the decrease is not enough.

Of the suicidal behaviors recorded, 62.5% resulted in death, while 37.5% were attempts that did not result in death. Death is becoming increasingly inevitable for suicidal people, indicating that the methods used to alleviate psychological suffering are fatal and deliberate.

4-1 Geo spatial Distribution

The mapping of suicidal behaviors remains faithful to the norm. Kairouan recorded 8 suicides, Bizerte 5, Nabeul 4, Kef 3, Jendouba 2, Kasserie 2, Sidi Bouzid 2, Tunis 2 and Ariana, Mahdia, Seliana and Sousse 1 respectively. The governorates with the highest numbers are the poorest and most marginalized. The governorate of Kairouan continued to record the highest numbers, a fact that should alarm authorities and healthcare providers alike.



4-2 Gendered Distribution




81,25%



18,75%

Men continue to form the majority group among suicide victims. They account for 81.25% of the total rate, while women make up 18.75%. This confirms the difficulties men have in verbalizing their suffering and seeking help before committing suicide.


4-3 Suicide Sites



Of the suicides, 8 were adults, 8 were young people, 6 were pupils, 5 were elderly people, 2 were employees, one was a doctor, one was a teacher, and one was a person wanted by the police. Student suicides are a sign of institutional failure and family and social pressure, as well as neglect of the issue of bullying in educational institutions. The suicides of doctors and teachers are indicative of the poor working conditions and stress affecting people working in these fields.

4-4 Biographical Categories of Suicide Victims

Of the suicides, 8 were adults, 8 were young people, 6 were pupils, 5 were elderly people, 2 were employees, one was a doctor, one was a teacher, and one was a person wanted by the police. Student suicides are a sign of institutional failure and family and social pressure, as well as neglect of the issue of bullying in educational institutions. The suicides of doctors and teachers are indicative of the poor working conditions and stress affecting people working in these fields.



4-5 Summary of motives for suicidal behaviors in the 3rd quarter 2023

MOTIVES

NEGLECT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

EXAMPLES

Suicide by hanging of an elderly man with psychiatric disorders in a stable.

Suicide of a drunk young man in front of a police station.

SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Body of adult male suicide victim discovered several days after the fact.

Discovery of the body of a young man who committed suicide by hanging several days later.

FAMILY CONFLICTS

Suicide of a young man following a family conflict.

BULLYING AND VIOLENCE IN THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT

Suicide of a young teenager following an attack by the mother of a classmate.

PROTESTS

Suicide by immolation in protest at poor social and economic conditions.

Elderly man commits suicide by immolation on public highway.

WORKING CONDITIONS

Suicide of a teacher because of a restrictive work schedule.

Suicide of a dentist because of working conditions.